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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to examine contemporary factors that prevent an orderly resolution to a 
sovereign debt crisis. It comprises of five chapters. The first chapter introduces the research 
and highlights its main contributions. The second chapter narrates the background and 
motivation for the study. The third chapter studies a related paper on holdouts in sovereign 
debt restructuring and finds that, under a discrete time version with two creditors, 
asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria exists. This result, overlooked by the original paper, 
implies immediate agreement as the time between successive periods tends to zero. The 
fourth chapter investigates the impact of heterogeneous beliefs on delays in sovereign debt 
restructuring and finds that parties inefficiently delay settlement when their combined beliefs 
of court-outcomes are sufficiently heterogeneous. The chapter also explores other model 
expositions and establishes delay conditions. The fifth chapter studies the implied duty on 
the debtor to act in good faith in sovereign debt restructuring and is divided into two parts. 
The first part theoretically examines the efficiency and distributional impacts from enforcing 
a good faith duty on the debtor when bargaining with heterogeneous creditors. Here, good 
faith is defined as the non-violation of the court interpretation of the pari passu clause. The 
second part identifies judicial attempts made to enforce the good faith debtor duty to 
negotiate and proposes a doctrinal threshold that restricts judicial intervention to situations 
in which there is clear evidence of a failure, on the part of the debtor, to negotiate in good 
faith.  
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Chapter 1  
1. Introduction 
 
“Negotiations take place in an ambiguous legal context. Several different jurisdictions, all 
with different perspectives, influence the process. Different legal orders often reach different 
conclusions for the same problem. It may not be clear which will prevail (and possibly none 
of them would prevail), and how the implicit bargaining among different countries’ 
judiciaries will be resolved.” 
        (Guzman and Stiglitz, 2016) 
 
As a public good, sovereign debt restructuring helps a country to share the risks in its income 
generation. In other words during booms, the country pays a risk premium on its debt but 
during recessions, the country receives a debt relief through a debt write-down (Varoufakis, 
2016).  However, extensive empirical research show that sovereign debt restructurings in 
recessions are normally associated with a general lack of coordination between creditors and 
debtors, often disorderly and costly to both parties. Sovereign debt crisis – a dramatic rise in 
sovereign spreads when creditors fear the inability of the sovereign to meet its debt 
obligation – leaves severe adverse effects on the economy. Not only does the sovereign 
suffer from discontinued access to international capital market (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), 
creditors hold unto plummeting assets (Ghosal and Thampanishvong, 2012), stock markets 
collapses as investor and business confidence shrinks (Ahn, 2012), further deepening the 
recession. Owing to the absence of an international insolvency procedure for implementing 
sovereign debt restructuring, debt workouts continue to be undertaken on a case-by-case 
basis. Moreover, proposals for creating a centralized dispute resolution mechanism for 
coordinating parties have not been successful (Buchheit et al., 2013). Debt restructuring 
inefficiencies caused by conflicting expectations of court enforcement outcomes under 
adversarial-type legal systems form the core of this thesis.  
Contrary to a defaulted corporate debtor who can file for bankruptcy and face judicial 
proceedings that become binding on all creditors, a sovereign debtor faces no such 
protections. The absence of an international bankruptcy court for enforcing debt repayment 
acts as a major weakness against the sovereign as creditors may easily obtain court 
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judgements in their favour, but at the same time it could act as a strength due to the limited 
available attachable assets outside the sovereign’s jurisdiction that can be used to enforce 
those judgments (Buchheit and Gulati, 2017, p. 224). However, such strategic balance in 
sovereign debt restructuring that drives the incentive to negotiate – that is, the sovereign’s 
unlimited liability and weak enforcement – has been upset by court decisions ensuing from 
NML v. Argentina1. The thesis aims to fill in the gap in the economic and legal literature of 
sovereign debt restructuring by examining current loopholes in the US legal infrastructure 
governing sovereign debt that gives rise to divergent expectations of court outcomes and 
consequently hinder any progress towards an orderly resolution to a debt crisis. 
The NML decision, in favour of the plaintiff creditors, granted an injunction preventing the 
sovereign debtor from servicing other external debt without satisfying holdout claims. The 
courts interpreted a contract clause, known as the pari passu clause2, as requiring equal 
ranking of all similarly situated external debt and recognised Argentina’s then-conduct3 as 
violating this promise. This creates a high enforcement environment paving the way for 
many more lawsuits to come as creditors become more optimistic about court outcomes 
while debtors embrace weak enforcement. This reinforces the study of conflicting prospects 
and its effects on debt restructuring.  
Although White Hawthorne v. Argentina4 provides some clarification on the combination of 
conduct that constitutes a breach of the pari passu clause, finding that Argentina’s new (good 
faith) conduct was no longer in violation of the clause, legal scholars agree that the NML 
decision has set a precedent for future disputes, increasing the prospects of holdouts 
obtaining preferential settlement through seeking NML-style pari passu injunctions and thus 
causing more disruptions to the market-driven process for restructuring sovereign debt. 
(Buchheit and Gulati, 2017, p. 229).  
There is very limited research in the role courts play towards shaping bargaining outcomes 
of sovereign debt restructuring. Barely is there any theoretical work modelling court 
                                                
1 See NML Capital, Ltd v Argentina, No 08 Civ 6978 (TPG) (SDNY 23 Feb 2012); NML Capital, Ltd v 
Argentina, 99 F3d 246, 264 (2d Cir 2012); NML Capital, Ltd v Argentina, No 08 Civ 6978 (TPG), 2012 US 
Dist LEXIS; 167272 SDNY 21 Nov 2012); NML Capital, Ltd v Argentina, 727 F3d 230 (2d Cir 2013), cert 
denied 134 SCt 2819 (16 June 2014). 
2 The pari passu clause is a boilerplate clause that promises to maintain the equal ranking of external private 
debt. 
3 In the Second Circuit’s 2013 Decision (727 F3d at 247), it states “As we have held, by defaulting on the 
[plaintiffs’] Bonds, enacting legislation specifically forbidding future payment on them, and continuing to 
pay interest on subsequently issued debt, Argentina breached its promise of equal treatment”. 
4  See White Hawthorne, LLC, et al v The Republic of Argentina (16-cv-1042 (TPG), Opinion dated 22 
December 2016). 
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decisions in influencing settlement outcomes, neither is there any bargaining framework that 
considers parties differing expectations of court decisions in sovereign debt disputes and 
implications that such has on delays in restructuring. Furthermore, there is very little 
discussion around the legal and economic significance of court enforcement of good faith 
duties in sovereign debt restructuring. The aim of this dissertation is to fill these gaps.     
1.1. Contribution to the literature 
The resolution of sovereign debt crisis continues to remain a difficult challenge, with the 
duration of restructuring taking on average more than six years to complete (Benjamin and 
Wright, 2016).5 The economic literature has often overlooked the impediments of the legal 
system governing sovereign debt due to the notion of unenforceability and general immunity 
from legal action. As enforcement powers of foreign courts remain limited, the standard 
view of academics place greater weight on alternative default penalties – such as reputation 
theories (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), direct trade sanctions (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a), 
reputation spill-overs on other sectors of the economy (Cole and Kehoe, 1998) – to explain 
debt repayment.  
However, the empirical case for the pure reputation principle remains weak (Trebesch, 2011). 
For example, Eichengreen (1987) and Lindert and Morton (1989) establish that default 
history has had little bearing on a sovereign’s future borrowing prospects. More often than 
not, literature has arrived at similarly conclusions (Trebesch, 2011). An interesting point 
stated in (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a, p. 158) is that “primary motivation for repayment is the 
threat of direct sanctions that lenders can impose by going to creditor country courts … Such 
sanctions can cost defaulting debtor countries their ability to transact freely in the financial 
and goods markets. For example, if a country repudiates its foreign loans, it will be forced 
to conduct its trade in roundabout ways to avoid seizure.” This leads to the more pertinent 
role legal enforcement plays in sovereign debt markets. 
Schumacher et al. (2015) show that there is an increasing share of sovereign defaults subject 
to lawsuits in national courts in the US and the UK, finding that both the absolute number 
and likelihood of creditor litigation has strongly increased from 1976-2010. Schumacher et 
al. (2018) also find that investor lawsuits significantly decrease the likelihood of market 
access and significantly increase the duration of restructuring negotiations. There is so far 
no theoretical literature that models the enforcement of government debt in foreign courts, 
                                                
5 And even when they do not take too long, they may not achieve their initial restructuring objectives. Greek 
debt restructuring in 2012 provides an example. For more details, see (Varoufakis, 2016). 
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where third party claims may be attached, and that shows the resulting efficiency 
implications of this type-enforcement on bargaining negotiations.  
Thus, the thesis contributes to the literature in two main ways. Firstly, it provides a 
theoretical framework for modelling different expectations of an adversarial litigation 
outcome and establishing the effects on delays in restructuring – this would be the first 
attempt in the sovereign debt literature. This is undertaken in Chapter 4 where it is found 
that adversarial-type legal systems give rise to heterogeneous beliefs about court outcomes 
and causes delays in bargaining. Secondly, it reviews the court decision in White Hawthorne 
v. Argentina regarding its good faith assessment of Argentina’s conduct, and subsequently 
builds on a theoretical framework that imposes good faith conduct (i.e. non-voilation of pari 
passu clause) on the debtor’s bargaining behaviour with different creditors. Afterwards, it 
examines the possibility of a doctrinal threshold that restricts judicial intervention to 
situations in which there is clear evidence of a failure of good faith duty to negotiate by the 
debtor. These are undertaken in Chapter 5 and thus revives a discussion of good faith duties 
in the determination of a contractual dispute in sovereign debt. Chapter 3 provides a short 
note on a published theoretical piece by Pitchford and Wright (2012) and establishes an 
immediate settlement result in a simplified model contrary to the paper’s findings. Chapter 
2 provides the background and motivation of the thesis, where the issues of weak 
enforcement, absence of a bankruptcy procedure, the rising recourse to legal tools for 
enforcement and a literature review around these issues are discussed.     
1.2. Summary of chapters 
The dissertation consists of four self-contained chapters, which are structured along the 
central theme of the dissertation. Chapter 2 presents the background and motivation for the 
thesis, as well as containing the literature review. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 examine theories 
of delay in sovereign debt restructuring resulting from creditor coordination problems and 
divergent expectations respectively. Chapter 5 explores the effects of an obligatory 
commitment to good faith conduct and provides the case for judicial deference in sovereign 
debt disputes. 
1.2.1. Chapter 2: Background and Motivation 
Since the late 1970s, many governments issuing foreign debt have been subject to restrictive 
sovereign immunity laws that make it possible for creditors to sue them upon default 
(Weidemaier, 2014). However, it remains difficult to enforce court judgements due to the 
few attachable assets located in foreign jurisdictions. This chapter begins by discussing the 
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economic literature on sovereign debt enforcement. It then draws on more recent court cases 
that suggest sovereign debt may be enforced through direct legal sanctions that block access 
to international capital markets. It then reviews other historic attempts by holdouts who try 
to utilize other legal means for enforcing debt, and highlights successes and failures. 
Subsequently it argues that contract terms do matter, stressing the available creditor remedies 
for enforcement and the collapse of sovereign defences. This will later lead to the key 
motivation for undertaken this thesis, that is, that the presence of weak enforcement, 
unlimited debtor liability and current legal systems (being adversarial) provides occasion for 
conflicting expectations of judicial outcomes and drives delays in restructuring. The chapter 
then turns to both the theoretical and empirical literature on delay and discusses the literature 
on litigation optimism.    
1.2.2. Chapter 3: Evaluating Pitchford and Wright (2012) Holdout 
paper 
Pitchford and Wright (2012) present a continuous-time dynamic model of sovereign debt 
restructuring with delay where creditors use mixed strategies to govern their timing decisions 
to enter, or not to enter, into negotiations with the sovereign. In a model where only one 
creditor can bargain with the debtor at a time, they state that a pure strategy solution involves 
players coordinating on entry times. Chapter 3 presents the discrete time version of their 
paper with two creditors and shows that the asymmetric pure strategy equilibria implies 
immediate agreement as the time difference between successive periods converges to zero. 
This result renders their claim of coordination on entry times irrelevant.   
1.2.3. Chapter 4: Heterogeneous beliefs in Sovereign debt 
restructuring 
This chapter investigates the impact of heterogeneous beliefs on delays in sovereign debt 
restructuring negotiations. It comprises of four sections: Firstly, it presents selected case 
studies demonstrating heterogeneous beliefs of court outcomes. Secondly, it introduces a 
sequential bargaining model of finite time horizon where each party holds individual beliefs 
of expected outcomes and shows that parties inefficiently delay settlement when their 
combined beliefs are sufficiently heterogeneous. It calibrates the model to quantify welfare 
losses, provides policy implications and concludes that non-adversarial legal systems are 
required for more efficient restructuring negotiations. Thirdly, the chapter examines other 
model expositions with evolving beliefs for a shorter time horizon and establishes similar 
results. Fourthly, it then considers the Yildiz (2003) model with heterogeneous beliefs about 
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the recognition process. Yildiz found that if the bargaining game is played for a sufficiently 
long time, players settle immediately. Here I characterize the conditions for delay under 
common and different discount factors, and with evolving beliefs. 
1.2.4. Chapter 5: The Enforcement of a Duty to Negotiate in 
Sovereign Debt Litigation, with Dania Thomas 
Trebesch (2011) found empirical evidence suggesting that “Good faith crisis resolution may 
help to significantly reduce the collateral damage of default”. In other words, when 
governments are less confrontational or coercive during debt negotiations, the private sector 
may find it less difficult to borrow internationally. There is a general consensus that good 
faith conduct amongst bargaining parties has the potential to smoothen – and facilitate 
sustainable – debt workouts (Goldmann, 2016). A New York court decision in White 
Hawthorne v. Argentina (“Hawthorne”) revives the discussion of good faith duties in the 
determination of a contractual dispute. This chapter is divided into two parts.   
The first part builds on the theoretical framework presented in Ghosal and Miller (2016) 
(where debtor bargains with heterogeneous creditors) and imposes an obligatory 
commitment to a good faith debtor conduct. Here, fulfilment of the good faith duty is defined 
according to the non-violation of the pari-passu clause, as interpreted by Judge Griesa in 
Hawthorne. We support our definition of good faith by Professor Summer’s excluder 
analysis which states good faith is not acting in bad faith. Unlike Ghosal and Miller that 
found bargaining delays under a Lock law, we find that delays are eliminated under the good 
faith obligation with the impatient creditor and debtor being better off while the patient 
creditor, who is sufficiently heterogeneous from the impatient type, is worse off.  
Having shown the welfare-enhancing benefits of good faith, we are led to the second part of 
the chapter where we propose a template for judicial deference conditional on debtor 
satisfying a good faith duty to negotiate. Such opportunity allows the good faith market 
norms evolved to restrain the consequences of opportunistic behaviour and thereby facilitate 
successful debt workouts. In addition, our proposal is further justified by the high-
enforcement environment created by the court injunction that ensued NML v. Argentina. 
Thus we clarify the nature of a good faith determination in a contract law dispute involving 
sophisticated commercial parties and assess the case for the satisfaction of a threshold 
determination of the good faith duty before the ratable payment interpretation is triggered. 
In the presence of a clear evidence showing the debtor’s failure to negotiate in good faith, 
ratable payment interpretation and the injunction may then be applied.   
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Chapter 2  
2. Background and Motivation 
2.1. Overview of sovereign debt enforcement  
 
The fundamental issue with sovereign debt in comparison to corporate debt has been the 
general lack of contractual enforcement mechanisms due to the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. The legal doctrine meant that sovereigns could not be bound by the contracts they 
sign and thus rendered sovereign debt repayment difficult to enforce. Under the doctrine, the 
sovereign could protect itself from suit and its assets from attachment within its own (and 
other countries) jurisdiction. However, following the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act FSIA (1976) in the US and the State Immunity Act SIA (1978) in the UK, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity has been weakened to allow lawsuits against sovereigns 
relating to commercial transactions (Weidemaier, 2014). As the issuance of sovereign debt 
is recognised as a commercial activity, creditors could sue a sovereign upon default. 6  
However, a winning lawsuit is of little significance if accompanied by unsuccessful 
attachments on debtor’s assets. For instance, Swiss company Noga faced several failed 
attempts in seizing Russia’s assets (Pitchford and Wright, 2012). Consequently, this raises 
the central question of why sovereigns ever repay their seemingly unenforceable debt. The 
traditional economic literature suggests that maintaining capital markets access, avoiding 
direct sanctions and political costs are some of the reasons why sovereigns repay, thereby 
treating the law of contracts with periphery interest.7 But in reality defaults do occur and thus 
these theories are insufficient to explain sovereign debt repayment.   
Recent court cases suggest enhanced sovereign debt enforcement through direct actions of 
creditors preventing the sovereign from normal credit market access. This type of sanction 
stems from the fervent efforts of creditors using foreign courts to limit the debtor’s access to 
                                                
6 Sovereign bonds governed under domestic law faces less litigation threat compared to bonds governed under 
foreign law as governments could change domestic law when confronted with a sovereign debt restructuring. 
More details provided below. 
7 See more details on traditional theories of sovereign debt in (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2007, Chapter 
2) 
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capital markets. For example, following the implementation of the Brady Plan8 in Peru, 
Elliot Associates – a hedge fund who refrained from participating in the deal after purchasing 
Peru’s distressed debt at a large discount – obtained a summary judgment against Peru in 
New York and was granted an injunction relief by a Belgian court to stop debt repayments 
on Peru’s Brady bonds. The ruling brought Peru to the brink of default and as a result it 
quickly reached a settlement.9 Furthermore, in 2010, NML Capital, a subsidiary to Elliot 
Associates, obtained an injunction preventing Argentina from servicing its debt payments 
on its 2005 restructured bonds unless it made ratable payments to NML (Miller and Thomas, 
2007).  Prior to the modern era, market participants did not believe that such legal tactics 
played any role in incentivizing sovereign debt repayments (Buchheit and Pam, 2004). 
However, given more recent enforcement orders, it is clear that such legal techniques could 
work towards discouraging default, as well as placing creditors at a higher bargaining stance 
during restructuring negotiations. Hence, court outcomes play a much larger role in recent 
times in shaping default incentives and bargaining positions.   
2.1.1. Economic Literature on Sovereign Debt Enforcement 
How is debt enforceable? Why do creditors lend to sovereigns even in the presence of weak 
contractual enforcement? What can a creditor do its capacity to enforce debt repayments and 
what are the other mechanisms used to enforce debt? In this section, we examine these 
questions in turn and identify majorly discussed drivers of sovereign debt enforcement which 
rely on the ability of creditors to impose default costs on debtors, such as trade sanctions, 
exclusion from credit markets and litigation. We later conclude that changes in the law in 
the last 30-40 years as well as the development of new legal strategies have significantly 
enhanced creditor enforcement actions against defaulted sovereigns. 
Extensive historic economic literature on sovereign debt advocates the use of non-legal 
enforcement mechanisms to justify sovereign debt repayment. There is a general consensus 
that, unlike the corporate world, sovereign debt contracts cannot be enforced due to the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, leaving creditors with few legal tools to prevent strategic 
default. Thus academic literature examines why sovereigns repay in the first place with little 
or no legal enforcement. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) provide one of the earliest explanations 
                                                
8 “The term “Brady Plan” derives from a March 1989 speech by Nicholas Brady, then Secretary of the United 
States Treasury, urging commercial lenders to forgive some of the debt that they were owed by less 
developed countries, restructure what remained, and continue to grant those countries additional loans.” For 
more details, see Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion and The Republic of Peru, 194 F.3d (2d Cir. 
1999). 
9 Although it was largely speculated that Fujimori, Peru’s then president, was unwilling to risk the political 
costs of a default on the Brady bonds (Gulati and Scott, 2013, pp. 15-16). 
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for the existence of sovereign debt based on a debtor’s incentive to sustain credit market 
access. If borrowing is the only way to insure against output shocks, the threat of permanent 
exclusion following a default induces repayment. The traditional literature assumes that the 
marginal return on capital must be above the interest rate otherwise default results. Likewise, 
Kocherlakota (1996) proposed a model supporting repayment through the aforementioned 
retaliatory mechanism. He showed that out-of-equilibrium threats to retaliate by stopping 
future capital market access could support sovereign borrowing and lending and he showed 
the threats were credible in being subgame perfect (Pitchford and Wright, 2013).  Though 
these papers were very influential, they were heavily criticized as both the creditor and 
debtor could potentially be better off with renegotiated contracts consisting new lending 
(Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer, 2007). Moreover, in response to Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), 
Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) argue that the sovereign may purchase an insurance contract 
delivering payments in low output states and thus permanent exclusion as a reason for 
repayment becomes redundant.10 Numerous academics within the discipline claim that Eaton 
and Gersovitz (1981) reputation theory remains unconvincing. In particular, (Lindert and 
Morton, 1989, p. 3) concludes that creditors do not punish debtors with a prior default history 
and pay little attention to the past repayment record of sovereign debtors. Their findings 
weaken the belief that a default penalty ensures repayment.    
Several theories between 1980’s and the early 1990’s asserted the use of direct sanctions to 
stimulate repayment. Such punishments involve denial of trade credit or seizure of country’s 
trade outside its national boarders. Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) insisted on the use of contracts 
contingent on such sanctions for non-repayment. Empirical evidence of enforcement through 
trade sanctions is ambiguous11 and, as suggested by Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2007), 
such contracts may be sub-optimal when sanctions harm both parties. In challenging Bulow 
and Rogoff (1989b), Kletzer and Wright (2000) consider the case of many lenders, where a 
new lender can violate the sanction agreement. With the original lending relationship 
restored when sovereign defaults on new lender that violated the sanction agreement, no 
potential creditor will provide new lending and thus sovereign debt is sustained at first lender.  
                                                
10 However, in responding to Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) critique, a number of authors suggested insurance 
companies may be unable to commit to future payments to defaulted sovereigns as their repayments could 
be attached by past lenders.   
11 To name a few, Borensztein and Panizza (2010) show that defaulted sovereigns experience a decline in 
foreign trade. However, Martinez and Sandleris (2011) show that trade between non-creditor nations were 
hit significantly and thus unexplained by trade sanctions.    
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Wright (2002) shows that sovereign lending can exist through syndicated lending, where 
lenders can collectively punish default 12  and those who deviate from the cooperative 
arrangement are excluded from group. Wright (2002) provides some evidence suggesting 
collusive punishment to creditors who deviate from debtor’s sanction. The paper shows that 
institutions that lent to Spain in the 1860’s, in violation of a market –wide embargo, found 
their financial transactions disrupted by creditors who respected the embargo. Furthermore 
on credit market punishments, Amador (2003) shows that sovereign debt can be sustained 
through political incentives i.e. governments desire to maintain access to the capital markets 
in the event it becomes re-elected. Other research stresses on the boarder implications on the 
debtor’s reputation following a default. Cole and Kehoe (1998) argue that if borrower is 
found untrustworthy in one relationship (with lenders), he would be assumed untrustworthy 
in other relationships such as in matters involving foreign direct investment or in 
international political cooperation. Thus, sovereign debt is sustained through maintaining 
other relationships.13  In addition, sovereigns may wish to repay their debts to avoid adverse 
knock-on effects on citizens, for instance, a domestic banking crisis (Pitchford and Wright, 
2013). Moreover, Sandleris (2008) show that, in a model where government has true 
information about the productivity level of the country, sovereign may repay debts in order 
to signal high productiveness to creditors to ensure domestic firms maintain access to capital 
markets. 
In all the above models discussed, default does not occur in equilibrium. This is a reflection 
of the assumption that contracts are written under the conditions of perfect information such 
that sovereign’s payoffs under default states are guaranteed to be less than payoffs in normal 
states. Default events could occur in equilibrium if there is limited contracting flexibility 
such as cashflows varying across different states or incomplete information in sovereign’s 
type (see (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006), (Tomz and Wright, 2007), (Arellano, 2008)). Cole 
et al. (1995) study a model in which the gains from access to the capital markets change over 
time with the country’s demand for borrowing which is unknown to creditors. Their model 
produces defaults along on the equilibrium path of play. Eaton (1996) presents a model of 
incomplete information about the sovereign’s type, where bad types optimally default, good 
types try to repay and lenders attempt to separate out the types by observing the sovereign’s 
                                                
12 Collusive punishment to sovereign is not necessary permanent exclusion by group but high interest premiums 
such that sovereign is far worse defaulting. 
13 Cole and Kehoe (1998) first show that the loss of reputation from default (and the resulting lack of access to 
future credit) is enough to support repayment, provided there is no ability to save abroad. The Bulow-Rogoff 
findings of no sovereign lending results when debtor can save abroad and has only one repeated relationship 
with lenders where the loss of reputation is limited to creditors only. 
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default history. In a model where a default increases the probability that sovereign is a bad 
type, they show that bad-type debtors repay in equilibrium in order to maintain a reputation 
for repayments and thus avoid exclusion from credit markets.    
These traditional economic literatures do not account for the changing climate of 
enforcement strategies creditors may possess that help sustain the market for sovereign 
lending.  Such tactics employed by litigant creditors could block a sovereign from 
international capital market access. We thus turn to the significance of landmark court 
decisions made in sovereign debt disputes and the implications they leave on holdout 
bargaining leverage during restructuring negotiations. 
 
2.2. Legal matters in sovereign default and 
restructuring  
 
As posed by Weidemaier and Gulati (2014b), if contract law really does not matter, how 
does one explain the fact that sovereign loans involve detailed contracts, expensive lawyers, 
and frequent litigation? Since the 1980’s, there have been a large number of creditor suits, 
including several cases in which holdouts have in fact been able to secure better terms than 
average creditors. A famous early case is CIBC Bank and Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco 
Central do Brazil (1995).14 
The Dart family had purchased up to $1.4 billion of Brazilian Multiyear Deposit facility 
Agreement (MYDFA), a 1988 debt restructuring agreement between Brazil and creditor 
banks for its previous outstanding debt. Brazil ceased servicing MYDFA debt in 1989 and 
eventually initiated negotiations leading to a 1994 restructuring under the Brady Plan that 
was accepted by all its creditors except the Darts. Brazil restructured all debt except for $1.6 
Billion, preventing the Darts from becoming the majority debt holder with the right to 
accelerate outstanding principal and interest payments. The Darts, through CIBC as the 
holder of record of the debt, sued the Central bank of Brazil in New York, claiming (1) the 
past due interest under the MYDFA and (2) the right to accelerate the principal and accrued 
interest payments. The court later sided with the Darts on the first claim, although it declined 
to allow acceleration of debt. In 1996, Brazil settled, paying the Darts $52.3 million in 
                                                
14 See CIBC Bank & Trust Co. v. Banco Cent. do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
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Eligible Interest Bonds covering past due interest until the settlement date of the Brady deal 
April 1994 and $25million cash payment covering interest due on October 1994.15 Since the 
litigation-triggered settlement signalled Brazil was going to continue servicing the remaining 
MYDFA debt, Darts later sold their MYDFA holding for $1.28 billion in Eurobonds. This 
meant that Darts came out much better than creditors that had accepted the Brady exchange 
(Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer, 2007). 
In another case, Elliot Associates, LP v. Republic of Panama (1997)16, Elliot obtained 
judgements against Panama and subsequently settled for its full claim. Elliot extraction of 
full repayment was due to the attachment order it has secured against a U.S. based asset of a 
state-owned telecommunications company it was yet to privatize and a large new bond issue 
in New York. The settlement amount of over $57 million was less than the value of the 
privatization deal and the proceeds from the bond issue (Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer, 
2007). In this case, the gains from settling holdouts outweighed the cost of doing so.  
The prominent 1999 case of Elliot Associates v Banco de la Nacion and The Republic of 
Peru17 represents a stark example of enforcing debt through interference with future debt 
repayments. Elliot Associates purchased Peru’s non-performing debt at a large discount 
before Peru finalised its Brady deal in November 1996. Elliot sought an ex parte order of 
prejudgement attachment on Brady bonds that could be suitable for attachment, and obtained 
a $57 million judgement against Peru in New York. Subsequently, they were granted an 
enforcement order by a Brussels appeals court, on an ex parte basis, to prevent Peru from 
making payments on its Brady bonds. The Enforcement order enjoined Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company, the then operator of the Euroclear, from processing payments in respect of 
Peru’s Brady bonds.  The order was granted on the basis that Peru violated a pari passu 
covenant requiring all creditors be paid pro rata in accordance with their claims. Faced with 
the prospect of defaulting on all its Brady bonds, Peru made an out-of-court settlement of 
$56.3 million to Elliot on bonds purchased for only $11million with principal $21 million, 
satisfying almost all claims Elliot sought after. 
The Elliot-Peru case seemed to have revealed a powerful mechanism for enforcing claims 
of holdout creditors through seeking court orders to interfere with payments to creditors who 
                                                
15 See (Bloomberg Business News, 1996) 
16 See Elliott Associates, LP v. Republic of Panama, 975 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
17 See Elliott Associates, LP v. Republic of Peru, 12 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
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may have agreed to a debt restructuring. There have been several cases where holdouts 
attempted to use Elliot’s legal strategy, namely the ratable payment interpretation of the pari 
passu clause, as a creditor remedy. In the case Red Mountain Finance v Democratic Republic 
of Congo (2001)18, Red Mountain sought a US court order requesting the interpretation of 
ratable payment be applied to its credit agreement with Congo. Though this was rejected by 
the court, an order was issued similar to this effect, namely enjoining the Congo from 
satisfying external debt repayments without making proportionate payments to Red 
Mountain (Buchheit and Pam, 2004). The Congo later settled the case at about 37 percent of 
the value of the creditor’s claim, making the Congo able to satisfy an IMF debt repayment 
and resume borrowing from official lenders (Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer, 2007). In 
another case, LNC Investments v Republic of Nicaragua (2003)19, LNC sought an injunction 
preventing Euroclear from processing Nicaragua payments on other bonds on the basis of a 
breach on a pari passu covenant in Nicaragua’s loan agreement. 20  Court granted the 
injunction and awarded LNC a final judgement over $86 million but later reversed its 
decision on appeal.21 
A comparatively recent22 decade-long legal dispute called the ‘sovereign debt trial of the 
century’ NML Capital v. Argentina (2001)23 represents a striking example of leverage in 
holdout strategies by distressed securities funds. Argentina, forced to default on $82bn worth 
of foreign bonds December 2001, restructured 93% of its debt by 2010. Exchange 
bondholders accepted a haircut of roughly 30 cents to the dollar. NML Capital (an affiliate 
of Elliot Associates) abstained from taking part in Argentina’s debt restructuring and 
pressured for full repayment via litigation. The plaintiff obtained money judgements against 
Argentina but so far failed to enforce those judgments on Argentine assets. In November 
2012, NML argued that Argentina violated its pari passu covenant in its bonds by paying 
restructured-bond holders without paying holdouts. The New York district court judge 
presiding over the case ruled in favour of NML, prohibiting the payment of interest to the 
                                                
18 See Red Mountain Fin., Inc. v. Democratic Republic of Congo, No. CV 00-0164 R (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2001) 
19 See LNC Investments v Republic of Nicaragua, Commercial Court of Brussels, Sept. 11, 2003, General 
Docket No. 240/RK/03, at 16–17, rev’d, Court of Appeal Brussels, 9th Chamber Mar. 19, 2004, General 
Docket No. 2003/KR/334. 
20 See Public Hearing of Summary Proceedings of Thursday September 11, 2003, Republic of Nicaragua v. 
LNC Investments & Euroclear Bank S.A. (unofficial translation on file with authors). 
21 However, there were unsuccessful attempts attaching the injunction to any of Nicaragua’s assets. See LNC 
Investments LLC, f/k/a Investments, Inc. ,Appellant v. Republic of Nicaragua. No. 03-1224.  
22 A relatively few number of Argentina’s creditors are still holding out even at the time of writing. 
23 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246-265 (2d Cir. 2012) 
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bondholders of restructured debt before full repayment of holdout bondholders.  The 
injunction stated that whenever ‘Argentina pays any amount due under the terms of the 
exchange bonds, it must also pay plaintiffs the same fraction of the amount due to them’. 24 
This was the ratable payment interpretation that raises novel concerns on the feasibility of 
future debt restructuring. The injunction has since been lifted after the country reached an 
agreement with majority of its holdouts, leaving Elliot with a generous settlement of $2.4bn 
– equivalent to a thousand percentage profit as compared to exchange bond holders that 
accepted a 70% haircut on their bonds. 25   
From the cases mentioned above, holdouts seem to enjoy more leverage in current times than 
in past decades. However, as stated in Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2007), the leverage 
remains limited by the high legal costs, uncertainty involved and forgone debt service on 
restructured debt. Hence holdout strategies may only be worthwhile for specialized firms 
with sophisticated lawyers such as Elliot Associates. 
2.2.1. Contract terms do matter to aid enforcement or 
renegotiation 
Scholars have attributed the boilerplate nature of sovereign bond contracts to the costs of 
drafting new terms, including both direct costs and unanticipated costs following market 
reactions. Additionally, several theories attempt to explain the stickiness of boilerplate terms 
in contracts. These include learning externalities (the resistance of contracting parties to 
adopt new terms less understood by the market and potentially erroneously interpreted by 
courts), network externalities (the reluctance to insert idiosyncratic contract terms not priced 
by the market, thus reducing the asset’s tradability) and negative signalling (sovereign’s 
averseness to insist a change of contract term that increases lending risk) (Gulati and Scott, 
2013, p. 36). 
However, empirical analysis finds that boilerplate contract terms do change in response to 
shocks (Choi et al., 2012). Data suggests that not only do the parties change terms to 
maximise their surplus, but they also modify and clarify contractual language following 
costly litigation (Gulati and Scott, 2013, p. 43). Recent events following NML Capital, Ltd 
v the Republic of Argentina (2014) rejuvenates the issue of elucidating contract terms. In 
May 2015, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) published a new updated 
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) and aggregated CACs in response to the New York 
                                                
24 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 11-4065 (2d Cir. 2012). See timeline of events from (Jerin, 
2014). 
25 For more details, see (Wigglesworth and Moore, 2016). 
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court’s decision following a protracted and costly litigation process. Moreover, the ICMA 
developed an alternative language for the pari passu clause eliminating the rateable payment 
interpretation capitalised by NML (International Capital Market Association, 2015). These 
new revised provisions will now be included in the terms and conditions of sovereign debt 
contracts, making it harder for holdouts to disrupt future bond restructurings or interfere with 
debt repayments to exchange bondholders. Thus it can be implied that the evolution of such 
clauses is evidence to the belief that contract terms do matter. 
To summarise, boilerplate terms aids to address both the enforcement problem (sovereign’s 
strategic refusal to pay debt) and the renegotiation problem (sovereign’s difficulty to 
restructure debt) (Choi et al., 2012). As discussed earlier, traditional economic literature 
advocates the use of non-legal mechanisms to enforce debt repayment. However, since the 
enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act FSIA (1976) allowing lawsuits against 
sovereigns in the US, and the State Immunity Act SIA (1978) in the UK, there have been 
several high-profile cases we have considered in this section.26 Now we turn to the shrinking 
availability of sovereign legal defenses to mitigate court enforcement. 
2.2.2. Sovereign defences to mitigate sovereign debt 
enforcement 
Sovereigns have sought to avoid creditor enforcement action – such as litigation that may 
pose a threat to debt restructuring – by invoking various legal defences. They have relied on 
the principles of sovereign immunity, comity, act-of-state doctrine27, law of Champerty28 as 
defences to creditor claims. However, these defences have been largely rejected by US courts 
and therefore creditors are generally able to obtain money judgments against foreign states 
in US, though courts have granted stays of litigation pending the restructuring of debt and 
economy stability (Boccuzzi et al., 2015). 
For instance, in the Allied Bank v Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago (1989) case, the US 
appeals court held that defaulting on foreign debt did not constitute an act-of-state and thus 
                                                
26 See evidence of increased litigation and money judgements in Schumacher et al. (2015), albeit limited ability 
to collect on debt as highlighted above. 
27 Acts of state doctrine states that courts should not judge the validity of a sovereigns act committed on its 
territory.  It is a judicially created rule of abstention concerning the justifiability of the acts of foreign 
governments (Power, 1996). 
28 New York “Law of Champerty” prohibits litigating on a claim purchased exclusively for the purposes of 
filing a law suit. 
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Costa Rica defense through this doctrine was not applicable to the litigation.29  The Second 
Circuit further asserted that it was of the United States’ national interest to ensure that its 
creditors could resort to legal remedies to enforce debt. As a result, the district court’s ruling 
was reversed in favour of Allied Bank and the motion for summary judgment was granted. 
However, it was later established that Allied’s final settlement was no better than the debt 
restructuring offer made to other creditors (Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer, 2007). 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the act-of-state doctrine proved futile for reasons that 
defaults payable in foreign jurisdiction are not considered sovereign acts worthy of judicial 
deference (Panizza et al., 2009). 
In another case, Elliot Associates, LP v Banco de la Nacion (1999)30, the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court ruling of committed Champerty, holding that Elliot’s purpose of 
suit was for the collection of debt it acquired and that its purchase of debt was legitimate i.e. 
to make profit. Again, one of the reasons the appeal court ruled in favour of Elliot was to 
ensure US-based creditors could enforce debt absent of full performance.31 
Another example was demonstrated by the Second Circuit decision in NML Capital v. 
Republic of Argentina. Argentina’s floating rate accrual notes (FRANs) included default 
provisions (allowing for acceleration of claims on debt) and interest rate provisions 
(allowing for interest rate adjustments in accordance to the perceived risk in purchasing 
Argentine bonds). Following the announcement that it could no longer service its debt, 
default provisions were being triggered. Argentina appealed that the interest rate provision 
on its debt should not be enforced because it would be contrary to public policy against 
inflated interest rates. The Second Circuit rejected Argentina’s plea and persisted parties to 
adhere to the plain language set forth in the terms underlying debt contracts (Lastra and 
Buchheit, 2015, pp. 112-113). 
Thus the above examples have demonstrated the decree of the US courts that contracts are 
to be enforced according to their terms. However, many sovereigns’ assets have proved 
immune from attachment. Case of Pravin Banker v Banco Popular del Peru (1997)32 
                                                
29The Court agreed with the United States government amicus brief that the situs of the property at issue was 
located in the US and thus the act-of-state doctrine – which respects the acts of a foreign sovereign within 
its own territory – did not apply. For more details, See Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola 
de Cartago. 566 F.Supp. 1440  
30 See Elliott Assocs. L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999) 
31 Id 
32 See Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 852 (2nd Cir. 1997) 
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provides an example where summary judgment was granted but unsuccessful attachments 
were made on Peru’s assets. Another case is Kensington v Republic of Congo (2003)33 where, 
similar to Elliot v Peru (2000), creditor sought an order attempting to attach other 
bondholders payments under the pari passu clause. The motion was denied. Further cases 
involved the extensive litigation associated in Argentina’s 2001 default, where summary 
judgements were granted in roughly 140 lawsuits, but attempt to attach sovereign assets (for 
example, central bank reserves) proved futile.34  
2.2.3. Creditor remedies to enforce sovereign debt 
With the exception of legislations like the FSIA and SIA, sovereigns are usually immune 
from lawsuits in foreign courts under public international law (Choi et al., 2012). 
Consequently, debtors issue waivers of sovereign immunity in bond contracts to enable 
creditors obtain foreign judgements in the event of default (Weidemaier, 2014).35 However, 
such waivers do not guarantee payment, as assets must be found for attachment. It remains 
difficult for creditors to find and seize assets not protected by immunity (Weidemaier and 
McCarl, 2015). Aside from a few famous cases such as Elliot v. Peru (2000) and NML 
Capital v. Argentina (2012), creditors have been largely unsuccessful in recovering 
payments from courts. In this section, we detail a range of possible terms that could trigger 
a race to the courthouse by creditors.  
Since sovereigns can choose to withdraw waivers of immunity under domestic jurisdiction, 
debtors adopt foreign governing law clauses unconstrained by public international law. The 
consent to a foreign jurisdiction, such as New York or English Law, means that a creditor’s 
lawsuit will be independent of the government of the sovereign and thus treated fairly as 
debtors are prevented from strategically changing the law in their favour. Nevertheless, the 
question remains whether assets located in foreign jurisdiction can be attached (Weidemaier, 
2014). 
Other clauses that facilitate legal enforcement include cross-default clauses. This clause 
follows that a sovereign’s default on one creditor constitutes a cross-default on all other 
creditors. In other words, in the event that the sovereign stops making payments to one or 
more creditors, all other receiving creditors could accelerate their future payments (i.e. face 
value and accrued interest). Furthermore, the acceleration clause permits an individual 
                                                
33 See Kensington International Limited v Republic of Congo (2003) EWCA Civ 709 
34 For more cases, see (Buchheit and Pam, 2004). 
35 Such contracts include Waivers of immunity from suit and/or from execution. Sovereign debt issuances from 
countries such as Australia, Finland, Portugal, South Africa, and Turkey include both waivers in English-
law bonds, albeit include only waiver of immunity from suit in New York-law bonds (Weidemaier, 2014) 
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creditor to accelerate all future obligations making them all due immediately if a sovereign 
defaults on its debt. Some acceleration clauses involve a voting threshold over 25% of 
outstanding bonds before acceleration can take place (Gulati and Scott, 2013, p. 27). 
Other types of enforcement clauses that deter the sovereign from securing or making 
preferential payments to certain creditors are the negative pledge clause and Pari passu 
clause. The negative pledge clause prohibits the sovereign from earmarking certain assets or 
revenue streams to some lenders without equally securing the debt of other bondholders. 
However this clause does not prevent the debtor from, for example, enacting a law that 
honours the debt obligations of exchange bondholders before settling other creditors. (Choi 
et al., 2012).  Pari passu clause addresses this problem by precluding involuntary 
subordination of debt. Thus, the sovereign cannot lower the legal rank of existing debt in 
favour of future creditors. In sovereign debt issuances, the clause stipulates that “Debt will 
rank equally in right of payment with all other present and future unsecured and 
unsubordinated external indebtedness of the issuer” (Buchheit and Pam, 2004). The broader 
implications of the Pari passu clause suggest that all creditors must agree to a proposed debt 
restructuring, otherwise the sovereign faces the threat of lawsuit by a non-consenting creditor 
and thus risks making ratable payments to all other creditors. 
To conclude section 2.2, the discussed case studies and enforcement terms suggest that legal 
disputes are likely to remain an important challenge in future debt crises. Though the 
proportion of creditor litigation in relation to restructured debt participation is generally 
small, lawsuits against foreign sovereigns have been on the rise (Schumacher et al., 2015). 
This suggests that litigation is increasingly perceived as a lucrative outside option for 
specialised distressed hedge funds. Credit default swaps (CDS) could also be seen as an 
outside option should the debtor default, as the payments over CDS would be activated in 
such event. However, there are very limited experiences with settling sovereign CDS 
contracts (International Monetary Fund, 2013). Nevertheless, the possession of CDS in 
relation to sovereign debt could jeopardize orderly future debt restructuring. 
2.3. Related literature 
2.3.1. Overview of theoretical and empirical literature on delay 
A perturbing issue, stressed across various classes of the sovereign debt literature, is the 
duration of a restructuring process. Pitchford and Wright (2007) claim that default takes an 
average of seven years to resolve, according to the standard definition of default (Standard 
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& Poors, 2018)36. Using alternative definitions of default, Tomz and Wright (2013) found 
normal credit market access for some countries to be far longer than the default episode. 
Moreover, Benjamin and Wright (2016) show that levels of indebtedness of sovereign 
defaulters after restructuring are at least as high as at the point of default.37 Cruces and 
Trebesch (2013) find that creditors lose on average 40 per cent as a result of debt 
restructuring. Certain stands of literature attribute delays to political instability (e.g. elections 
and leadership changes, resignations and cabinet reshuffles, wars, coups), as opposed to 
creditor coordination failures. For example, Trebesch (2008) shows that sovereigns more 
often than creditors are to blame for restructuring delays. They show empirically that 
political instability and government behaviour (e.g. government’s refusal to guarantee for 
the debt incurred by earlier governments) are more important factors contributing to delay 
than creditor behaviour (such as holdouts & litigation). Scholars have sought to investigate 
the reasons for protracted sovereign debt restructuring and associated inefficiencies caused 
to both the debtor and creditors alike.  
A commonly cited explanation for the inefficiencies in sovereign debt restructuring, i.e. its 
associated delay and related costs, is the lack of symmetric information between the 
bargaining parties (Pitchford and Wright, 2012). In a world of asymmetric information, 
neither party may have complete information of the gains from settlement for the other party. 
An extension of Admati and Perry (1987) bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty is 
studied in Cramton (1992) where the time between successive offers is set endogenously by 
the players. In this setting, delay reveals each party’s value of a settlement such that a costly 
delay in making an offer signals a lower value of settlement relative to other player. In other 
words, a higher bargaining position is signalled through costly delay in making an offer. In 
a war of attrition game setting, Hörner and Sahuguet (2010) show that investing in resources 
to signal bargaining strength induces early settlement, rather than through the time cost of 
delay. Turning to complete information models, Benjamin and Wright (2016) show that 
delays may stem from commitment problems where the debtor cannot be trusted to honour 
future debt restructuring agreements, thereby attributing the causes of socially inefficient 
delays to the lack of enforceability of contracts. Here, for the very same reason that led to 
the default in the first place, the sovereign may be unable to credibly commit to making 
                                                
36For standard definition of default, see “D” category in Standard & Poors (2018). However, Das et al. (2012) 
paper reports that debt renegotiations have become quicker since the 1990s, with many bond restructurings 
being resolved within one or two years and with creditor participation exceeding 90 percent. The only two-
outlier cases were Argentina in 2005 and Dominica in 2004. 
37 Supporting evidence is found in Das et al. (2012) showing restructurings can have serious adverse effects on 
both the domestic and financial sector. 
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payments on restructured debt. Thus, the creditor may optimally delay a debt restructuring 
until future default risk is low. Low default risk facilitates the sharing of surplus gained from 
debt restructuring and here there is a greater amount of surplus to be shared after re-access 
to capital markets. Thus, bargaining surplus could be endogenously determined such that 
variations in expected future default risk affect the size of future surplus, which may explain 
delay. However, none of the existing literatures on asymmetric or symmetric information in 
bargaining have attempted to explain inefficient delays caused by parties biased expectations 
of payoffs from negotiation breakdowns, which we study in Chapter 4 of the thesis.  
In contrast, Merlo and Wilson (1995) find that delay may be efficient if the size of the 
bargaining surplus, determined by a stochastic process, can grow in the future. The fact that 
the surplus may grow at a rate higher than the discount factor generates socially efficient 
delays. Supporting evidence by Ozler (1993) shows that temporary suspensions of payments 
by LDC’s leading to loan rescheduling during the period 1978-80 had a positive impact on 
creditors returns as well as reducing the debt service burden on debtor. A bargaining 
approach applied to explain Argentina sovereign debt swap of 2005 by Dhillon et al. (2006) 
suggests that negotiators are better off delaying settlement to create some breathing space 
for economic recovery. Similar findings by Bi (2008) suggest that delay is optimal as 
bargaining parties can share a larger “cake” once the debtor country has recovered. However, 
none of these studies have considered the effect of the impending and obstructive nature of 
creditor lawsuits on debt restructuring processes.  
Another explanation of delay is a lack of creditor coordination towards an orderly debt 
restructuring.  In practice, especially relating to Argentina’s debt restructuring since 2005, 
we find that some creditors accept offers earlier, some reject and accept later, meanwhile 
some reject and litigate in anticipation of full settlement. Pitchford and Wright (2013) 
highlight some of the reasons for coordination failures including free-riding incentives (on 
haircuts or negotiation costs of other creditors) and successful litigation in recent past against 
sovereigns in default. Pre-restructuring litigation could disrupt and thus slow down the 
restructuring process. However, in cases such as Pravin Banker v. Banco del Peru (1997), 
the court granted the debtor’s request for stay of litigation amid fears that it will disrupt 
ongoing restructuring negotiations (Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer, 2007). Several policy 
proposals have advocated instruments helpful towards addressing the creditor coordination 
problem, such as collective action clauses that allow a supermajority of creditors to bind 
holdouts to debt restructuring.  Such clauses have been adopted under New York Law since 
2003. More discussion on this below in section 4.7. 
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In the next two sections, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, we draw on the theoretical and empirical literature 
on optimism in driving bargaining delays, which is relevant for Chapter 4 of the thesis.   
2.3.2. Excessive optimism literature 
In addition to the aforementioned literatures, a prominent explanation for costly delays is the 
parties’ excessive optimism about their future bargaining power ((Farber and Katz, 1979), 
(Shavell, 1982) and (Ali, 2006)). They claim that when parties are excessively optimistic 
about the future there can be no mutually agreed split of the bargaining pie for which all 
parties would be willing to accept immediately, causing delay in agreement. Additionally, 
extensive experimental and field evidence also show that people tend to form optimistic 
beliefs about future uncertainty when bargaining and that this causes impasse (e.g. (Babcock 
and Loewenstein, 1997)). This evidence suggests that there is a strong positive correlation 
between the optimism of the parties and the probability that bargaining ends in an impasse 
(Ortner, 2010). Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) presented evidence illustrating the 
persistence of self-serving bias despite parties sharing identical information, hence casting 
doubt on the asymmetric information hypothesis of private information. Babcock et al. 
(1997) shows that an intervention targeted at debiasing parties’ expectations served to reduce 
bargaining impasse. This provides further support for the importance of the self-serving bias. 
However, Yildiz (2003) argued that excessive optimism alone cannot explain the observed 
delays in bargaining. The author introduces a sequential bargaining model in which the 
players are excessively optimistic about their future abilities to make offers, where making 
offers is the only source of bargaining power. He shows that when parties are sufficiently 
optimistic for a sufficiently long time, they reach an agreement immediately in a subgame 
perfect equilibrium (SPE). The model presented in Chapter 4 contrasts sharply from the 
existing literatures on excessive optimism by demonstrating that players share optimistic 
beliefs about outside options endogenously determined during temporary disagreements in 
negotiations. Moreover, Yildiz’s framework does not account for the role of endogenously 
determined outside options driving delays in bargaining. Moreover, in the chapter we 
explore the effect of other parameters unique to a litigation process, such as legal costs, on 
delays in bargaining. We argue therefore that there is no existing theoretical framework that 
investigates the role of optimism about endogenously determined outside options in 
explaining delays in bargaining, an inquiry of particular importance in sovereign debt 
restructuring negotiations.   
Further research has examined the role of optimism in bargaining. Simsek and Yildiz (2007) 
findings suggest that in equilibrium optimistic players with a nearby deadline delay 
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agreement until the deadline, so-called deadline effect. Additionally, Yildiz (2004) claims 
that if parties can learn about their bargaining power during the negotiations, optimism may 
cause long delays in equilibrium by virtue of players expecting that their opponent will revise 
their own belief having observed delay which signals stronger position. In his model, 
agreement is reached when it is no longer worthwhile waiting for opponent to learn. 
Furthermore, evidence by Ali (2006) and Ortner (2010) establish inefficient delays in 
equilibrium under persistent optimism. Ali (2006) showed that under multilateral bargaining 
games, there are costly delays in an arbitrarily long finite game, albeit immediate agreement 
persists with frequent offers. Similarly, Ortner (2010) suggests that under bilateral 
bargaining environments, inefficiencies disappear when players can make offers arbitrarily 
frequently in settings where the size of the bargaining surplus is stochastic. More recently, 
Friedenberg (2017) found that delay may be attributed to second-order optimism, where 
parties fear to make mutually beneficial offers that are ‘better-than-expected’, as doing so 
may cause the opponent to become more optimistic about her future prospects and holdout 
for an ‘even better’ offer. These papers highlighted above study complete information 
bargaining games and as a result, any delay is common-knowledge at the start of the game 
and not a possibility unlike incomplete information models where for a specific type of 
player agreement is reached immediately (Yildiz, 2011). The paper in Chapter 4 goes beyond 
existing theoretical literature on optimism to account for delays in both finite- and infinite-
horizon settings where players hold persistent biased-beliefs during negotiations in debt 
restructuring. 
2.3.3. Litigation optimism literature 
Further economics and law literature based on models of uncertainty and asymmetric 
information attempt to explain the failure of reaching settlement (See (Cooter et al., 1982), 
(Priest and Klein, 1984), (Bebchuk, 1984), (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986), (Nalebuff, 1987), 
(Spier, 1994, Spier, 1992) and (Farmer and Pecorino, 1996)). Legal scholars and 
practitioners find that negotiation breakdowns are often attributed to optimistic beliefs 
shared by competing parties (See (Birke and Fox, 1999), (Kaplow and Shavell, 2002), 
(Loewenstein et al., 1993)). The model explored in Chapter 4 relates to the simple numerical 
framework provided in Hay and Spier (1997) demonstrating that parties may find no 
mutually acceptable settlement if both are sufficiently optimistic about their prospects in 
court. 
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Extensive legal literature, starting with the work of Landes (1971), Posner (1973), and Gould 
(1973), advocate that litigants may have inconsistent priors about the outcome of a trial.38 
Moreover, bargaining literature on litigation suggests that trials are inevitable if it is 
infeasible to match parties’ expectations in court through initial settlement. Our model 
presented in Chapter 4 challenges the traditional view of litigation that trials are only an 
outside option in bargaining. Such perspective contrast sharply from sovereign debt 
litigation cases, which usually forms an integral part of the debt restructuring process and 
are useful for reducing information asymmetries between parties when pleadings are 
submitted. The creditor(s) and sovereign debtor then reach settlement upon conclusion of 
the litigation case. On the matter of updating beliefs, Aumann (1976) finds that – through 
rational choice theory – parties revise their optimistic assessment of prevailing in litigation 
downwards once they observe, during the course of bargaining, the optimism of their 
opponent. In addition, as stated in Spier (2007), litigants revise their beliefs over time 
according to new information, learning about the underlying merits of the case and being 
aware of the strategies their opponents employ. 
Much research has found that optimism increases the probability of bargaining impasse. 
Korobkin (2002) studies the role of aspirations in settlement negotiations. He claims that the 
undesirable consequence of negotiators setting high aspirations is the increased likelihood 
of bargaining impasse. This is as a result of a reduced bargaining zone which follows from 
setting high reservations prices. Furthermore, using evolutionary game theory, Bar-Gill 
(2006) provides a theoretical explanation for the persistence of optimism bias in litigation. 
The paper states that optimistic players succeed in extracting favourable settlements by 
credibly threatening to resort to costly litigation. It finds that when the sum of parties’ 
optimism is too high, settlement negotiations fail and a costly trial follows. The paper also 
reports that the level of optimism required for a breakdown in negotiations is increasing in 
the cost of litigation, decreasing in the size of judgement and decreasing in the strength of 
the plaintiff’s case. Our findings in Chapter 4 complement that of Bar-Gill (2006) in that 
players need to be sufficiently optimistic about their prospects in litigation for negotiations 
to breakdown and that failed settlements are triggered by high judgement values and low 
legal costs. However, our different approach is to examine the effect of inter-period litigation 
on final settlement outcomes.  Moreover, the model we explore in Chapter 4 departs from 
this strand of literature when considering an environment of weak contractual enforcement, 
                                                
38 See also (Priest, 1985), (Ramseyer and Nakazato, 1989), (Landes, 1993), (Miller, 1993). These papers show 
that optimism is a major factor causing delays in settlement, triggering costly litigation. 
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the norm in sovereign debt litigation, where creditors experience difficulties in enforcing 
their judgement due to limited available attachable assets of the sovereign. Thus, our findings 
suggest that creditors accept a haircut post-trial by settling for an amount equivalent to the 
value of the attachable asset, which is less than the judgement claims. This is in sharp 
contrast with existing literature, for example Bar-Gill (2006), which suggests that the 
judgement value, decreed by the court, is awarded to the creditor in settlement post-litigation. 
Gertner and Miller (1995) state that when parties’ belief about the outcome of trial is 
common knowledge, the parties only fail to settle if the plaintiff’s expectation of litigation 
outcome exceeds the defendant’s by the sum of the party’s litigation costs (which is the 
bargaining surplus – savings made from preventing trial). However, due to the common 
knowledge assumption of optimism, the paper mentions that it seems very unlikely that a 
party’s belief will be observable by the opposition. They further claim that it is difficult to 
imagine how a party’s prior or idiosyncratic information processing can be directly revealed 
to others. Consequently, diverse literatures have explored the effects of asymmetric 
information on the equilibrium outcomes of bargaining, where parties have incomplete 
information about the possible outcome of trial. Here, the evidence suggests that there is a 
positive probability of breakdown in negotiations (See (Bebchuk, 1984), (Cooter and 
Rubinfeld, 1989), (Kennan and Wilson, 1991), (Kritzer, 1990), (Spier, 1994)).  
Cooter et al. (1982) studies a bargaining model with incomplete information where 
uncertainty persists because players have unobservable traits which influence their 
bargaining strategies. As such, the equilibrium concept is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
where the adoption of certain strategies make bargaining less likely to result in early 
settlement. Our model in Chapter 4 also studies the case of incomplete information but only 
regarding court-outcomes – everything else is common knowledge between parties. 
Nalebuff (1987) studies the case of private information where the defendant knows more 
about the plaintiff’s chances of success at trial. In equilibrium, the plaintiff demands more 
than he wishes to limit the defendant's ability to signal the weakness of the plaintiff's case. 
In our model, neither player has private information about their chances of success at trial. 
Furthermore, Spier (1994) looks at the case of two-sided incomplete information where each 
party possess private information about the future behaviour of the court – the plaintiff 
private information may concern the value of his damages while the defendants may concern 
his degree of negligence. (Spier, 1994, Spier, 1992) admit equilibrium strategies in which 
settlement is always delayed for a duration proportionate to the value of the informed party’s 
private information. Babcock et al. (1995) provides an explanation of bargaining impasse 
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where disputants preferences are being drawn from different distributions unlike the Priest 
and Klein (1984) model (where preferences are drawn from same distribution). They ran an 
experiment to establish the causal link between self-serving bias and settlement behaviour. 
A key feature of their experiment was that all information (regarding their individual roles, 
case materials etc.) was shared between parties. They found that their estimates of the 
judge’s decision were systematically different despite the information shared. This points to 
an interesting insight on information processing which the paper in Chapter 4 also 
acknowledges – i.e. that parties’ beliefs do not necessarily converge pre-trial despite being 
presented with the same public information.  
Priest and Klein (1984) model posits that parties possess imperfect information which causes 
them to estimate a case's value with error. They show that failed settlements are those in 
which the plaintiff overestimates and/or the defendant underestimates the expected value of 
the case at trial, albeit such estimates are assumed to be rational and so parties form unbiased 
assessments of court decisions, contrary to my proposition that biased expectations are 
formed by parties. In addition, the paper assumes that parties behave non-strategically with 
respect to litigation and settlement as if their actions have no effect on current or future 
actions of the other party. Our model considers a dynamic bargaining framework where the 
equilibrium outcome depends on strategic actions of players. Loewenstein et al. (1993) tests 
the Priest-Klein model in an experimental setting, finding that parties assessments of what 
is considered a fair settlement and their predictions of the judge’s award were both biased - 
the size of which was a strong predictor of settlement failures. Farmer et al. (2004) found 
evidence on Major League Baseball that settlement failures resulted from parties’ (players 
and clubs) optimism in their offer proposals, with aggressive offers triggering final offer 
arbitrations. They argue that their results are more consistent with an optimism model than 
with an asymmetric information model because the “facts of the case” (consisting mostly of 
player’s statistics such as salary, rating & experience) are all public information.  A key 
difference in their theory relative to ours is that we examine civil litigation when applied in 
sovereign debt context, rather than arbitration. In addition, the arbitrator determines the final 
offer while in our case, bargaining continues post-litigation.   
Bebchuk (1984) presents a screening model where the defendant has private information in 
regards to her perceived strength of the case – it may be strong (i.e. with a high chance of 
winning, she is the high type defendant) or weak (i.e. with a low chance of winning, she is 
the low type defendant). The plaintiff demand screens out weak defendants such that in 
equilibrium there is a possibility of settlement with weak types and litigation with strong-
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types. Here the different information parties have about the likely outcome of the case stem 
from private information contrary to my proposition. The paper finds that the probability of 
pre-trial settlement increases with trial costs, decreases with asymmetric information, 
decreases with higher expected judgement by optimistic litigant, increases with risk 
aversion.39  
Similarly, Spier (1992) presents a dynamic extension of Bebchuk (1984) where the 
defendant holds private information about the value of damages. The plaintiff learns of the 
strength of her case through making one-sided offers. In equilibrium, a sequence of screening 
offers are accepted by only certain types of defendants, thus leading to the possibility of 
delay. Like in all other papers, it is assumed that the court can enforce any judgement against 
the defendant. Furthermore, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) study a one-period signalling 
model where the plaintiff has private information about the true level of damages and makes 
the settlement demand to signal their type. Here, players share common knowledge about 
the likelihood that court verdict will be in the plaintiff’s favour but share asymmetric 
information about the level of compensation to be awarded by the court. The equilibrium 
results entail a mixture of settlement and litigation. My bargaining model rests on the 
premise that parties lack common knowledge of the court verdict – which could either go in 
the debtor’s or creditor’s favour – but have symmetric information about other 
characteristics of the model. 
Furthermore, Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) show that trials could occur in equilibrium when 
one party underestimates the strength of the opponent’s case. By inducing a discovery 
process of full informational exchange before trial, where parties willingly reveal 
advantageous facts that correct their opponent’s false optimism, the paper finds that it is 
possible for parties to settle in the discovery stage. Likewise, Priest (1985) "selection 
hypothesis" model posits that non-settlement pre-trial is driven by imperfect information, 
causing parties to estimate the value of case with error. Issacharoff et al. (1996) mentions 
that the source of the imperfect information may be underdeveloped legal norms governing 
the conduct in-question, or misperceptions about the facts of the case. They find that cases 
                                                
39 Bebchuk (1996) considers an n-period bargaining model to explain the reasons why a plaintiff files a lawsuit 
even though the litigation has a negative expected value. He finds that, provided the plaintiff’s legal costs 
are sufficiently split among the stages of litigation, by backward induction the plaintiff has a credible threat 
to sue in the first period and thus parties settle immediately. In his model, however, the players have identical 
expectations over the probability of prevailing at trial. 
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which go to trial are simply the ones in which the plaintiffs and defendant's errors compound 
to eliminate the settlement range.40 
Adding to the literature on private information in bargaining, Hay and Spier (1997) 
highlights that what may lead to bargaining impasse may include a party’s reputational 
objective misjudge by opposing party. Gertner and Miller (1995) establish further reasons 
of impasse, showing that a reactive devaluation – a strategic incentive to devalue each other’s 
concessions simply because it is offered by the opponent – can increase delays in bargaining. 
Hubbard (2013) established similar results showing that in equilibrium, delays in agreement 
could occur when defendant gains through delay by refusing every settlement offer from 
plaintiff. The equilibrium strategy here is an inefficient one in which the plaintiff files a 
costly and detailed complaint in the first period, following eventual settlement in the second 
period. Gertner and Miller (1995) also mention that lawyer-client agency problems can cause 
delays in settlement as, for example, the attorney if working on an hourly fee may have an 
incentive to overstate the strength of a case in order to induce the client to bring the case to 
court rather than settling. Similarly, as pointed by Issacharoff et al. (1996), some scholars 
argue that protracted litigation and trials occur because lawyers are compensated on the basis 
of the amount of time they spend on a case (See (Clermont and Currivan, 1978); (Coffee, 
1987); (Mnookin, 1993). 
These papers suggest that there is strong association between imperfect information among 
parties and settlement failures across diverse court cases, resulting in a costly and lengthy 
litigation process. The model analysed in Chapter 4 adds to the extensive literature on 
settlement and litigation through investigating the degree to which optimistic beliefs in 
sovereign debt litigation hinder early settlement in the restructuring of a country’s debt.
                                                
40 Issacharoff et al. (1996)also states that, since five percent or fewer of all controversies in the United States 
reach trial before any resolution of case, cases that proceed to trial do so because of real uncertainty or 
because of perverse litigant behaviour. 
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Chapter 3  
3. Evaluating Pitchford and Wright (2012) Paper 
in a Discrete-Time-Two-Creditors Framework 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is a solution concept commonly used in strategic 
form games and has been applied to various disciplines for both theoretical and applied 
theory considerations. In a Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE), there is no strategic 
uncertainty. Here each player plays their equilibrium strategy which contain a set of actions 
that constitutes a best response to their opponents set of actions in equilibrium. No player 
profits from a unilateral deviation from his equilibrium action.  A mixed strategy, on the 
other hand, is a probability distribution over all pure strategies, allowing a player to 
randomly select a pure strategy. Established by Nash (1950), every finite strategic-form 
game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, players optimally 
randomise between (all or a subset of) pure strategies, not necessarily with equal 
probabilities. Here players have no incentive to deviate from their optimal mixed strategy 
conditional on opponents playing their equilibrium strategies. Since probabilities are 
continuous, there are infinitely many mixed strategies available to a player. One of the 
problems with interpreting a player’s equilibrium mixed strategy as a choice of play is the 
indifference each player holds of all mixed strategies within the support of his equilibrium 
strategy.    
Pitchford and Wright (2012) present a continuous-time dynamic model of sovereign debt 
restructuring with delay where creditors use mixed strategies to govern their timing decisions 
to enter, or not to enter, into negotiations with the sovereign. The authors justify the focus 
on mixed strategies on the basis that pre-existing social norms in sovereign debt restructuring 
(such as uncommon sovereign defaults and anonymous creditors) would fail parties to 
coordinate to a pure-strategy equilibrium. They also provide the Harsanyi (1973) 
reinterpretation of mixed strategies – that each creditor is not fully informed about other 
creditor’s payoff functions due to (small) random variations in payoffs and thus each 
optimally plays a mixed strategy in response to the uncertainty faced about other creditors’ 
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actions. As a result of these claims, they did not show the asymmetric Pure strategy Nash 
equilibria (PSNE) that involve creditors coordinating on the order of entry. Moreover, as 
they work directly at the continuous time limit, it is not possible to study how the asymmetric 
PSNE change as the time difference between two successive periods tends to zero. This is 
what we aim to do in this paper. Working with discrete time settings, not only do we show 
the asymmetric PSNE result but we also establish that it involves immediate agreement as 
the gap between two periods tends to zero. This renders their claims about players 
coordinating in the order of entry redundant in continuous time settings.  
The paper does not discredit Pitchford and Wright’s MSNE solution. What the paper does it 
to show that there are other equilibrium outcomes without delay that exists within the model 
framework which was not shown in their paper. In addition, their justification for solely 
focussing on MSNE is not sufficient as many theoretical papers in sovereign debt 
restructuring have been able to show that delays can occur in pure strategies. For a discussion 
of some theoretical papers see section 2.3.1 above. 
3.2. Literature review  
A body of literature on games with war of attrition have shown that where there exist pure 
strategy Nash equilibria, immediate agreement results in continuous time settings.41 Smith 
and Stacchetti (2002)42 presents a complete-information continuous-time bargaining model 
with endogenous war of attrition where players expected continuation payoffs increase as 
game proceeds and showed that there exists two pure strategy SPE that yield immediate 
agreement and a continuum of equilibria in mixed strategies that yield delays with positive 
probabilities. Though we reach similar findings in pure-strategies, our modelling approach 
contrasts from Smith and Stacchetti (2002). Their paper explores the bargaining problem 
without temporal monopoly43 and studies one in which player’s actions are governed by their 
aspiration values (or expected payoffs) which follow a martingale stochastic process. 
Because of their deviation from temporal monopoly assumptions, they work directly in 
                                                
41 The War of Attrition is a classic game of timing first introduced by Maynard Smith (1974) to study the 
evolutionary stability of certain patterns of behaviour in animal conflicts. The setup is that two players 
compete for a prize and the player prepared to wait longer wins the prize, but both players incur a waiting 
cost which is a function of the delay occurred in resolving the conflict. 
42  Smith and Stacchetti (2002) showed that players are engaged in a sequence of wars of attrition until 
agreement because expected payoff from waiting exceeds that of offering in a bargaining game.  
43 Negotiated offers enjoy a temporary monopoly by avoiding the time cost of delay. A temporal monopoly 
captures situations where the time cost of each bargaining period plays a main role to players in avoiding 
delay.  
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continuous time. In addition, their solution concept differs – they solve for pure strategy or 
mixed strategy SPE counterparts of an aspirational equilibrium. Our paper rather abstracts 
away from these complexities by maintaining the Rubinstein bargaining model assumptions 
of temporal monopoly and solves for the corresponding subgame perfect equilibrium and 
Nash equilibrium solutions.44 
Hendricks et al. (1988) present a general framework of war of attrition in continuous time 
with complete information, generalizing the Bishop and Cannings (1978) model, to allow 
for asymmetric return functions and arbitrary payoffs in the event that no player ever 
concedes. They showed that there exists a unique subgame perfect outcome where one of 
the two players moves immediately with probability one ending the game instantaneously. 
Furthermore, Bulow and Klemperer (1999) show that even with private information, where 
player’s valuation of the prize item is not common knowledge, a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium exists with perfect efficient sorting where the weakest players leave the game 
instantaneously. Our paper further contrasts from these literature as they assume an 
exogenous rising sequence of payoffs, contrary to ours which assumes payoffs endogenously 
increase as the number of players remaining in the game falls. This endogenous increase in 
payoffs is attributed to reasons of weak contractual enforcement, where (1) the sovereign 
cannot commit to settling on the same or inferior terms with holdout creditors and (2) the 
holdouts can extract a higher settlement by preventing the sovereign from re-accessing 
capital markets. Thus, by solving for the SPE using backward induction, later settlers are 
paid higher than earlier settlers. Despite rising endogenous payoffs, we show that players 
settle immediately in pure strategies.  
The cited papers have been able to show that equilibrium delay results in immediate 
settlement in continuous time settings, complementing our results that the asymmetric 
equilibria involve immediate agreement as the time difference between periods converges to 
zero.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
44 Rubinstein, A. (1982): “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica, 50(1), 97–109. 
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3.3. Model 
There are two symmetric creditors, and a sovereign. All players have complete information, 
are risk neutral and have a common discount rate r. The game is represented in a discrete 
time setting of 1 = 0,1,2…∞ and begins in 1 = 18 = 0 after a debt default. The sovereign 
remains in default until it settles both creditors, after which it is able to re-access world 
capital markets and gain 9 (the surplus gross of settlement payments). 45 
In the initial timing stage, denoted by	;8, each of the two creditors chooses some	1 at which 
to enter the settlement stage, denoted by	<8. It is assumed that only one creditor can enter a 
settlement stage at a time and that ties are resolved by a random allocation with equal 
probabilities. The first creditor who enters <8	receives his settlement and exits the game at 
some 	1 = 1= . A no-exit situation is characterised by a rejection of settlement offer and 
follows another round of bargaining until offer is accepted. From	1 = 1= + 1, the remaining 
creditor at	;=  decides when to enter settlement stage	<= . The creditor exits the game at 
some 	1 = 1?  after receipt of his settlement. Game ends and sovereign re-accesses the 
international capital markets.46  (See Figure 3.1 below).  
 
Figure 3.1 – Structure of game 
                                                
45 9 is interpreted in Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) as the output gain in re-accessing the capital markets, i.e. 
withdrawal from direct sanctions. In Bulow and Rogoff (1989b), it is the full gains from trade by regaining 
normal access to trade credit. In Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), it is access to future credit. A vast majority 
of the theoretical literature on sovereign borrowing explain that sovereigns face losses or sanctions if they 
repudiate on their debt. Such costs may differ from that stated in the theoretical literature on sovereign debt 
restructuring where default has already occurred. There is no reason to assume the losses prevented from no 
default are the same as the losses incurred from default. Similarly, it would be misleading to assume that 
the relative gains from no default are the same as the gains from recovering from a default. 
46 The sovereign’s constraint is not only its inability to re-access the capital markets until it settles all creditors 
but also its inability to pay earlier-settling creditors until it settles holdouts. This was reflected in the US 
district court judgement against Argentina in the NML vs Argentina (2012) lawsuit prohibiting the sovereign 
from making payments to exchange bondholders without concurrently settling the holdouts. See NML 
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 2012) and NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic 
of Argentina, No. 08-cv-6978 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011) 
;8 <8 1 = 0,1, …∞ 
;= <= 
Sovereign obtains	9 
1 = 1= + 1, 1= + 2…∞ 
Settle/exits at 1= 
Settle/exits at 1? 
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Subgame 2 starts at the beginning of the timing stage ;8 where the two creditors decide 
when to enter	<8. After a creditor who enters  <8 exits, the game then proceeds to Subgame 
1 where only one creditor remains. Let @A denote the payoff to the creditor and 9A denote the 
payoff to the sovereign at the start of subgame	B,	for	B = 2,1,	where	B indicates the number 
of remaining creditors. Lowercase variables CA and	DA denote the payoffs at the end of the 
settlement stage	<A . The creditor who enters	<A	would immediately engage in a bilateral 
bargain with the sovereign that continues until an agreement is made. In bargaining creditor 
bears a transaction cost for negotiation, such that his payoff is some fraction E ∈ (0,1)	of 
bargained amount. 47 
The settlement stage involves negotiations that follow the random-offers variant of 
Rubinstein (1982) bargaining game. Once a creditor has entered the settlement stage, nature 
randomly assigns who makes the offer. Let L denote the probability the creditor is selected 
and 1 − L the probability that sovereign is chosen. Acceptance on either party ends the 
bargain with creditor exiting the game. Rejection leads to another round of bargaining in the 
next period where the proposer is randomly selected again. Bargaining continues until an 
offer is accepted. (See Figure 3.2 below).  
 
Figure 3.2 – Bargaining sub-game 
 
                                                
47 Pitchford and Wright claim that E varies with respect to <A	,	stating that the transaction costs are weakly 
larger for earlier settling creditors i.e. 	EA ≤ EAO=. For simplicity we let creditors bear the same proportional 
negotiation cost as assumed in their calibration exercise (Pitchford and Wright, 2012, p. 827). 
Agreement: Exit 
Rejection: Delay one period Entry Nature 
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3.4. Equilibrium solutions 
Game is solved using backward induction.  We obtain solutions to the stages in this 
following order:	<=, ;=, <8, ;8. Alternating back through settlement and timing stages in this 
way, we characterise a Subgame Perfect equilibrium (SPE) of a two-creditor game.    
3.4.1. Proposition 1 
There exist asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, namely (P, QP)	RST	(QP, P), in which 
players coordinate on the order of entry at ;8. 
We first solve the solution from	<=  which begins when the second creditor has entered 
(Lemma 1a). Following, we solve 	;=  taken as given the equilibrium payoffs in 		<=	 to 
determine whether the second creditor wishes to enter to bargain with the sovereign (Lemma 
1b). Moving back in the tree, we then solve <8 which begins when the first creditor has 
entered (Lemma 2a) and then solve the timing stage 	;8  to determine which of the two 
creditors enters		<8	(Lemma 2b).48 P denotes Enter, QP denotes Not-Enter. 
3.4.1.1. Lemma 1a: Bargaining outcome in	U) 
The unique SPE pay-off from bargaining stage	<= is 	C= = L9E and D= = (1 − L)9. 
Proof: 
We first assume SPE payoffs are not unique. Let the set of SPE payoffs for the sovereign be 
given by V= ≡ X=: ∃	an	SPE	of	<=with	payoffs	 X=, i= . Let the set of SPE payoffs for the 
creditor be given by j= ≡ i=: ∃	an	SPE	of	<=with	payoffs	 X=, i= . Suppose that the set of 
SPE values is non-empty i.e. there exists a (non-trivial) supremum (least upper bound within 
the set) and an infimum (greatest lower bound within the set).  Thus, the sovereign can do 
no better than X= ≡ kClV=and no worse than	X= ≡ BSmV=. Similarly, the creditor can do no 
better than i= ≡ kClj= and no worse than i= ≡ BSmj=. 
Consider a subgame of 	<= that begins after nature has determined that the creditor makes 
the offer. Let discount factor 	n = ==op ∈ (0,1) . The sovereign will reject all offers less 
than	nX=, the worst payoff it could get after rejection and thus the creditor’s payoff can be 
                                                
48 Note that, as in the case of Pitchford and Wright, the analysis has been simplified by the assumption that 
bargaining does not end until an agreement is reached. This means that in settlement stage	<A, the creditor 
cannot return to the timing stage	;A, allowing for separability of the solutions of 	<A	and	;A.  
  Chapter 3 
34 
 
no greater than	9 − 	nX=.The sovereign will accept any offer greater than nX=, the best it 
could get after rejection and thus the creditor’s payoff can be no less than	9 − nX=. 
Consider a subgame of 	<= that begins after nature has determined that the sovereign makes 
the offer. The creditor will reject any offer below 	ni= and thus sovereign’s payoff is no 
greater than 	9 − ni=. The creditor will accept any offer above ni= and thus sovereign’s 
payoff is no less than 9 − ni=. 
Moving back to the point in 	<= before nature has selected the proposer, we must have:  i= = L 9 − nX= + (1 − L)	ni= (3.1) 49 i= = L 9 − nX= + (1 − L)	ni= (3.2) X= = LnX= + 1 − L 9 − ni=  (3.3) X= = LnX= + (1 − L) 9 − ni=  (3.4) 
Substituting and solving these equations, we find  i= = i= = L9 and	X= = X= = 1 − L 9. 
This establishes the uniqueness of SPE values.  
The SPE strategies are as follows: The creditor always proposes to the sovereign n 1 − L 9 
and thus receives	 1 − n 1 − L 9. The creditor accepts any offer greater than or equal to nL9. The sovereign always proposes to the creditor nL9 and thus receives	 1 − nL 9. The 
sovereign accepts any proposal greater than or equal to n 1 − L 9. If nature chooses the 
sovereign to make the offer, the creditor will only accept any offer if it’s at least as large as nL9	since rejection leads to 	<= with payoffs	nL9. This acceptance rule constitutes a best 
response for the creditor. Therefore, the sovereign proposes the share nL9 which the creditor 
immediately accepts. Similar reasoning applies for the case where nature chooses creditor to 
make the offer. Thus in expected terms, C= = L9E	and	D= = (1 − L)9. 
3.4.1.2. Lemma 1b: Entry outcome in 	#) 
With one creditor left at	;=, the creditor immediately enters the settlement stage	<= at 1= + 1 
since his expected discounted payoff is  @= = nqL9E  for ∀k = 0,1, …∞  which is 
maximised at k = 0, where k represents the choice of entry from 1 = 1= + 1. Thus there is 
                                                
49 i= is a probability-weighted sum of the best the creditor can do if it makes the offer (where the sovereign 
offer pinned down to nX=  and thus the creditor maximises with	9 − 	nX=) and the best it can do if the 
sovereign makes the offer (where it receives ni=).  
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no incentive to delay entry and @= = C= = L9E . The sovereign’s expected discounted 
payoff is 9= = nq 1 − L 9 which at k = 0	is	9= = D= = 1 − L 9. 
3.4.1.3. Lemma 2a: Bargaining outcome in	U$ 
Similar to lemma 1a, let the set of SPE payoffs for the sovereign be given by V8 ≡ {X8: ∃ an 
SPE of	<8 with payoffs	 X8, i8 }. Let the set of SPE payoffs for the creditor be given by j8 ≡ {i8: ∃	an SPE of	<8 with payoffs	 X8, i8 }. From lemma 1a, it is understood that the 
bargained surplus at <8 has reduced from 9 to 1 − L 9 in anticipation of the settlement to 
the second-settling creditor. It is straightforward to derive SPE payoffs 	i8 = i8 =L 1 − L 9,	X8 = X8 = 1 − L 89. SPE strategies remain the same at stated in lemma 1a: 
When the first-settling creditor enters	<8, immediate settlement occurs. As lemma 1b shows 
that the second-settling creditor does not delay entry into <=, the expected discounted payoffs 
are C8 = L 1 − L 9E	and	D8 = (1 − L)89 for the creditor and sovereign respectively. 
3.4.1.4. Lemma 2b: Entry outcome in	#$ 
In every 1 of the timing stage	;8, creditors simultaneously choose to enter or not-enter. If at 1 = 0 both choose to Qu1	vS1vw the settlement stage	<8 , we move over to 1 = 1	within the 
Timing stage	;8 where the creditors again decide whether or not to enter	<8. If creditors 
again decide simultaneously to Qu1	vS1vw  	<8 , we move to 1 = 2 where they yet again 
decide to enter or not-enter. The timing stage 	;8 continues in this format until one creditor 
enters	<8.  Let us represent the simultaneous game in normal form: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
Note that	C8 < 	@=. Take the following pure strategy: with probability  l ∈ 0,1  Creditor 1 
will PS1vw in every given 1 and with probability  y ∈ 0,1   Creditor 2 will PS1vw in every 
given	1 . Let us first compute Creditor 1’s discounted continuation payoff (bottom-right 
payoff of the matrix in Table 3.1) 
Creditor 2 
C
re
di
to
r 1
 
 z {z z 12C8 + 12@=, 12 C8 + 12@= C8, @= 
{z @=, C8 (Game restarts) Continuation payoff 
 
Table 3.1 – Normal form representation of #$ 
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The continuation payoff for creditor 1, |}=,	 is  
|}= = n1 − 1 − l 1 − y n y@= 1 − 12l + lC8 1 − 12y 	 (3.5) 
 
Proof: 
Computing for the creditor’s continuation payoff, we get: 
ly n 12C8 + n 12@= + 1 − l yn@= + l(1 − y)nC8 + 1 − l 1 − y [ly(n8 12 C8+ n8 12@=) + 1 − l yn8@= + l(1 − y)n8C8+ 1 − l 1 − y [ly n 12 C8 + n 12@= + 1 − l yn@= + l(1− y)nC8 + 1 − l 1 − y […… 
Solving and re-arranging:  
 lyn =8 C8 + l 1 − y nC8 + 1 − l 1 − y 	ly	n8 =8 C8 + 1 − l 1 − y 8ln8C8 + 1 −l 8 1 − y 8lyn =8 C8 + 1 − l 8 1 − y lnC8 …+ lyn =8 @= + 1 − l yn@= + 1 −l 1 − y 	lyn8 =8 @= + 1 − l 8 1 − y yn8@= + 1 − l 8 1 − y 8lyn =8 @= + 1 −l  1 − y 8yn@= + ⋯ 
Factorising: 12C8 lyn + 1 − l 1 − y lyn8 + 1 − l 8 1 − y 8lyn + ⋯+ C8 l 1 − y n + 1 − l 1 − y 8ln8 + 1 − l 8 1 − y lyn + ⋯+ 12@= lyn + 1 − l 1 − y lyn8 + 1 − l 8 1 − y 8lyn + ⋯+ @= 1 − l yn + 1 − l 8(1 − y)yn8 + 1 − l  1 − y 8yn + ⋯  12 C8 + @= lyn 1 + 1 − l 1 − y n + 1 − l 8 1 − y 8n8 + 1 − l  1 − y n …+ C8l 1 − y n 1 + 1 − l 1 − y n + 1 − l 8 1 − y 8n8+ 1 − l  1 − y n …+ @= 1 − l yn 1 + 1 − l 1 − y n + 1 − l 8 1 − y 8n8+ 1 − l  1 − y n …  
Simplifying an infinite geometric series: 
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Let Å = 1 + 1 − l 1 − y n + 1 − l 8 1 − y 8n8 + 1 − l  1 − y n + ⋯ 
Now 1 − l 1 − y nÅ = 1 − l 1 − y n + 1 − l 8 1 − y 8n8 + 1 − l  1 −y n + 1 − l Ç 1 − y ÇnÇ … 
Since	Å − 1 − l 1 − y nÅ = 1,	therefore	Å = ==O =OÉ =OÑ Ö 
Thus continuation payoff = ==O =OÉ =OÑ Ö =8 C8 + @= lyn + C8l 1 − y n + @= 1 −l yn  
= n1 − 1 − l 1 − y n y@= 1 − 12l + lC8 1 − 12y  
           Q.E.D 
By symmetry, the continuation payoffs for creditor 2, |}8, is 
|}8 = n1 − 1 − l 1 − y n l@= 1 − 12y + yC8 1 − 12l 	 (3.6) 
 
Note that all the subgames in timing stage ;8 are identical. Therefore let us characterise the 
stationary pure strategy Nash equilibria as follows:  
• When y = 1, best response for Creditor 1 is l∗ = 0 as @= > =8 C8 + @= . When l =0 , best response for Creditor 2 is y∗ = 1  as C8 > |}8  for every n < 1 . Thus l∗, y∗ = 0,1  is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
In other words, when Creditor 2 chooses the strategy PS1vw in every 1 of ;8,	Creditor 1’s 
optimal response strategy is Qu1	PS1vw in every 1	of ;8. Also, when Creditor 1 strategy is Qu1	PS1vw in every 1 of ;8,	Creditor 2’s optimal response strategy is PS1vw in every 1	of ;8. 
If Creditor 1 chooses the pure strategy Qu1	PS1vw  in every 1	of ;8 , a pure strategy by 
Creditor 2 to PS1vw only after ; > 0 units of time in ;8 is strictly dominated by the pure 
strategy PS1vw  in every 1	of ;8  as nàC8 < C8 . Similarly, if Creditor 2 chooses the pure 
strategy PS1vw in every 1	of ;8, a pure strategy by Creditor 1 to PS1vw only after ; > 0 
units of time in ;8 is strictly dominated by the pure strategy	Qu1	PS1vw in every 1	of ;8 as nâ@=äâã? > nâ@=àO=âã? + nâ =8 C8 + @=äâãà ,	 which solves to  åç=OÖ > åç =OÖé=OÖ +Öé=OÖ =8 C8 + @=  and is true since	@= > C8.  
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• By symmetry, when y = 0 , best response for Creditor 1 is l∗ = 1  as C8 > |}= . 
When 	l = 1 , best response for Creditor 2 is y∗ = 0  as 	@= > =8 C8 + @= . Thus l∗, y∗ = 1,0  is also pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Therefore, there exists asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria namely (P, QP)	RST	(QP, P) where creditors coordinate on the order of entry. Next we report the 
result for the continuous time limit case as ∆→ 0 where ∆ represents the time difference 
between successive periods. 
3.4.2. Corollary 1 
In the limit, as ∆→ 0, the asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria converges to a game 
with immediate agreement. 
Proof: 
The analysis above showed that the whole game ends in 1 = 1 as one creditor at timing stage ;8	immediately enters the settlement stage <8 at 1 = 0 and settles with the sovereign, thus 1= = 0. This is followed by the timing stage ;= where the remaining creditor immediately 
enters settlement stage <=  at 1 = 1= + 1 and settles with the sovereign, thus	1? = 1. This 
result implies that there is trivial delay. Here we show that when the time differences between 
two successive periods tend to zero, the whole game ends almost immediately.  
Let the game be represented as	1 = 0, ∆,2∆…∞ and the discount factor be n = ==op∆. Note 
that as	∆→ 0, n → 1. Walking backwards from the bargaining outcome in <= to the Entry 
outcome in ;8 , we use the results from Lemma 1a – Lemma 2b and show how the 
equilibrium results change as ∆→ 0.  
The Bargaining outcome in <=and Entry outcome in	;=: In the limit, as ∆→ 0, the realised 
discounted payoffs converge to the expected payoffs of @= = C= = L9E  and 9= = D= =1 − L 9. Bargaining parties settle immediately in <=. Creditor has no incentive to delay 
entry, thus creditor’s entry time in 	;= converges to 1 = 1= and also exit time in <= converges 
to 1? = 1=. 
The Bargaining outcome in <8 and Entry outcome in ;8: Similarly, in the limit, as ∆→ 0, the 
realised discounted payoffs converge to the expected payoffs of C8 = L 1 − L 9E	and D8 = (1 − L)89. Bargaining parties settle immediately in <8. We have already showed in 
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Lemma 2b that creditors coordinate on the order of entry with one creditor entering ;8 
immediately i.e. 1= = 0.  
Thus as ∆→ 0, the last-settling creditor entry time in ;= converges to 1 = 0, with his exit 
time in <= converging to 1? = 0. Thus with ∆> 0 but negligibly small, the game ends almost 
immediately with players splitting the bargaining pie according to their respective bargaining 
power. 
Q.E.D. 
The PSNE shows that in the limit, there is immediate agreement with no delay and since we 
are attempting to have comparable results with the Pitchford and Wright paper, which 
models in continuous time settings, we look at the case for when ∆	→ 0.  
By letting ∆	→ 0, we capture the possible speedy nature of the bargaining process between 
the debtor and its creditors. After the debtor has made an announcement of a default or a 
possible default, he instantaneously attempts to engage in negotiations with creditors to 
avoid unnecessary delays. Such engagements may be physical (such as a meeting) or 
electronic (such as emails), which would require allowing for the time interval between 
successive rounds of bargaining to tend to zero. In addition, when the debtor has settled with 
a creditor, it is not surprising that the debtor immediately attempts to bargain with rest of 
creditors through similar engagements. Thus, we look at the case for where ∆	→ 0 allowing 
for quick correspondence between parties.  
Notwithstanding, there may be breakdowns in negotiations at any given bargaining phase. 
However, we do not model this.  
3.5. Discussion on robustness 
3.5.1. Risk Aversion 
In the paper, we assumed players have risk neutral preferences. However, the assumption of 
linear utility is restrictive, and particularly so if players’ behaviour as a function of their 
preferences is central in determining the possibility of delay. However, if all players have 
the same risk averse (concave) utility functions, bargaining shares for individual players 
would not change and thus our equilibrium results of immediate agreement remain the same. 
If however, for example, the debtor is risk neutral while the creditors are risk averse, we 
could expect to see that the creditors respective bargaining share will be lower than their 
equilibrium offers presented above, but we still obtain our result immediate agreement as 
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their risk averse preferences have been accounted for in their resulting payoffs and does not 
influence their entry decisions to bargain with the debtor any further. A similar reasoning 
also applies for the converse (debtor risk averse and creditors risk neutral). 
3.5.2. Asymmetric creditors 
In the paper, we assumed symmetric creditors. However, creditors may differ in many forms, 
for example, in their discount rates, bargaining abilities, creditor holdings or even in their 
risk preference. Let’s take one case i.e. different discount factors where one creditor is more 
patient than the other, albeit n < 1. It is expected that the impatient creditor receives less 
than a creditor’s equilibrium payoff as stated above, while the patient creditor receives more. 
Moreover, we are more likely to end up in the pure strategy equilibrium where the impatient 
creditor enters bargaining with the debtor first, while the patient creditor enters second. Thus, 
the impatient creditor is even more likely to be worse off. Nevertheless, our equilibrium 
conditions for immediate settlement should not change since delay is costly. Similarly, when 
considering the other variations of asymmetry between creditors, a higher equilibrium share 
will be granted to that which has a higher bargaining power, but immediate settlement still 
results.  
3.6. Conclusion 
Pitchford and Wright (2012) focused on a symmetric mixed-strategy SPE of delay where 
creditors randomise according to the choice of settling now or later. They did not show the 
pure strategy result where players coordinate on the order of entry, with one creditor entering 
into negotiations immediately and the remaining creditor delaying entry by reason of each 
bargaining with the sovereign at a time. We have been able to show that this asymmetric 
pure strategy solution in discrete time settings involves instantaneous settlement as the time 
gap between two periods becomes negligibly small, contrary to their claims that players 
coordinate on their order of entry in the continuous time limit.  
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Chapter 4  
4. Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: 
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Adversarial 
Litigation 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the absence of an international bankruptcy regime, a sovereign debtor and its creditors are 
faced with an incomplete contracting problem, characterised by the uncertainty about a 
sovereign’s ability and/or willingness to pay and creditors’ attitude towards a debt 
restructuring.  Consequently, contracts have embedded terms that attempt to address these 
issues, imposing constraints on both creditors and sovereigns. Despite the insertion and 
revision of clauses aimed at alleviating some of the inefficiencies in debt workouts, 50 
evidence from sovereign debt lawsuits suggest that parties may have heterogeneous 
interpretations of contractual terms leading up to different expectations of judiciary 
outcomes. 
This chapter analyses the problem of reaching early settlements in sovereign debt 
restructurings driven by heterogeneous beliefs about creditor-litigation outcomes during 
temporary disagreements in bargaining. Against the backdrop of an adversarial justice 
system governing sovereign debt51 , could parties hold heterogeneous priors over court 
outcomes? This question follows from the observation that bargaining parties receive public 
signals i.e. publically available information such as court records, official statistics, country 
reports, newspaper reports etc. Parties could use such public signals to make different 
inferences about court outcomes prior to bargaining. To what extent can this explain delays 
                                                
50  Bi et al. (2011) states that legal innovations, for example minimum participation thresholds (such as 
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) which allow for a supermajority of bondholders that agree to a debt 
restructuring to bind all others holders, including those who voted against the restructuring) and defensive 
“exit consents” or “exit amendments” (which refer to changes in the non-payment terms of the bonds, such 
as cross-default, listing, and acceleration clauses, potentially impairing the liquidity and litigation prospects 
associated with a particular bond) can help coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Also see International 
Capital Market Association (2014) publishing revised language for sovereign debt issuances to address 
certain inefficiencies hampering successful completions of sovereign debt restructurings. 
51 The adversarial system is a legal system where two advocates represent their parties’ positions before an 
impartial judge who attempts to determine the truth of the case. 
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in debt-restructurings? What distributional implications do court decisions have on the 
bargaining outcome of debt restructurings? This chapter attempts to answer these questions 
through undertaking a theoretical analysis using legal materials. 
This chapter comprises of four main sections: Firstly, it presents selected case studies 
demonstrating heterogeneous beliefs of court outcomes. It reviews arguments put forward 
by parties in order to identify heterogeneous beliefs. We specifically study the legal disputes 
of NML Capital Ltd. et al v. Republic of Argentina (2001-2016) and Elliott Associates, L.P. 
V. Republic Of Peru (1996-2000), and investigate the major subjects under which parties 
had contrasting opinions. Our focus on these particular disputes is due to the availability of 
extensive legal materials (court pleadings, orders and decisions sourced from 
argentine.shearman.com and ravellaw.com) that provides clear evidence of heterogeneous 
beliefs.52 Secondly, it introduces a sequential bargaining model debt restructuring with finite 
horizon between two players (one creditor, one debtor). 53 The creditor is left to decide 
whether to accept or reject a proposed debt restructuring offer by the debtor. If the creditor 
rejects, he can choose to seek a court-enforcement order during temporary disagreements in 
negotiation. It is in this disagreement phase that the parties hold heterogeneous beliefs of 
litigation outcomes. The model solves for the subgame perfect equilibrium of delay. It 
calibrates the model to quantify welfare losses, provides policy implications and concludes 
that non-adversarial legal systems are required for more efficient restructuring negotiations. 
Thirdly, the chapter considers other model expositions with evolving beliefs for a shorter 
time horizon and establishes similar results of delay. Fourthly, it then considers the Yildiz 
(2003) model with heterogeneous beliefs about the recognition process. Yildiz found that if 
the bargaining game is played for a sufficiently long time, players settle immediately. Here 
I characterize the conditions for delay under common and different discount factors, and 
with evolving beliefs.  
                                                
52 Our case study investigation can also be extended to any sovereign debt lawsuit filed under an adversarial 
legal system comprising of contrary claims and defences raised by opposing sides in their respective 
pleadings before the final court verdict is made. 
53 The ‘one creditor’ assumption is an attempt to abstract away from creditor coordination issues causing delays 
in sovereign debt restructuring. In other words, it is an attempt to show that delay can still arise in spite of 
the presence of CAC’s. See Pitchford and Wright (2013) on the vast amount of theoretical literature on 
creditor coordination issues. In addition, allowing for more than one creditor will require accommodating 
different types of creditors with, for example, a holdout-type creditor being more optimistic in litigation 
than a normal-type creditor. This will further complicate the analysis and divert the reader’s attention away 
from the central focus of the chapter regarding the impact of adversarial litigation which requires just one 
creditor to file a lawsuit.  
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In recognition of the final settlement outcomes from sovereign debt disputes, discussed in 
section 2.2 above and section 4.3 below, we model an environment in which court decisions 
can be enforced through court orders – an attachment order or injunction order. Our 
discussion observes that when a creditor litigates and is successful in obtaining such orders, 
future negotiations are made against the backdrop of the granted order. For example, if it is 
an attachment order granted by the court for the satisfaction of the creditor’s claim, the 
creditor could seize the attached sovereign asset should future negotiations fail to recognise 
the order. Likewise, if it is an injunction order, the court would block payments to other 
creditors54 if future negotiations fail to recognise the order. This is the reason why court 
decisions can be enforced, either through the seizure of an asset or through inflicting pain on 
the sovereign for non-payment to third party creditors. Landmark sovereign debt cases have 
shown to support these types of court enforcement. 
The rest of the motivation for this chapter comes in two main folds; Firstly, evidence 
suggests that sovereign debt restructuring negotiations are usually time consuming and that 
delays are costly to both the sovereign (who faces disrupted access to world capital markets) 
and creditors (who hold onto illiquid and risky assets).55 Secondly and more importantly, 
theoretical literature modelling delays in sovereign debt restructurings have failed to account 
for the significant role courts play in shaping settlement outcomes.56 This chapter recognises 
the very limited application of the existing literature in modelling litigation in sovereign debt 
markets, see for example Schumacher et al. (2015) noting that the modelling framework 
from law and economics has scarcely been used to study lawsuits in this area. Consequently, 
our key contribution is to show the impact of a heterogeneous belief system, emerging from 
an adversarial jurisdiction governing sovereign debt, in explaining protracted delays in 
restructuring.  
There are two points that need to be emphasized. First, we do not study ex-ante implications 
on debtor’s incentives to default or not given heterogeneous beliefs. As a result, we cannot 
draw normative conclusions of the impact of clarified contractual clauses on the debtor’s or 
creditor’s behaviour pre-default. The chapter rather studies ex-post implications of 
                                                
54 Multiple creditors decision-making not modelled in our framework 
55 There is an extensive literature supporting costly delays in sovereign debt restructuring, see for example 
Guzman (2016) on Argentina’s sovereign debt restructuring, (Mariscal et al., 2015, Cruces and Trebesch, 
2013), (Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer, 2007)and (Roubini and Setser, 2004). 
56 Literature on explanations for delays in sovereign debt restructurings include: (Merlo and Wilson, 1998), 
(Bi, 2008) and (Benjamin and Wright, 2016) on uncertain recovery; (Bai and Zhang, 2012)on bank loans vs 
bonds with incomplete information about creditors’ outside options; (Pitchford and Wright, 2012) on 
multiple creditors and mixed strategies equilibria; (Ghosal and Miller, 2016) on creditor heterogeneity; 
(Ghosal et al., 2016) on recovery and signalling of sustainability concerns.  
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heterogeneous beliefs on the duration of a restructuring process. Second, the model in 4.4 
considers a one-shot litigation game after rejection of an initial offer, where the holdout has 
only one chance to hunt for attachable assets. In practice however, the creditor, having 
obtained summary judgement, can always launch subsequent proceedings against the debtor 
after previous court dismissals of attachment. For simplicity of exposition, the model 
focusses on the presence of heterogeneous beliefs in a one-shot litigation game and in so 
doing avoids computational issues that arise from the evolution of beliefs with dynamic 
litigation games.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows:  Section 4.2 discusses the related literature. 
Section 4.3 provides some suggestive and case study evidence of heterogeneous beliefs. 
Section 4.4 presents the theory. Section 4.5 solves the equilibrium conditions for delay. 
Section 4.6 presents calibrated results. Section 4.7 contains a policy discussion and Section 
4.8 concludes. An appendix follows with proofs of results (Section 4.9). Subsequently, we 
look at other model expositions (Section 4.10 – heterogeneous beliefs about inside options 
and Section 0 – Yildiz heterogeneous beliefs about recognition process).  
4.2. Related Literature 
Delay in this paper57 stems from players holding incompatible priors which are common 
knowledge, unlike many from the strand of theoretical literature that stress asymmetric 
information in explaining delays in bargaining (See for example (Fudenberg et al., 1985); 
(Grossman and Perry, 1986); (Bai and Zhang, 2012), (Ghosal et al., 2016) among many 
others). It is worth noting the distinction between heterogeneous beliefs and asymmetric 
information in these contexts. The former is concerned with heterogeneous priors while the 
latter is concerned with posteriors that are heterogeneous. To further clarify, in the case of 
heterogeneous beliefs, players have different priors over the states of the world commonly 
known among themselves at the start of the bargaining game whereas in the case of 
asymmetric information, players have common priors but later receive privately observed 
signals resulting to different posterior beliefs over the states of the world. Thus, in the case 
of asymmetric information, players are led to have heterogeneous posteriors because of 
private signals they receive as the game proceeds. We are not concerned with this case, but 
rather we are concerned with the first case where players hold heterogeneous priors. 
                                                
57 The words paper and chapter are used interchangeably. 
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The justification of modelling with heterogeneous beliefs, rather than with asymmetric 
information, about the outcome of litigation follows from the fact that the bargaining parties 
receive public signals about court-outcomes. It is implausible to explain the different beliefs 
parties have about court-outcomes on the basis of privately observed signals as all court 
documentation and records are public. Therefore, any difference in beliefs must be 
heterogeneous priors.  
Our model is perhaps closer to that of Yildiz (2003) heterogeneous beliefs framework which 
builds on a sequential bargaining model where players are optimistic about their future 
outside options. Yildiz demonstrates that if the bargaining game is sufficiently long and 
players perceive the outside options to be independently distributed across time, bargaining 
will end immediately. Our model contrasts with Yildiz in making outside options 
endogenous i.e. a function of history being determined by events that occur during temporary 
disagreements in bargaining. This has led to our main findings that players with excessive 
optimism are unable to satisfy their continuation payoffs with an immediate distribution of 
the pie, as opposed to Yildiz framework where players are able to do so.58 We argue therefore 
that there is no existing theoretical framework that investigates the role of optimism about 
endogenously determined outside options in explaining delays in bargaining. 
Extensive Law and Economics literature attempt to explain failures in reaching pre-trial 
settlement using modelling frameworks with uncertainty and informational asymmetries.59 
Much of the literature supports the asymmetric-information hypothesis that postulates 
private information, held by one or more litigants, as a cause of settlement delays.60 Our 
modelling framework can rather be supported by the divergent-expectations hypothesis. 
Literature motivated by this hypothesis posits that settlement failures result from 
incompatible expectations of trial outcomes (Sullivan, 2016). A relatable intuition is 
provided in a simple numerical framework in (Hay and Spier, 1997, p. 5) demonstrating that 
                                                
58 Moreover, the structures of the games are different. Yildiz framework is stationary due to every period of 
the bargaining game being identical to each other while our model is non-stationary due to the first-period 
being substantially different from that the rest of the periods of the bargaining game. In addition, our model 
studies the effect of other parameters unique to a litigation process, such as legal costs, on delays in 
bargaining. 
59 See (Spier, 2007) for a detailed review of the theoretical literature on pre-trial bargaining. 
60 See for example (Cooter et al., 1982) on unobservable traits by disputants; (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986) on 
plaintiff private information about level of damages and making offer; (Bebchuk, 1984) and (Nalebuff, 
1987) on defendants private information about strength of case with plaintiff making offer; (Spier, 1992) on 
a dynamic extension of (Bebchuk, 1984) where plaintiff makes one-sided offers; (Spier, 1994) on two-sided 
incomplete (private) information about the future behaviour of the court; (Farmer and Pecorino, 1996) for a 
comprehensive review of the literature on litigation and settlement under incomplete information. 
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parties may find no mutually acceptable settlement if both are sufficiently optimistic about 
their prospects in court. A vast amount of this literature models non-strategic decision-
making with respect to litigation and settlement, contrary to our framework.61 Furthermore, 
our paper can be supported by the ample amount of experimental and field evidence showing 
that people tend to form optimistic beliefs about future uncertainty when bargaining and 
such contributes to negotiation breakdowns.62 Thus, our paper adds to the literature on self-
serving bias that assigns the causes of costly delays to parties’ excessive subjective optimism 
about their future bargaining power. Though this literature criticise adversarial legal systems 
as given rise to opportunities for diverse expectations of a lawsuit eventually leading to 
delays in bargaining, none of the literature have modelled the uncertainty and dynamics 
peculiar to sovereign debt bargaining where there persists both weak enforcement of court 
judgement and post-litigation negotiations.63 In our paper, any post-litigation settlement is 
made against the backdrop of a discovered sovereign asset court-ordered for the satisfaction 
of creditor’s claims. Thus in our paper, players share optimistic beliefs about expected 
outside options available during post-litigation bargaining.  
Our result is more comparable to that of (Bar-Gill, 2006) who, studying the persistence of 
optimism bias about trial outcomes, finds that optimism increases the expected settlement 
value and thus increases the probability of impasse. However, our model and solution 
concept differ in the following respects. Bar-Gill’s framework is stationary and static and he 
used the solution concept of Evolutionary stable strategy, while our model is non-stationary 
and dynamic and we use the solution concept of Subgame perfect equilibrium. In addition, 
                                                
61 For the earliest models concerning party expectations, see (Landes, 1971), (Posner, 1973), (Gould, 1973), 
(Shavell, 1982). These authors did not explicitly model the bargaining process but simply assumed that a 
settlement would take place when the reservation value of the plaintiff is less than that of the defendant. In 
a later model, Priest and Klein (1984) postulate that settlement failures occurs because parties estimate a 
case’s value with error. Estimates in their model are assumed to be rational, contrary to our assumption that 
parties form subjective, and therefore biased, assessments of court decisions. In addition, their paper 
assumes that parties behave non-strategically with respect to litigation and settlement, contrary to our 
proposition where actions by one party affects both current and future actions of the other party.  
62 See for example, (Loewenstein et al., 1993) showing that parties assessments of what was considered a fair 
settlement and their predictions of the judge’s award were both biased – the magnitude of such bias being a 
strong predictor of settlement failures; (Babcock et al., 1995) establishing a causal link between self-serving 
bias and settlement found incompatible estimates of judges’ decisions despite all information being public; 
(Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997) also presenting evidence illustrating the persistence of self-serving bias 
despite parties sharing identical information; (Babcock et al., 1997) showing an intervention targeted at 
debiasing parties’ expectations served to reduce bargaining impasse; (Farmer et al., 2004) finding evidence 
on Major League Baseball showed that settlement failures, leading to the use of final-offer arbitrations 
between parties’ (players and clubs), resulted from optimism in offer proposals – the chapter’s results being 
more consistent with the optimism hypothesis than with the asymmetric information hypothesis because the 
“facts of the case” were all public information.  
63 Our theory departs from the literature when considering an environment of weak contractual enforcement, 
where creditors experience difficulties in enforcing their judgement due to limited available attachable assets 
of the sovereign debtor. 
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in considering an environment of weak enforcement, we contrast sharply from Bar-Gill who 
suggests that the judgement value decreed by the court is awarded to the creditor in a post-
litigation settlement.  Nevertheless, we complement the result of Bar-Gill (2006) in two 
ways: Firstly, when the sum of parties’ optimism is too high, settlement negotiations fail and 
a costly trial follows; Secondly, the level of optimism required for a breakdown in 
negotiations is increasing in the cost of litigation. 
 
4.3. Heterogeneous beliefs 
 
Firstly, we illustrate some examples where both parties may hold contradictory beliefs of the 
negotiation process in general, leading to possible disagreements in sovereign debt 
restructuring.  
1. Debtor’s willingness to repay debt: Creditor believes that the default and the 
proposed haircut are not in-line with government capacity to repay (Bi et al., 2011).64 
2. Counterparty’s attitude in debt re-negotiations: Debtor believes that since it is in 
crisis, creditor will accept a heavy haircut, whilst creditor believes that debtor could 
undergo austerity measures to repay debt in full. Through this, debtor signals 
inability to pay while creditor signals refusal to compromise to haircut (Guzman and 
Stiglitz, 2015b);  
3. Creditor’s enforcement tools: Though there is common knowledge of weak 
enforcement among parties, the creditor believes that enforcement tools may develop 
over the course of persisting in litigation, while the debtor believes that legal or other 
sanctions in the creditor’s possession are limited. (Miller and García-Fronti, 2004); 
4. Expected litigation outcome: Holdout creditor believes that with a high probability 
it will recover a settlement amount higher than the proposed haircut through 
                                                
64 In other words, creditor may believe that the debtor is capable of paying – having observed the set of publicly 
available indicators including official statistics such as government budget balance, reserves, capital flows 
etc. – but unwilling to pay. The debtor may believe otherwise, that he is incapable of paying due to other 
political commitments even though he is willing to pay. Alternatively, the debtor may be unwilling to pay 
because of certain political constraints independent of the capacity of paying. 
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litigation, whilst debtor believes otherwise. In other words, both creditor and debtor 
are optimistic in the event of a lawsuit.65 
Consequently, different expectations of the negotiation process and litigation outcomes can 
lead to delays in bargaining. We now provide evidence from the NML v Argentina and Elliot 
v Peru case study to motivate the examples listed above. Different opinions between the 
debtor and the creditor were public knowledge through the court pleadings and court 
decisions.  
 
4.3.1 Case-Study: NML Capital Ltd. V. Republic of Argentina (2001-
2016) 
 
The case NML Capital Ltd et al. V. Republic of Argentina reflected many disputes over the 
expected outcome of the lawsuit.66 Heterogeneous beliefs spanned across a range of subjects 
detailed in Table 4.1.  
Background67 
In December 2001, Argentina defaulted on its external debt. Its New York-law bonds 
contained clauses promising to protect holdout creditors from involuntary subordination. 
One of its key clauses, referred to as the “Equal treatment provision” provides that  
“The payment obligation of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least 
equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External 
Indebtedness…” 
In 2005, Argentina proposed an exchange offer to holders of defaulted bonds. Its prospectus 
stated the risks of not participating in the exchange offer, including the following  
                                                
65 Distinctively complex from Argentina, another recent illustrative example with official creditors is Ukraine 
vs Russia, see (Ogirenko, 2016) “Ukraine 'confident' of success in Russian debt lawsuit”. In addition, see 
(Gelpern, 2016, pp. 81-85) on circumstances surrounding the Ukraine vs Russia legal dispute (Russia 
claiming, inter alia, that Ukraine did not negotiate in good faith and Ukraine claiming payment waiver on 
basis of Russia’s invasion causing economic instability (arguments grounded in common law contract 
doctrine). Moreover, Gelpern states “In Argentina and Ukraine alike, courts could use guidance on the 
meaning of equality and good faith in sovereign debt practice, but such guidance is hard to come by because 
participants in the restructuring process often disagree on first principles.” 
66 As at the time of writing, there still remains a small minority of holdout bondholders who continue to hold 
out for a better deal. The majority of the creditors agreed a settlement with the sovereign on February 29, 
2016. See Ladjevardian v. Republic Argentina No. 06-cv-3276 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. May. 26, 2016) at 2. 
67 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246-265 (2d Cir. 2012) at 4-14 
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“Existing defaulted bonds eligible for exchange that are not tendered may remain in default 
indefinitely… The government has announced that it has no intension of resuming payment 
on any bonds eligible to participate in the exchange offer…that are not tendered or 
otherwise restructured as part of such transaction…”    
Simultaneously, Argentina legislature passed a law (“Lock Law”) declaring that  
“The national Executive Power may not, with respect to the [defaulted] bonds…, reopen the 
swap process established in the [2005 exchange offer]. The national state shall be prohibited 
from conducting any type of in-court or private settlement with respect to the [defaulted] 
bonds …” 
In 2010, Argentina re-opened the exchange offer and temporarily suspended the Lock Law 
(“Lock Law suspension”). The Lock Law Suspension contained that 
“…it is prohibited to offer the holders of government bonds who may have initiated judicial 
action, more favourable treatment than what is offered to those who have not done so.”   
The 2010 exchange offer also included in its prospectus that  
“Eligible Securities that are in default and that are not tendered may remain in default 
indefinitely and, if you elect to litigate, Argentina intends to oppose such attempts to collect 
on its defaulted debt. … In light of its financial and legal constraints, Argentina does not 
expect to resume payments on any Eligible Securities in default that remain outstanding 
following the expiration of the Invitation…” 
The holdouts did not participate in any of the swaps. Instead they persisted in litigation by 
seeking an injunctive relief on the basis of violation of the equal treatment provision. In 
February 2012, the US district court granted injunctive relief to the holdouts, ordering that  
“whenever the Republic pays any amount due under the terms of the exchange bonds, it must 
concurrently or in advance pay the holdouts the same fraction of the amount due to them” 
(“Ratable payment”). 
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Table 4.1 – NML v. Argentina Heterogeneous beliefs 
                                                
68 See Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L), 2012 WL 1494911 (2nd Cir. Apr. 17, 2012) at 10 
69 See Response Brief, supra note 68 at 17 fn. 8, 18. 
70 See Memorandum of Law of the Republic of Argentina in Response to Plaintiffs Brief on Remand, NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina,  No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 11, 
2012) at 2. 
71 See Response Brief, supra note 68 at 7 
72See  Response Brief, supra note 68 at 10 fn. 3 
Subject Holdouts (“NML”) belief Debtor's (“Argentina”) belief 
Equal 
treatment 
provision 
The provision was violated by Argentina through not making 
ratable payments to both types of bonds and giving payment 
obligations on defaulted bonds a priority behind that of exchange 
bonds. Equal treatment means servicing both the exchange bonds 
and holdout bonds according to their due claims.68 
The provision is only violated when preferential treatment is 
given to a particular class of bondholders without valid cause. It 
has been generally understood to forbid only legal 
subordination. 69  Equal treatment means both the exchange 
bondholders and the holdouts receive the same payment terms.70 
Lock law 
Argentina legally subordinated its payment obligations on the 
defaulted bonds through the lock law because the law made it 
illegal for the country to service the defaulted bonds, thereby 
rendering them unenforceable in Argentine courts.71 
The Lock law did not give any other debt legal preference in that 
it had not given the exchange bondholders a legally enforceable 
preference over the defaulted bonds in the event of a default on 
the exchange bonds.72  
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73 See Joint Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees NML Capital, Ltd. et al, NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina,  No. 12-105-cv(L), 2012 WL 1406898 (2nd Cir. Apr. 17, 2012), at 50 
74 See Memorandum of Law, supra note 70 at 15 
75 Laches is a defence to an equitable action stating that delay in pursuing an equitable claim or remedy may result in the relief/remedy being lost. A statute of limitation prescribes a deadline 
for bringing actions of certain kinds to court. In this case, the applicable statute of limitation was six years. 
76 See Joint Response Brief, supra note 73 at 23. The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C) is a set of laws providing legal rules and regulations for commercial transactions in the US. U.C.C. 
Article §4A 502 cmt. 4 states that “A creditor of the originator can levy on the account of the originator in the originator’s bank before the funds transfer is initiated . . . [but] cannot reach 
any other funds because no property of the originator is being transferred. 
78 See Memorandum of Law, supra note 70 at 19 
Debtor's 
willingness 
to pay 
In 2012, Argentina amended its Central Bank Charter to permit 
greater access to the Bank’s reserves to service debts. As 
Argentina was in possession of reserves much greater than the 
claims of both exchange bondholders and holdouts, it was 
therefore financial capable of meeting the ratable payment 
order.73 
Argentina was not financial capable of paying both the exchange 
bondholders and the holdouts as to comply with the ratable 
payment formula would require using foreign currency reserves 
which are subject to Argentine law and serve for essential central 
bank stabilising functions.74 
Equitable 
defence of 
Laches75 
Delay in advancing their claims for equitable relief was due to 
the efforts in obtaining money judgements and enforcing them. 
Plaintiffs delayed in making their claim for equitable relief 
despite the opportunity to do so. 
Processing 
agents of 
Argentina 
The financial institutions are agents, and not intermediary banks, 
of Argentina and thus the U.C.C. does not apply.76 Any financial 
institution with connection to the payment of the performing debt 
U.C.C. bars injunctions from binding intermediary banks that 
assist in making payments on the exchange bonds.78 All financial 
institutions prevented by the injunction from processing 
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77 See Memorandum of Law, supra note 70 at 3,22 
79 See Response Brief, supra note 68 at 32 
80 See Memorandum of Law, supra note 70 at 53 
is an agent of Argentina as they act on behalf of Argentina in 
processing the payments. 77 
payments are agents of exchange bondholders as Argentina 
relinquishes all control over the funds. 
Wider 
effects of 
the order 
Markets adjust rapidly to provide an appropriate balance 
between creditor and debtor’s interests, An example is the 
widespread adoption of Collective Action Clauses that allow 
restructuring with approval of fewer than all bondholders.79 
The ratable payment interpretation of the equal treatment clause 
will render future sovereign debt relief impossible to achieve. 
Such runs afoul with the US policy in favour of encouraging 
needed sovereign debt restructurings.80 
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4.3.2 Case-Study: Elliott Associates, L.P. V. Republic Of Peru 
(1996-2000) 
Elliott Associates, L.P. (referred herein as “Elliot” or “plaintiffs”) V. Republic of Peru 
(“Peru”) and Banco de la Nacion (“Banco”) (collectively “defendants”) reflected numerous 
disagreements on the application of the Champerty defence81 against satisfaction of money 
judgements sought by plaintiffs. Players shared heterogeneous beliefs on the following 
aspects: (1) what constitutes a violation of the New York Champerty law; (2) the 
interpretation of a payment guaranty within the terms of the contractual agreement, (3) the 
legitimacy of the debt assignment to Elliot and (4) the wider effects of affirming a Champerty 
defence in sovereign debt lawsuits. Other contested but relatively minor arguments shared 
amongst parties were: (5) a proposed exemption of the liability of Banco (a Peruvian stated 
owned bank) following to a Peruvian government decree declaring impossibility of 
performance, (6) interpretation of a contract clause that permitted the provision of compound 
interest according to the applicable law (see Table 4.2 below) 
Background82 
In March 1983, faced with insufficient foreign exchange reserves to service its foreign debt, 
Peru entered into restructuring negotiations with a committee of its major commercial 
creditors called the Bank Advisory Committee (BAC) acting on behalf of all affected foreign 
lenders. The negotiations yielded the Letter Agreements perfected in May 31, 1983. Further 
restructuring negotiations stalled in 1984 and Peru defaulted on debt to its foreign lenders. 
In March 1989, the Brady Plan was proposed encouraging commercial bank lenders to 
participate in a debt-reduction agreement of loans issued mostly by Latin American countries, 
including Peru. In October 1995, Peru and the BAC announced an agreement in line with 
the Brady Plan and by June 1996 the Brady Agreement was issued detailing elements of the 
debt restructuring terms. Only two creditors (Elliot Associates and Pravin Banker Associates 
Ltd. “Pravin”) opted out of the Brady Agreement and resorted to litigation. 
In February 1, 1996 the United States District Court, Southern district of New York, entered 
judgements in favour of the plaintiffs in a related action, Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco 
Popular del Peru (another Peruvian stated owned bank) and, a week later, Peru’s motion for 
                                                
81 The Champerty Law under Section 489 of the New York Judicial Law provides that:  “no corporation or 
association, directly or indirectly…shall solicit, buy or take assignment … of a bond promissory note, bill 
of exchange, book debt, or other thing in action, or any claim or demand, with the intent and the purpose of 
bringing an action or proceeding thereon…” 
82 See Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F.Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1996) at 1205-1207  
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an emergency stay was denied by the court. Peru appealed to the Court of Appeals Second 
Circuit, but the stay was also denied on April 12, 1996. On March 29, 1996 (after the district 
court’s denial of stay in Pravin case) and April 19, 1996 (a week after the appeals court 
denial of stay), Elliot purchased debt arising from the Letter Agreements in the secondary 
market. Elliot was assigned all right, title and interest from the debt purchase. Under the 
Letter Agreements Banco was liable to repay loans and interest. Moreover, pursuant to a 
guaranty also dated May 31, 1983, Peru guaranteed the repayment of Banco’s debt under the 
Letter Agreements. In May 1996, Elliot and Peru discussed possible terms of settlement but 
Elliot rejected the Brady Agreement. A month after Elliot demanded that Peru pay the 
outstanding principal and interest payments and threatened to bring suit otherwise. In 
September 1996, Elliot’s counsel met with Peru’s negotiators in an effort to reach settlement, 
but negotiations failed. The plaintiffs demanded full payment and the defendants suggested 
Elliot enter the Brady agreement. 
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Table 4.2 – Elliot v. Peru Heterogeneous beliefs 
                                                
83 See Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 12 F.Supp.2d (S.D.N.Y. 1998) at 344  
84 See Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco De La Nacion, 194 F.3d (2d Cir. 1999) at 372 
86 See Elliot v. Peru, supra note 83.  
87 See Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F.Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1996) at 1208  
Subject Holdouts (“Elliot”) belief Debtor's (“Peru”) belief 
Champerty law: 
violated or not? 
Elliot did not purchase the debt with the sole intent and 
purpose to sue and that thus the statute does not render 
unenforceable their claims. 83  Their primary goal for 
purchasing the debt was to be paid in full or otherwise resort 
to litigation for the collection of the debt acquired.84 § 489 is 
a penal statute which should be narrowly construed to the 
extent that a claim is filed for the sole purpose of obtaining 
costs, including attorney’s fees. 
Elliot’s alternatives to bringing action were the following: (1) 
Holding and reselling the debt; (2) participating in Peru’s 
privatisation program; (3) Participating in Peru’s 
restructuring, including negotiating to improve restructuring 
Elliot purchased the Peruvian debt in violation of the New 
York Champerty laws. The assignments to Elliot violated the 
New York Judicial Law § 489, which makes unlawful the 
purchase of debt “with the intent and for the purpose of 
bringing an action or proceeding thereon”.86 Elliot’s claims 
are unenforceable under the statute because the Peruvian 
loans were purchased for the purpose of bringing suit.87 
Champertous intent was inferred from: (1) purchasing the 
debt at a substantial discount a week after the Court of 
Appeals denied Peru’s motion for an emergency stay in the 
Pravin case; (2) Elliot knew that Peru was in default when it 
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85 See Elliot v. Peru, supra note 83 at 338 
88 See Elliot v. Peru, supra note 87 
89 Section 3 of the guaranty provides that Peru shall pay all such amounts “regardless of any law, regulation or order now or hereafter in effect in any jurisdiction…” and that the guaranty 
shall be “absolute and unconditional irrespective of … any other circumstance which might otherwise constitute a defence available to a ... any obligor”. 
90 See Elliot v. Peru, supra note 87 at 1211 
91 See Elliot v. Peru, supra note 90 at 1211-1212. The 1983 Letter agreements contained an assignment provision stating that the original creditor “may assign all or any part of its interest in 
this letter agreement to any financial institution”. 
terms for all creditors involved; (4) negotiating separately 
with Peru to obtain a better deal than the Brady terms.85 
purchased the debt and (3) Elliot has also sued the Republic 
of Panama in similar circumstances.88  
Peru’s Guaranty 
Peru unconditionally guaranteed payment under the Letter 
Agreements and is thus precluded from using any defences 
against fulfilment of its liability under the guaranty.89 
The waiver provided by the guaranty is ineffective because § 
489 is a penal law directed at the public interest and therefore 
cannot be waived. 
Elliot: a 
legitimate 
assignee or not? 
The provision did not contain any express words of the 
limitation on assignability, thus no restriction on the type of 
financial institution. 90 
Elliot was not a proper assignee of the debt because it was not 
a “financial institution” within the meaning of the loan 
agreements.91 
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92 See Elliot v. Peru, supra note 83 at 345 
93 See Elliot v. Peru, supra note 83 at 356  
94 See Elliot v. Peru, supra note 87 
95 The Act of State doctrine provides that the United States cannot question the validity of acts of a foreign state within its own territory 
96 See Elliot v. Peru, supra note 83 at 358  
Wider effects of 
affirming a 
Champerty 
defence 
Failure to enforce debt payments will undermine the 
reasonable expectations about contract law.92 The holding in 
favour of the Champerty defence will produce the perverse 
result that any debtor can post-default prevent assignment of 
its debt by announcing that it will not satisfy contractual 
claims unless sued.93 
Any ruling in favour of granting a writ of attachment to the 
plaintiffs, perhaps through a collapse of the Champerty 
defence and entering judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, will 
undermine the credibility of the Brady process, and leaving 
harsh results on the Peruvian economy and people.94 
Exemption of 
Banco from 
liability of debt 
Peruvian order cannot be recognised in New York because 
the Act of State doctrine95 does not apply since the property 
at issue is located in New York and therefore the Peruvian 
order has no bearing on an agreement governed by New 
York.96 
Banco was excused from liability on grounds that it was 
impossible for Banco to perform on the 1983 Letter 
Agreements due to a Peruvian government decree which 
removed Banco as a debtor under the agreement. As Banco 
was constrained by the governmental order, Banco was 
excused of its liability to perform. 
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4.3.3 Link between the case study and the key model parameters 
 
Table 4.3 – Key model parameters from case studies 
 
 
Holdouts belief Debtor's belief 
Model 
Parameter	
!" ∈ [0,1] denotes the creditor’s perception of the strength of 
his own case in litigation	
!) ∈ [0,1] denotes the debtor’s perception of the strength of his 
own case in litigation	
‘Heterogeneity in Beliefs’ denoted by	+ ∈ [0,1] + = !" − 1 − !) 	 = 	!" + !) − 1	
If + = 0, beliefs are consistent; If + < 0, players are pessimistic; If + > 0, players are optimistic 
 
      
  Chapter 4 
59 
 
4.4 Model 
There are two risk neutral players, a sovereign debtor ! and a creditor	#, with the same 
discount factor	$ ∈ (0,1).97 We consider a +-period bargaining game of debt restructuring, 
represented in a discrete time setting of	, = 0,1,2,3… , + − 1. The game begins in , = 0 
after a bond debt default caused by the unavailability of funds needed to satisfy creditor’s 
outstanding claims.98 The sovereign immediately makes an initial settlement offer to the 
creditor. Players bargain over the partition of the cake of size	2, which is not accessible until 
settlement. 2 is interpreted as the gains from re-accessing the international capital markets 
that will mark the end of the debt crisis.99 2 could also be interpreted as the gains from 
maintaining access to the international capital markets absent of any debt default. 
The model extends the Rubinstein-Stahl framework where players hold heterogeneous 
beliefs about outcomes from disagreements in bargaining. 100  Such beliefs are reflected 
through optimism about court enforcement decisions against commercial assets or payment-
streams of the sovereign.101 Henceforth, we refer to these so-called commercial assets or 
payment-streams simply as ‘sovereign assets’, which become exposed to liquidation or 
restraint pursuant to a court-enforcement order held in favour of the judgement creditor.102 
In this model, there is incomplete information due to the uncertainty in the court’s decision 
which could either be ruled in favour of the creditor or the debtor. Each player holds a 
                                                
97  Creditor 	#  could represent a large group of homogenous creditors (with the same set of beliefs and 
coordinated strategies) as well as a single creditor. 
98  More specifically, it is assumed that the sovereign defaults because the total outstanding debt claims 
(principal, plus full accrued interest up to maturity) in present value terms are more than the present value 
gains from maintaining access to the international capital market that may be used to service the debt up 
until maturity. 
99 2 includes funds raised from any international sovereign bond issuance after a negotiated settlement. For 
example in April 2016, Argentina issued $16.5billion of dollar-denominated debt to pay off £6.25 billion to 
holdouts in cash. The rest of the funds were planned to be invested in infrastructure projects. (See 
(MercoPress, 2016) and (Guzman, 2016)). 2 may also include gains from renewed trading relationships 
with international partners, as well as government revenues raised both directly and indirectly from 
infrastructure projects previously stalled by the initial debt default etc. 
100  In the standard Rubinstein-Stahl model, players share common knowledge about the outcomes of 
disagreement. 
101 The author acknowledges that the judgement creditor may initially seek a worldwide discovery of assets 
and if granted, the creditor may then instigate attempted seizures of assets in accordance with the law of the 
locale (See NML Capital, Ltd. V. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-842, 573 U.S. (2014) (slip op., at 1)). 
However, for the purpose of simplicity, the litigation process modelled in this paper skips this discovery 
process and considers the creditor’s decision to seek an enforcement order against an already-discovered 
commercial asset or payment-stream belonging to the sovereign. 
102 The court enforcement action in the NML vs Argentina lawsuit involved an injunctive order preventing 
payments to exchange bondholders until holdouts were settled. We refer to this type of court-enforcement 
action as a restraint on the use of a sovereign asset. A court enforcement action that involves an execution 
order is referred to here as a liquidation of a sovereign asset. 
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subjective expectation of the court’s ruling, i.e. the creditor hopes to secure a court 
enforcement order (in the likes of an attachment order or an injunction), while the debtor 
hopes for a dismissal of the creditor’s motions submitted the court. These heterogeneous 
beliefs are assumed to be common knowledge and thus there is no asymmetric information 
between players in the model.  
Figure 4.1 below illustrates the timeline of events. At date	, = 0, ! proposes an offer 3 ∈0, 2 	for #. If accepted, ! keeps	2 − 3 and the game ends immediately. If rejected, a one-
shot disagreement game 4	follows for a unit for time, where # decides between a set of 
actions 5, 65 . 5 denotes the action to Seek a court-enforcement order at a cost of a legal 
fee 89. 103 65 denotes the action to Not seek a court-enforcement order. If action 5 is made, 
the debtor has a singleton action set where he defends himself in court at a cost of a legal fee 8:. Heterogeneous beliefs apply only when creditor chooses 5. Subsequently, the court runs 
its verdict on the outcome of the litigation	; ∈ 0,1 . ; = 1 indicates creditor successfully 
secured an enforcement order while ; = 0 indicates creditor was unsuccessful. The game 
then continues to , = 1 at a cost of a surplus destruction by a factor	$.  
If ; = 1,	in , = 1 parties negotiate the defaulted debt in recognition of the court order. They 
bargain according to a random-offers procedure and the game ends following an acceptance 
or a rejection of an offer. Rejection yields the outside option payoff (See Remark 1 ). 
Outside option payoffs: There are two outside option payoffs. One is associated with the 
outside option payoff from an attachment order, while the other is associated with that of an 
injunction order. The reason why both should be considered follows from the court decisions 
that proceeded NML v. Argentina. The judge presiding over the case made two landmark 
decisions. One was an injunction order that blocks the sovereign from servicing other types 
of debt, while the other was the decision authorizing worldwide discovery of the sovereign’s 
assets104 to determine which assets are suitable for attachment and which are not. As a result 
of these two landmark decisions, it was important to investigate whether the equilibrium 
solutions differ in either case. An interesting insight that the paper finds is that that 
equilibrium outcome in Proposition 2 is the same under the two court orders and thus same 
under either outside option payoff.  
 
                                                
103 89  is a lump sum of all legal costs incurred by the holdout creditor, including initial legal fees applicable to 
obtaining a summary judgement. 
104 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-842, 573 U.S. (2014)  
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However, if ; = 0 or creditor’s choice was	65, the bargaining procedure follows a random-
offers variant of Rubinstein (1982) bargaining game where nature randomly selects the 
proposer for each period of the remainder of the game. Let < denote the probability the 
debtor is selected, so that 1 − < is the probability the creditor is chosen to make an offer in 
every round from	, = 1. The other party then accepts or rejects the offer. Acceptance ends 
the bargaining game. Rejection leads to a delay of one period and is followed by another 
round of bargaining where the proposer is again selected randomly. Bargaining continues in 
this fashion until the game ends. = denotes the total outstanding debt claims of the creditor.105 >	denotes the value of the 
sovereign asset subject to a restraint or liquidation by the enforcement order.	8? denotes the 
legal cost to player @ ∈ (#, !). Legal cost is incurred irrespective of the outcome of the 
litigation. We assume	= > 2 > > > 8? > 0 for	∀	@. This ordering of parameters is crucial 
for the following reasons: (1) The sovereign defaults because	= > 2; (2) There is weak 
enforcement because	= > >; (3) Players can eventually settle post-litigation because	2 > >; 
(4) Legal costs are sufficiently low enough to incentivise action	5. Let C = {1,0, 65} denote 
the outcome of	4, such that C = 1 means creditor chose 5 and	; = 1; C = 0 means creditor 
chose 5 and	; = 0; C = 65 means creditor chose	65. 
In addition, we assume that the court’s decision is final and therefore cannot be reversed or 
challenged.106 The following definitions are useful for equilibrium expositions. 
Definition 1 (Gains from immediate settlement): In the absence of heterogeneous beliefs, 
the total gain from immediate agreement is either 2 1 − $  (when it is anticipated the 
creditor will choose 65  in 	4 ) or 2 1 − $ + 89 + 8:  (when it is anticipated that the 
creditor will choose	5 in	4). 
The gains from immediate settlement are the total surplus parties realize from agreement 
over delay. In other words, it is the total cost of delay that the parties avoid from settling 
immediately. Thus, in the absence of heterogeneous beliefs, there always exist such gains 
from immediate settlement and therefore parties settle immediately.107 
                                                
105 The total outstanding debt claims includes all accrued interest payments and principal amounts. 
106 This assumption ensures the bargaining environment is stationary. Allowing for an appeal process may 
result in the debtor taking subsequent actions to launch a petition in higher courts against a lower-court 
ruling in favour of the creditor and thus the game would transit into a non-stationary environment.  
107 Furthermore, Definition 1 suggests that the gains from immediate settlement when the creditor will choose 5 are higher than the gains from immediate settlement when the creditor will choose	65. This means 5 is 
costly for both players.  
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Definition 2 (Beliefs): Let G9 ∈ 0,1  denote the creditor’s belief of a successful litigation 
in 4 and G: ∈ 0,1  denote the debtor’s belief of an unsuccessful litigation in	4. A successful 
litigation occurs when a court order is granted in favour of the judgement creditor. The 
combination of player’s beliefs is captured by parameter	H = G9 + G:. We say players are 
optimistic when H > 1 and pessimistic when	H < 1. Beliefs are consistent when	H = 1.  
Definition 3 (Degree of optimism): The degree of optimism that generates a delay in 
agreement at , = 0 is measured by	J = H − 1 ∈ [0,1]. Higher J	means player’s beliefs are 
more optimistic while lower J means they are less optimistic. When	J = 1, player’s beliefs 
are extremely optimistic. When	J = 0, player’s beliefs are consistent.  
Consistency of beliefs: Players beliefs are consistent when they have identical beliefs and so 
there is no optimism. For example, if the creditor believes with probability 0.7 that he will 
be successful in litigation and the debtor believes likewise that with probability 0.7 the 
creditor will be successful in litigation (and thus believes with probability 0.3 the creditor 
will be unsuccessful), this means that the players beliefs are consistent as they share the same 
expectations of outcomes from litigation. Thus, in this example, G9 = 0.7, G: = 0.3. 
Therefore, J = 0. Note that the case G9 = 	G: = 0.5 is only a special case of consistency of 
beliefs where each player shares the belief of equal probability of success in litigation. 
Equilibrium thresholds: Let G9  be the creditor’s belief that makes him indifferent between 
action 5 and action	65. Let J be the player’s degree of optimism that makes them indifferent 
between settling and delaying at , = 0 . G9  and J  are thresholds that are explicitly 
determined in the equilibrium analysis.  
The paper studies the case of optimism in driving delays in settlement. The paper does not 
study the case of pessimism since it would not be a threat to settlement. 
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Remark 1 (Outside options following	" = $): In the event of a successful creditor litigation, the sovereign asset is 
at threat to either: 
• Liquidation: The creditor receives the value from liquidating the asset while the debtor losses the value. Thus 
the creditor’s (resp. debtor’s) outside-option payoff is % (resp.	– %)  
• Restraint: The creditor receives no payoff from the restricted use of the asset but the debtor is inflicted the cost 
of not operating the asset. Thus the creditor’s (resp. debtor’s) outside-option payoff is 0 (resp.	– %).  
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Figure 4.1 –Timeline of events – Bargaining Game 
  Chapter 4 
64 
 
4.5 Characterization of Equilibrium 
The notion of equilibrium is subgame perfection (SPE). We characterize the condition for 
delay. 
4.5.1 Proposition 2 
Given	"# ∈ ("#, 1] and ) > ) ∈ (0,1], there exists a unique SPE at which players delay 
settlement at , = 0. At this SPE, the creditor’s best response is /. Parties eventually settle 
at	, = 1. 
For the proof below, we begin by working out the equilibrium expected continuation payoffs 
of players under different court outcomes and then solve for the participation constraints of 
players required for immediate agreement. Through this we will obtain the equilibrium 
bounds ) and "#  above which players delay agreement and creditor seeks an enforcement 
order.  
Proof. 
Consider a 0-period game with	, = 0,1,2,3… , 0 − 1. Let 5678 9  denote the equilibrium 
expected continuation payoffs of player : at time , given outcome	9. Let	;<8(9) denote the 
equilibrium offer proposed by player : for player > ≠ : at time , given outcome	9. Let	;#@ 
denote the equilibrium offer proposed by the debtor for the creditor at time	, = 0. 
Applying backward induction, a recognised player : at last round , = 0 − 1 given outcome 9 = 0 ∪ B/  proposes ;<CDE	 0 ∪ B/ = 0 . 108  This holds in equilibrium because player > 
accepts the offer (as he has no outside option) and a unilateral deviation by the recognised 
player : to an alternative proposal greater than zero would be unprofitable.109 Moving back 
to the beginning of 	, = 0 − 1 , the following are the player’s equilibrium expected 
continuation payoffs conditional on outcome	9:  56FCDE 0 ∪ B/ = G H − ;#CDE	 0 ∪ B/ + 1 − G ;FCDE	 0 ∪ B/ = GH 56#CDE 0 ∪ B/ = G	;#CDE	 0 ∪ B/ + 1 − G H − ;FCDE	 0 ∪ B/ = 1 − G H 
Following outcome 9 = 0 ∪ B/, all subgames from , = 1 are identical and so possess the 
same expected SPE payoffs. Therefore,  
                                                
108 ‘Recognised’ is the term used to indicate the chosen proposer of a particular round. 
109 An alternative offer greater than	0, though accepted by player	>, would not maximise the payoff of player :. 
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JKL	∀	, ≥ 1, 56F8 0 ∪ B/ = GH	OPQ	56#8 0 ∪ B/ = 1 − G H 
Following outcome 	9 = 1,  at , = 1  a recognised debtor proposes 	;#E	 1 = J . The 
responding creditor accepts the offer and a unilateral deviation by the recognised debtor to 
an alternative proposal greater (resp. less) than J would be unprofitable (resp. rejected).110 
On the other hand, a recognised creditor proposes	;FE	 1 = 0. The responding debtor accepts 
the offer and a unilateral deviation by the recognised creditor to an alternative proposal 
greater than zero would be unprofitable.111 Therefore, 56FE 1 = G H − ;#E	 1 + 1 − G ;FE	 1 = G H − J  56#E 1 = G	;#E	 1 + 1 − G H − ;FE	 1 = GJ + 1 − G H 
Now in	R, creditor chooses / iff −S# + "#T56#E 1 + 1 − "# T56#E 0 > T56#E B/  
Since	56#E 0 = 56#E B/ , the inequality solves to 
 "# > "# = S#TGJ (4.1) 
Thus the creditor chooses / iff "# > "#   and B/ otherwise.  
If	"# ≤ "# , both players know that at the beginning of the bargaining game that the creditor 
will choose	B/. Thus in the bargaining round of	, = 0, debtor will propose an indifferent 
offer ;#@ = T56#E B/ 	:VV		H − ;#@ ≥ T56FE B/ . This simplifies to H 1 − T > 0 and thus 
players settle at , = 0.  
If otherwise	"# > "# , both players know that creditor will choose	/. Thus in the bargaining 
round of	, = 0, an indifferent offer is proposed subject to the satisfaction of the debtor’s 
participation constraint i.e.  ;#@ = 56#@ = −S# + "#T56#E 1 + 1 − "# T56#E 0 		:VV 	H − ;#@ ≥ 56F@ = −SF + "FT56FE 0 + 1 − "F T56FE 1  
                                                
110 An alternative offer greater than	J, though accepted by the responding creditor, would not maximise the 
payoff of the recognised debtor. Also, an alternative offer less than J would be rejected by the responding 
creditor as he could liquidate the asset and receive J (for which debtor incurs	– J < H − J) or inflict pain 
on debtor through a restricted use of the asset (for which debtor similarly incurs – J < H − J). 
111 An alternative offer greater than 0, though accepted by the responding debtor, would not maximise the 
payoff of the recognised creditor. 
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Simplifying, players delay agreement at , = 0		:VV 
 H < Y − 1 TGJ − S# + SF1 − T  (4.2) 
This unique solution also applies for infinite games. (See Proof of Proposition 2 in the 
appendix).  
Assuming condition (4.1) holds, substitute ) for Y − 1 in condition (4.2) and rearrange, we 
get 
 ) > ) = H 1 − T + S# + SFTGJ   (4.3) 
 
 
Q.E.D. 
Therefore, while for any ) ≤ ) players prefer to settle immediately, they strictly prefer to 
delay agreement for any	) > ).112 This distinguishes our result from the standard Rubinstein-
Stahl solution where players always prefer to settle immediately due to the common 
knowledge they share of outcomes from negotiation breakdowns. The result also implies 
that heterogeneous beliefs are necessary but not sufficient for delay as players suspend 
negotiations only if the required threshold ()) is met. 
The general intuition here is that players are unable to settle immediately when the 
bargaining pie is not sufficient to compensate the parties’ expectations from litigation.  We 
can also infer from condition (4.3) that players are more likely to settle at , = 0 if the gains 
from settlement, the numerator of	), are high. 
4.5.2 Remark 2 
Regardless of whether the enforcement order is an attachment or an injunction, the 
equilibrium analysis is the same. 
The equilibrium analysis remains the same regardless of the type of enforcement order. This 
is because in either case the creditor is compensated no less than J in equilibrium at , = 1. 
Therefore, even though the two type of enforcement orders are associated with slightly 
different outside option payoffs, their games are both strategically equivalent.   
                                                
112 Without loss of generality, assume that if players are indifferent between delay and immediate settlement, 
they settle immediately. 
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4.5.3 Graphical representation of delay and settlement 
Here we illustrate the argument behind Proposition 2 using a standard graphical exposition, 
showing the role of heterogeneous beliefs in driving delays under simplifying assumptions.  
Take G = EZ	and S# = SF for illustrative purposes, so that players are only asymmetric with 
respect to their beliefs.  
Figure 4.2 – Expected continuation payoffs at [ = \ and ‘inefficient’ delay 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the players’ expected continuation payoffs at	, = 0 where the x-axis (resp. 
y-axis) represents that for debtor (resp. creditor). Players are able to reach an immediate 
settlement when the combination of their equilibrium expected continuation payoffs 56#@	and	56F@  rest within the bargaining zone (referred to as the area on and beneath the 
settlement line). Therefore, players are only able to settle immediately when their combined 
beliefs )  are sufficiently below the equilibrium threshold. However, when the creditor’s 
belief of a successful litigation is sufficiently high and when the player’s combined beliefs 
are sufficiently optimistic, then the combination of 56#@	 and 	56F@  will lie outside the 
bargaining zone and, in particular, will rest within the shaded region above the 45°line. 
Under such circumstances, they delay agreement at	, = 0. Delay is inefficient as players 
lose the possible gains from settlement equivalent to	H(1 − T) + S# + SF.  
 
 
 
 
 
0 
Players delay when	H < 56#@ + 56F@  
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Figure 4.3 – Expected continuation payoffs at [ = ` and settlement 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the players’ expected continuation payoffs at , = 1, which depend on the 
outcome in	R. Players reach an agreement at , = 1 because the bargaining pie H can now 
accommodate their expected continuation payoffs. When the 45°line from the origin labelled "9 = 0 ∪ B/" intersects the Pareto efficient settlement-line, players split the pie half/half in 
expectation. The intuition is this: if the creditor is unsuccessful in litigation or failed to seek 
an enforcement action, the parties will distribute the pie evenly according to the assumption 
that they both share the same bargaining power	G = EZ. When the 45°line from J labelled "9 = 1" intersects the Pareto efficient settlement-line, players split the reduced bargaining 
surplus H − J evenly in expectation. The intuition is this: if the creditor is successful in 
litigation, the bargaining surplus reduces from H to H − J as the debtor must at least match 
the creditor’s outside option J  and so the remaining H − J  is split evenly amongst the 
parties according to the assumption	G = EZ. Thus the creditor receives bDcZ + J and the debtor 
receives bDcZ  in expectation. As expected, the higher	J the higher the settlement payoff to 
the creditor and the lower it is to the debtor. Corollary 3 provides further intuitive results. 
4.5.4 Corollary 2 
With homogenous beliefs i.e. ) = 0, there is immediate agreement. 
Consistent with the Rubenstein-Stahl framework, homogenous beliefs yield immediate 
settlement results. Though such beliefs are sufficient for immediate agreement, they are not 
H − J2  
H 2d  
H2 
H + J2  
0 
H 
H 45° 56FE  
56#E  
Players settle as	H ≥ 56#E(9) + 56FE(9) 
It is assumed that J < bZ in the diagram 
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necessary since players with heterogeneous beliefs can immediately settle if threshold for 
delay is not met. This means that parties will not delay settlement either because they hold 
consistent beliefs or they hold insufficient inconsistent beliefs. 
4.5.5 Corollary 3 ) is strictly increasing in S7 for : ∈ e, f 	and H but strictly decreasing in, J, T	OPQ	G. (See 
Table 4.5 in the appendix). Similarly, "#  is strictly increasing in S#  and strictly decreasing 
in, J, T	OPQ	G. 
Corollary 3 suggests that delays are associated with relatively low legal costs, low gains 
from re-accessing the capital market, high asset value, high discount factors and high 
recognition probability for the debtor. This is intuitive as optimistic players are more willing 
to risk disagreement in the following circumstances: (1) paying a small legal fee, (2) being 
faced with scarce resources for compensating creditor’s claims, (3) anticipating a high 
sovereign-asset value enjoined by the court order, (4) acquiring low discount rates, (5) when 
the creditor has relatively low future bargaining power. One of the main implications of this 
result is that litigation needs to be made costly to sustain market bargaining and thus to 
prevent inefficient delay.  
4.5.6 Comparative statics and Minor extensions 
4.5.6.1 Alternative discrete time interval version 
Here we want to consider the effect on the equilibrium analysis when we converge to 
continuous time settings. As stated above, the bargaining game between parties could be one 
in which there are less frictions, enabling parties to respond sooner rather than later. 
In the basic model, we assumed that the time interval between consecutive periods is one. 
Now, let us allow offers to be made at discrete points in time, namely,	, = 	0, ∆, 2∆, 3∆, … ,h∆, … , 0 − 1∆, where ∆> 0. The discount factor T = EEij∆ where L denotes the interest rate 
on sovereign debt, which we assume to be constant. Using condition (4.3), in the limit, 
as 	∆	→ 0 , 	T → 1 . limo→E ) = pqiprsc . Therefore, the less the time interval between two 
consecutive offers, it becomes increasing more likely to observe delay. 
In the main text and in this extension, we make the implicit assumption that the duration of 
litigation phase is the same as the time difference between successive bargaining rounds. 
This is a strong assumption and thus we are led to consider the following extension below.  
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4.5.6.2 Different time intervals between consecutive offers 
Here we look the more realistic case i.e. the effect on the equilibrium analysis of a longer 
duration of the litigation phase. In the basic model, we assumed identical time intervals 
between consecutive offers for the whole bargaining game. But it is not unusual for the time 
interval of the litigation-related disagreement phase to be longer than that of other 
disagreement phases. We show that the longer the period of litigation, the less the likelihood 
of delay at	, = 0.  
Model: We allow offers be made at discrete points in time, namely , = 	0,∆E, 2∆Z, 3∆t, … , h∆u, … , 0 − 1∆CDE	 where , = 	h∆u  indicates h8v  bargaining round 
resulting from a time interval ∆u  of delay from h − 18v  bargaining round to the h8v 
bargaining round. In the basic model, we set ∆u= 1	VKL	∀	h . Now, let ∆Z= ∆t= ⋯ =∆CDE= ∆	= 1 but	1 < ∆E< 2. We now show that in this revised model, there will be a 
reduced likelihood of delay at , = 0. 
Proof. 
From times , = ∆E to	, = 0 − 1, the same discount factor (given by T = EEij∆ = EEij).  All 
subgames from , = ∆E  following outcome 9 = 0 ∪ B/  (prior to the realization of the 
identity of the proposer) are identical. We now use the same technique performed in the 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Applying backward induction, at the beginning of subgame	∆E a recognised debtor given 
outcome 9 = 0 ∪ B/  proposes ;#∆x 0 ∪ B/ = EEij∆y 1 − G H = T 1 − G H  and a 
recognised creditor given outcome 9 = 0 ∪ B/ proposes	;F∆x 0 ∪ B/ = TGH. Therefore, 
equilibrium expected payoffs conditional on outcome 9 = 0 ∪ B/  is: 
56F∆x 0 ∪ B/ = G H − T 1 − G H	 + 1 − G TGH = GH 56#∆x 0 ∪ B/ = G	T 1 − G H + 1 − G H − TGH = 1 − G H 
Following from the Proof of Proposition 2, the equilibrium expected payoffs conditional on 
outcome	9 = 1 is, 
56F∆x 1 = G H − J  56#∆x 1 = GJ + 1 − G H 
Let T∆x ≡ EEij∆x. Now in R, creditor chooses A if 
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−S# + "#T∆x56#∆x 1 + 1 − "# T∆x56#∆x 0 > T∆x56#E B/  
The inequality solves to 
 "# > "# = S#T∆xGJ (4.4) 
Therefore players delay settlement at , = 0 if  
 ) > ) = H 1 − T + S# + SFT∆xGJ   (4.5) 
Since 	 {|{o∆x < 0,	 then 		 {|{∆x > 0 . Therefore the longer the period of litigation, the more 
impatient players are and thus the higher the likelihood of settlement at , = 0.  
Q.E.D. 
4.6 Calibration 
Here, we present results from the calibrated version of the model, using NML vs Argentina 
as a reference case study. We compute for the minimum degree of heterogeneity in beliefs 
required for delay in agreement. 
We estimate or use reported values on the parameters }, H, J, T, G, S#, SF in the Argentine 
2001 default, litigation and 2016 settlement. All values are reported in 2016 terms. e 
represents the group of holdout creditors who failed to participate in the 2005 and 2010 debt 
restructuring, while f represents the Republic of Argentina. We assume that where at least 
one single holdout-creditor seeks a court-enforcement order, he acts on behalf of all other 
holdout-creditors that did not seek an enforcement order.113  
Choice value for ~, the total outstanding debt claims by  
In order to establish whether the sovereign defaults in the first place, we estimate the value 
of the outstanding debt payments at 2001 (i.e. full principal plus future streams of interest 
payments till maturity) to the holdout creditors. 
                                                
113 All other holdout-creditors include those who only obtained money judgements, as well as those you did 
not litigate at all. 
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We obtain information on a selected category of bonds with the highest litigation rates and 
holdout rates of over twenty percent across the whole sample of bonds associated with 
holdouts. These seven bonds are identified in (Cruces and Samples, 2016, p. 17)114 and we 
estimate the value of the accrued debt payments on these bonds from the 2001 default, 
through calculating the present value of the bonds as at 2001 and then re-calculating for the 
future values of these bonds at 2016. We then take the weighted-average of both the coupon 
rate and remaining maturity across the seven bonds. We then use these averages to estimate, 
in the same fashion, the value of the accrued debt payments of the other 119 bonds associated 
with holdouts.115 Through this method, we can roughly estimate the total outstanding debt 
payments to the holdout bonds.    
Table 4.6 in the appendix shows the details of the seven bonds and reports the computed 
weighted-average coupon rate and remaining maturity used as a proxy for the coupon rate 
and maturity of the remaining 119 bonds. Using a discount rate of 7.5% justified below (see 
sub-section on ‘choice value for T, discount factor’), we estimate the value of outstanding 
debt payments discounted to 2016 (using present value or future value calculations where 
applicable). We find that the total outstanding debt payments amount to $25.1 billion in 2016 
terms. Therefore, } = $25.1ÅP. This leaves an average annual cost of servicing the debt 
across a 15 year default period (2001-2016) to be approx. $1.67billion. 
Choice value for Ç , the gains from re-accessing (or maintaining access to) the 
international capital markets 
Here we refer ‘gains’ as funds raised from world capital markets. In April 19 2016, Argentina 
raised $16.5billion in its first return to the international capital markets since its 2001 debt 
default. These particular funds were raised through bond issuances governed by New York 
                                                
114 From Cruces and Samples (2016), details of the seven bonds with the highest litigation rates and holdout 
rates over twenty percent, including their currency, coupon rate, ISIN codes, maturity dates and total 
principal (in millions) outstanding (in those series) post-2010 are (the number preceding each bond is the 
order in which each bond appears in Republic of Argentina 2004, Annex C): #41: Global bond, ARP ten 
percent 2001-2004 and twelve percent 2004-2008 due 2008, XS0130278467, Jun-2001, $595; #9: Global 
bond, USD 11.375% due 2017, US040114AR16, Jan-1997, $419; #17: Bond, USD variable rate due 2005 
(FRAN), US040114AX83, Apr-1998, $298; #14: Global bond, USD 10.25% due 2030, US040114GB00, 
Jul-2000, $122;  #7: Global bond, USD 12.375% due 2012, US040114GD65, Feb-2001, $113; #11: Global 
bond, USD twelve percent due 2020, US040114FB19, Feb-2000, $66; #48: Brady Par bond, EUR 5.87% 
due 2023, DE0004103007, Mar-1993, $58. 
115 Cited in Cruces and Samples (2016), a total of 126 bond series were associated with holdouts after the 2010 
exchange, of which seven of them had holdout rates of over twenty percent. The rest of the bonds with 
twenty-percent-or-less holdout rates were 119 bonds.   
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law.116 A significant proportion of the funds were to settle the holdout creditors shortly after. 
For the purposes of calibration, we therefore set	H = $16.5ÅP, assuming also that Argentina 
would have been able to raise no less than this amount across the 15 year period (2001-2016) 
had the sovereign not defaulted in the first place. This averages to $1.1billion per year. 
Choice value for Ñ, the value of the sovereign asset bound by enforcement order 
In April 22 2016, Argentina reported it had settled with majority of its holdout creditors, 
paying $9.4billion from its $16.5bn bond offering mentioned above.117As previously stated, 
the enforcement order used against Argentina was associated with preventing the sovereign 
from making scheduled payments on exchange bonds (and thereby blocking access to the 
international capital markets) without settling the holdout creditors. The eventual settlement 
in April 2016 implies that Argentina valued the sovereign asset – which in this case was the 
continued service of payments to exchange bondholders – at a cost of $9.4bn in payments to 
holdouts. As a result, we set J = $9.4ÅP as this final settlement to majority of its holdouts 
meant that the sovereign could not only continue servicing the exchange bonds but could 
also re-gain access to the international capital markets. 
Choice value for Ü, the discount factor 
Argentina’s ten-year bonds, which accounted for a significant 40% of the total $16.5bn bond 
issuance, traded at 7.5%.118 At the same time, it was reported that comparable emerging 
market bonds (10-year with single-B credit ratings) were trading at approx. 7.47%. 119 
Therefore, we set the discount rate L = 7.5% and thus the discount factor T = EEij = 0.93.  
Choice value for â, the bargaining power (i.e. recognition probability) of ä 
                                                
116 See (Moore et al., 2016) 
117 See (Kraul and D'Alessandro, 2016) 
118 Local press revealed an initial breakdown of US$2.75bn three-year bonds at a 6.25% yield, US$4.5bn five-
year bonds at a 6.875% yield, US$6.5bn ten-year bonds at 7.5%, and US$2.75bn 30-year bonds priced at 
8.0%. See supra note 116 
119 Other emerging-market 10-year bonds with single-B credit ratings are trading at about 7.47%. See (Wernau 
and Cui, 2016) 
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Argentina’s 2005 and 2010 bond exchanges involved a unilateral offer made by the 
sovereign to its creditors.120 Therefore we set G = 1, though the 2016 negotiations involved 
a slightly different dynamic to the bargaining process.121 
Choice value for ã and ãä, the legal cost incurred by  and ä respectively 
It was reported in (Guzman and Stiglitz, 2015b, p. 12) that vulture funds were compensated 
with $325miilion for legal fees incurred during trial.122 Therefore, we set S# = $325å. This 
value could be presumably higher since not all litigant creditors that similarly sought for an 
injunctive order were vulture funds. Due to the lack of availability of data on Argentina’s 
legal costs SF, we set SF = S# = S for the calibration and examine changing levels of SF. 
Table 4.4 – Parameter values for Calibration 
 
Name Meaning Values Normalized 
values* ~ Total outstanding debt claims by e $25.1ÅP 1.52 Ç Gains made from re-accessing (or maintaining 
access to) the international capital markets $16.5ÅP 1 Ñ Value of the sovereign asset bound to a court-
enforcement order $9.4ÅP 0.57 Ü Discount factor 0.93 0.93 â Bargaining power of f 1 1 ãç Legal cost incurred by player : $325å 0.02 
*Values in US dollars in the third column are normalized by dividing them by H 
Table 4.4 lists the parameters and their assigned values for the purpose of estimating the 
degree of heterogeneity required for delay in the Argentina case study. Relating the case to 
Figure 4.1 timeline, we assume the following: (1) 	, = 1 represent the years from 2001 to 
2010; (2) time difference between , = 1 and , = 2 represent the years from 2011 to 2015; 
(3)	, = 2 represent the years from 2016 to 2025. Thus we assume periods of negotiations 
take 9 years while periods of disagreement take 4 years.  
                                                
120  In 2005, after prolonged, contentious, and unsuccessful attempts to restructure the debt, Argentina 
abandoned the negotiation process and made a unilateral offer. In 2010, the government decided to open 
another bond exchange, on generally similar terms as before, to deal with remaining holdouts. See 
(Hornbeck, 2013, p. 2) 
121 The 2016 settlement involved back-and-forth negotiations between the sovereign and holdout creditors for 
which they eventually reached a final settlement as stated above. Dan Pollack was a court-appointed 
mediator for a deal between Argentina and its debt holder. See (Stevenson, 2016). In this sense, it could be 
argued that in 2016	G = 0.5. We therefore fix G to an initial value equal to 1 and then observe how our delay 
conditions change with respect to decreasing values of G. 
122 The court order that resulted from the suit by leading plaintiffs (majority of which were vulture funds) 
extended to all other holdouts involved (including others who litigated i.e. me-too litigants and those who 
did not). See (Guzman, 2016, p. 12)   
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Results 
Substituting the normalized values into equation (4.3) above, we find that players delay with 
sufficiently heterogeneous beliefs above	) = 0.21. This means that, assuming all values 
reported are known at the start of bargaining game, there is a high tendency to observe delay 
in agreement driven by players optimism in litigation.  
We can make a straight forward comparison between the Rubinstein-Stahl solution and our 
heterogeneous beliefs model using the calibrated values in Table 4.4. 
Rubinstein-Stahl Model solution 
In applying the Rubinstein model, players have homogenous beliefs and thus, the creditors 
belief of a successful litigation equates the debtor’s belief of a successful litigation i.e. ) =0 as "é = 1 − "F. Substituting our values for equation (4.1), we obtain "é = 0.038. When "é ≤ 0.038,	creditor receives  ;#@ = 0	and	debtor receives	H − ;#@ = 1. Thus, there is no 
efficiency loss as ;#@ + 	H − ;#@ = 1 . When "é > 0.038 , creditor receives  ;#@ =0.5301"é − 0.02, and	debtor receives H − ;#@ = 1.02 − 0.5301"é . Here also there is no 
efficiency loss. Thus, under the Rubinstein solution we cannot observe efficiency losses.  
Heterogeneous-beliefs Model solution 
Under our heterogeneous beliefs model, "é ≠ 1 − "F . When ) ≤ 0.21 , we obtain the 
Rubinstein solution above. However, when ) > 0.21, delay occurs at , = 0. As "é > 0.038, 
creditor chooses /  in R . If 9 = 0,  then at , = 1 , creditor receives  ;#E = 0	and debtor 
receives H −	;#E = 1. If we discount these payoffs to , = 0 and subtract the legal costs 
players incur in litigation, creditor receives a discounted payoff T;#E − S# = −0.02, and 
debtor receives T H − ;#E − SF = 0.91. Therefore, there are efficiency losses since T;#E −S# + 	T H − ;#E − SF = 0.89 < H.  
Similarly, if 9 = 1, then at , = 1, creditor receives  ;#E = 0.43	and debtor receives H −	;#E = 0.57. Discounted payoffs less legal costs mean that creditor receives 0.38 and debtor 
receives 0.51. Therefore, there are also efficiency losses of the same magnitude as above.  
Overall welfare loss equals H 1 − T + S# + SF = 0.11.  
Now, using the normalised values in Table 4.4, we investigate the responsiveness of the 
minimum degree of optimism required for delay (i.e. ê) to changes in parameter values 
ceteris paribus.  
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Figure 4.4 shows the changes in ) to changes in H, S7	VKL	∀: ∈ f, e 	OPQ	S = SF = S# . S7 refers to any one player’s legal cost, while S refers to the specific case where both players 
legal cost are the same. As Corollary 3 suggests, we find ) is positively correlated with these 
variables. Therefore, players are more likely to disagree – associated with lower levels of ) 
– when bargaining pie and legal costs are lower. 
Figure 4.4 – Response of  ê to changes in Ç, ãç and ã 
 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the changes in ) to changes in J, T	OPQ	G. Again as Corollary 3 suggests, 
we find ) is negatively correlated with these variables. Therefore, players are more likely to 
disagree when the value of the sovereign asset, the discount factor and the recognition 
probability are higher.  
Figure 4.5 – Response of  ê to changes in Ñ, Ü and â 
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4.7 Policy discussion 
A crucial question in policy debates concerning the implementation of an international 
sovereign insolvency procedure is this: Are restructuring delays associated with the presence 
of incomplete information regarding the enforceability of contracts?123 Our results establish 
that heterogeneous beliefs about court enforcement can cause inefficient delays in bargaining. 
This raises the question of whether there is a role for a formal process – in the likes of a 
sovereign bankruptcy procedure – or an informal framework – analogous to a third party 
intervention – that may coordinate parties’ expectations of a debt workout or legal dispute 
pre/post- default. In this section, we evaluate existing policy proposals aimed at limiting the 
role that adversarial courts plays in resolving disputes.   
Statutory frameworks 
A number of proposals have called for the creation of formal, statutory mechanisms for 
restructuring sovereign debt – more akin to international bankruptcy procedures for countries 
in debt distress. Such frameworks could help address the inefficient delays that arise from 
players pursing full-blown litigation because of their heterogeneous expectations of 
outcomes from adversarial litigation. The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM) proposed by Krueger (2001) was based on an international insolvency procedure 
binding on all IMF member countries – requiring the amendment of IMF Articles of 
Agreement and thereby revisions of national laws. It sought to address, among other things, 
the problem of holdouts i.e. creditors who reject a restructuring deal and subsequently take 
legal action to assert their contractual rights. It was designed to approve payment standstills, 
facilitate restructuring and write down unsustainable sovereign debt (Fischer, 2003). Such 
an international legal framework was supposed to work as a deterrent to disruptive litigation. 
For example only litigating creditors, who received satisfaction of court judgements prior to 
the sovereign reaching a restructuring agreement with the majority of its creditors, would 
not be subject to the SDRM. As a result, it was understood that this uncertainty – in regards 
to the timing of a majority settlement outcome against the timing of the satisfaction of 
individual court judgements – would pose a deterrent to litigation given the legal expenses 
incurred therein (Hagan, 2008). Therefore, the existence of the SDRM would limit the role 
                                                
123 This question is reinforced in matters pertaining to particular jurisdictions. For example, the United States 
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit recognized the competing interest faced by the U.S. government to (1) 
ensure the successful, voluntary resolution of past-due foreign sovereign debt and (2) maintain the 
enforceability of contracts under the law. See Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 
109 F.3d 852 (2nd Cir. 1997). It may not be surprising therefore to observe competing parties in a sovereign 
debt lawsuit placing more weight on one policy interest over another.   
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adversarial-type legal systems play in resolving sovereign debt disputes and thus 
heterogeneous beliefs may no longer act as a driver of inefficient delays in restructuring. 
Similarly emphasized by (Eichengreen, 2003), a statutory regime would consist of certain 
features that impose significant restraints on litigation, albeit with the approval of a 
supermajority of creditors (Brooks and Lombardi, 2015, p. 10).  
Some other more recent statutory proposals include the following: An International Debt 
Restructuring Court, International Sovereign Debt Tribunal, Fair and Transparent 
Arbitration Process, and Immunization. The International Debt Restructuring Court 
(IDRC), proposed by a group of UN experts (United Nations, 2009), is based on an 
internationally recognised set of rules that determines the required debt reduction, priority 
of claims and fair burden sharing amongst creditors. Its rulings will receive worldwide 
recognition in national courts of participating countries (Swiss Federal Council, 2013, p. 21). 
The International Sovereign Debt Tribunal (SDT), proposed by (Paulus, 2010), is designed 
to adjudicate disputes arising from the restructuring process. Argued by the authors, an 
arbitration panel under the SDT consisting of a “selected pool of expert arbitrators” 
experienced in handling sovereign debt disputes and jointly chosen by creditor(s) and the 
debtor, could restore trust, confidence and legitimacy in debt workouts (Brooks and 
Lombardi, 2015, p. 11) 124 . Parties’ decision to resort to an independent international 
arbitration process would be based on a contractual agreement stipulated in the debt 
instrument at the time of issuance. Other calls have been made for such a process in resolving 
sovereign debt disputes ((Latindadd, 2014); (Jubilee USA Network, 2012); (Eurodad, 2009)). 
The Fair and Transparent Arbitration Process (FTAP), suggested by (Raffer, 2005), 
proposes for an international insolvency procedure where an ad hoc court of arbitration 
determines the level of debt sustainability from a restructuring offer supported by a simple 
majority. Here, all stakeholders affected by the debt are entitled to public hearing, 
suppressing the adverse effect of an adversarial litigation where only the pleadings of the 
creditor(s) and sovereign debtor are heard. However, questions still remain regarding the 
capacity of the arbitration court in assessing the sustainability of debt (Swiss Federal Council, 
2013, p. 22). Immunization is a limited statutory reform, proposed by Buchheit et al. (2013), 
                                                
124 Moreover, in direct condemnation of the US court ruling in favour of Argentina’s holdouts, (Guzman, 2016, 
p. 15) states that “domestic judges of major lending jurisdictions such as New York, who do not understand 
the nature of sovereign debt restructuring processes, are still the ones in charge of deciding what the ultimate 
goals of a restructuring should be, and what remedies should be implemented to achieve those goals” absent 
any major improvements in the contractual approach for resolving the deficiencies observed in sovereign 
debt restructuring. Thus, an arbitration panel consisting of experts will be highly rewarding in restoring 
mutual confidence in the dealings of sovereign debt dispute and thus may reduce self-serving bias of 
arbitration outcomes.     
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motivated by the 2012 US court ruling in favour of Argentina’s holdout creditors who sought 
to interfere with payments to third-party creditors. The reform suggests introducing laws in 
major financial centres to immunize payments and clearing systems from interference by 
holdout creditors and thus, such a reform aims to reduce the uncertainty regarding the 
possible seizure of attachable assets and upset of revenue streams. 
Incorporated with a process for resolving disputes, such aforementioned regimes may 
provide a more efficient alternative to adversarial litigation. However, questions still remain 
– for example, who will act as an impartial arbiter of sovereign debt disputes, what are the 
due processes and how will such a framework be binding on creditors and debtors. There is 
a general consensus that institutions such as IMF have been questioned on the basis of its 
legitimacy and credibility (Brooks and Lombardi, 2015, p. 11). 
Contractual frameworks 
The main set of tools currently used for restructuring sovereign debt is considered a 
contractual approach. Collective Action Clauses (CAC’s) are designed to facilitate creditor 
coordination in the event of default and prevent holdouts. In addition to the ‘majority 
restructuring clauses’ that bind holdouts to amended payment-terms agreed by a 
supermajority of bondholders, CAC’s also include ‘majority enforcement clauses’ that 
prevent individual bondholders from taking the sovereign to court ((Das et al., 2012); 
(Weidemaier and Gulati, 2014a)). Strengthening such clauses provides strong advantages: 
Where voting thresholds are met, adversarial courts play no role in settling disputes as 
majority agreements become binding on holdouts. An obvious criticism of CAC’s, however, 
is that they fall short in aggregating all creditors’ claims and binding them, along with the 
sovereign, to a single restructuring agreement in cases where supermajority thresholds are 
not met (Brooks and Lombardi, 2015, p. 16). Thereby, the settlement of disputes remains at 
the discretion of the courts when voting thresholds are not reached. Where players are 
excessively optimistic about court decisions, we may experience delays. This concern is 
aggravated where the creditor-base is largely homogenous with holdout-type creditors. In 
such situations, CAC’s would be ineffective in preventing recourse to the current adversarial 
litigation.  
Other frameworks/proposals/interventions 
There are other formal (or informal) debt restructuring frameworks aimed at limiting the role 
of courts. They tend to coordinate parties in ways that reduces incentives to pursue litigation 
or intensify litigation efforts. For example, the IMF lending into arrears (LIA) policy in 
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International Monetary Fund (2002) seeks to support adjustment programs while facilitating 
orderly debt restructuring to restore market access. Under the policy, the Fund may lend to 
a debtor in arrears to external private creditors if, among other things, the debtor is pursuing 
appropriate policies and is making good faith efforts to reach a collaborative agreement with 
its creditors.125 Thus through good debtor-conduct, creditors may have decreased incentives 
to pursue or persist in litigation. However, International Monetary Fund (2013) reports that 
the application of the LIA policy appears to lack clarity on the assessment of the good faith 
criterion. Even more importantly, debtor must seek fund support before the LIA policy may 
apply. Therefore, despite the expectation that mutual good-faith efforts limit the role of 
courts, the LIA policy is without its shortcomings. Furthermore, the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF) Principles for Stable Capital Glows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Institute 
of International Finance (2013) constitute a voluntary code of conduct between all sovereign 
debt issuers and their private sector creditors to help preserve the access of sovereign debtors 
to external financing during periods of financing distress.126 Where debt restructuring is 
deemed inevitable, the Principles seek the cooperation between debtors and creditors in an 
orderly fashion involving continuous engagement towards a fair resolution of debt 
difficulties limiting litigation risk. 
One of the key concerns with current practice highlighted in UNCTAD (2015a), hereafter 
‘UNCTAD proposal’, is the multiplicity of tribunals and adjudication bodies dealing with 
debt problems and as a result creating legal incoherence due to possible variations in legal 
interpretations. 127  Thus, the absence of a global coherence framework in dealing with 
sovereign debt disputes may facilitate the scope for forming different expectations of 
litigation processes and consequently lead to inefficiencies in negotiations. Two principles 
suggested in the UNCTAD proposal that may reduce heterogeneity in expectations are (1) 
Transparency and (2) Good faith. Transparency in sovereign debt workouts could coordinate 
expectations of debt restructuring processes in general and in turn potentially limit the role 
of courts. The provision of information on the sovereign’s debt workout institutions, 
processes and underlying data in relation to debt sustainability, projections and creditor 
holdings, as stated in the UNCTAD proposal, sends a strong signal of transparency to the 
                                                
125 More details discussed in Chapter 5 
126 More details discussed in  Chapter 5 
127 The UNCTAD proposal argues that the lack of clear, universally applicable rules and principles undermines 
the predictability of debt enforcement, spiralling uncertainty and threatening to complicate crisis resolutions. 
They mention that this is particularly reinforced by conflicting judicial and administrative orders granted by 
courts of the United States, United Kingdom and European Union in relation to holdout litigation.  
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stakeholders involved.128 Good faith in sovereign debt workouts could reduce delays in 
agreement through not only restricting the role of courts but also coordinating expectations 
of litigation outcomes. As mentioned in the UNCTAD proposal, good faith has gained 
importance for the interpretation of contractual obligations in common law jurisdictions.129 
Unilateral or mutual conduct of good faith could then be recognised by courts and in turn 
collectively shape parties’ prospects of court outcomes. Challenges in the global adoption of 
these among other principles remain as the UNCTAD proposal failed to gain unanimous 
consent across all member states.130 Reasons for the lack of consensus among members 
included the uncertainty underlying the legal interpretations of some principles (UNCTAD, 
2015b). The lack of an internationally recognised agenda, whether formal or informal, poses 
serious risks in achieving timely sovereign debt workouts. 
Additionally, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) has recently played a 
role in reducing ambiguity in contractual language. It proposed model clauses intended to 
facilitate future sovereign debt restructurings through providing greater clarity on the 
interpretations of certain terms in bond contracts governed by English law and New York 
Law. 131 However, the ICMA-type intervention is without its limitation. Although progress 
has been made in incorporating the enhanced clauses in international sovereign bond 
issuances,132 there remains a significant outstanding stock of debt – approximately 82 percent 
                                                
128 Though it remains an open question as to whether transparency is an established principle of law, one may 
argue it is an emerging one (see UNCTAD (2015a)). Therefore, it could be expected that heterogeneous 
beliefs of court decisions on motions relating to transparency could be reduced if such principle is 
incorporated into contracts.  
129 For example, in the Uniform Commercial code (U.C.C.) of the U.S., there is an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. The U.C.C. defines “good faith” as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing.” U.C.C. § 1- 201(b)(20) (amended 2003). However, these 
explanations do not provide a definite meaning of good faith and fair dealing. See (Madsen and Litteken, 
2014). 
130 A draft resolution on "Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes" was adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in New York at its Sixty-Ninth Session on 10 September 2015, 
with 136 member states voting for, 6 against and 41 abstentions. The six countries that voted against their 
adoption were United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Israel and Japan. This group includes the 
major lending jurisdictions and leading creditor countries. See (UNCTAD, 2015b). 
131 In May 2015, the ICMA published a new updated Collective Action Clauses (CACs) and aggregated CACs 
in response to the New York court’s decision in the NML Ltd v Argentina sovereign debt dispute. The 
ICMA also developed an alternative language for the Pari passu clause eliminating the ratable payment 
interpretation (International Capital Market Association, 2014). As a reminder, CACs is a contract clause 
that allows for a supermajority of bondholders that agree to a debt restructuring to bind all other holders, 
including those who voted against the restructuring. Pari passu clause is a contract clause referring to equal 
rights of payment, or equal seniority on bonds. 
132 International Monetary Fund (2016) reports that approximately 154 issuances governed by English and New 
York law – representing 74 percent of the nominal principal amount of total issuances from October 1, 2014 
to October 31, 2016 – have included the enhanced clauses. The ICMA initially issued a press release on the 
revised collective action clauses and a new standard pari passu clause on August 29, 2014. See (International 
Capital Market Association, 2014). 
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of US$ 1.032 trillion in total nominal principal amount as at October 31, 2016 – without the 
new provisions (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Thus, there remains a strong call for 
further work into the redesigning of contracts to facilitate common understandings among 
market participants and accordingly reduce the role of courts. 
Finally, an important point to note on the recent evolution in the legal environment is the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision authorizing discovery of worldwide assets held by a foreign-
sovereign judgment debtor.133 After discovery, a district court could then determine the 
assets immune from attachment or not. 134  Such ruling accommodates for further 
heterogeneous expectations of court decisions regarding the immunity of an asset and thus 
poses to lengthen delays in sovereign debt restructuring processes.135 The findings of this 
paper suggest likewise, that the launching of a discovery process after sovereign debt 
restructuring negotiations threatens to delay settlements. It leaves a possible adverse ex-ante 
effect on the implementation of debt restructuring as it discourages creditors from 
participating in a debt relief peradventure they find suitable assets for attachment. As a result, 
the sovereign may be placed in a more vulnerable position and recovery from a debt crisis 
even more difficult. These implications are a by-product of the court’s affirmed order in the 
Argentine litigation that sets a precedent for future sovereign debt litigations. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Evidence suggests that creditors and sovereign debtors hold significant heterogeneous 
beliefs about outcomes from sovereign debt disputes filed under an adversarial legal system. 
This paper has shown that this may be driving inefficient delays in restructuring negotiations, 
and as such produce quantifiable non-negligible welfare losses illustrated in the calibration 
exercise. An important policy implication is that non-adversarial legal systems will lead to 
more efficient restructuring negotiations. However, there remains an open question about 
the effectiveness of such alternative legal frameworks in addressing inefficiencies caused by 
heterogeneous beliefs. Thus, there are three main areas we plan to explore for future research. 
                                                
133 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-842, 573 U.S. (2014)  
134  District court confirmed it would serve as a “clearinghouse for information” regarding a sovereign’s 
worldwide assets. See NML v. Argentina supra note 133 (slip op., at 3))   
135 The supreme court acknowledged heterogeneous opinions of parties by stating that Argentina may regard 
certain property immune from execution but “NML may think the same property not immune”. See NML 
v. Argentina supra note 133 (slip op., at 10))  (emphasis in original). However, The district court expects 
initial negotiations over specific production requests of assets to include “some reasonable definition of the 
information being sought.” Through these type of negotiations, the district court seeks to limit discovery to 
that which is “reasonably calculated to lead to attachable property”. See NML v. Argentina supra note 133 
(slip op., at 3)). Therefore, this statement alone suggests that such negotiations aim to synchronise divergent 
expectations of court decision on attachment. Notwithstanding, the statement leaves the courts with an 
enormous amount of discretion.  
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Firstly, we aim to investigate the extent to which these alternatives can provide a better 
approach to adversarial litigation. Secondly, we aim to assess the ex-ante implications of 
these alternatives in reducing heterogeneous beliefs – for example, studying their impact on 
debtors’ borrowing incentives and creditors’ lending behaviour. Thirdly, we plan to examine 
how the model can be modified when applying other national legal systems. 
4.9 Appendix 
4.9.1 Proof of Proposition 2 
Since the uniqueness of the SPE expected payoffs following 9 = 1 has already been shown 
within the proof of Proposition 2, we only establish here the uniqueness in SPE continuation 
payoffs for infinite games following 9 = 0 ∪ B/. 
Let the set of SPE payoffs for any , ≥ 1 of the creditor conditional on 9 = 0 ∪ B/ be given 
by:  5ë#8 0 ∪ B/ ≡ 56#8 0 ∪ B/ : ∃	OP	/î5	KV	OPY	ïñÅóOåò		ô:,ℎ	õOYKVVï 56#8 0 ∪ B/ , 56F8 0∪ B/ 	  
Let the set of SPE payoffs for any , ≥ 1 of the debtor conditional on 9 = 0 ∪ B/ be given 
by:  5ëF8 0 ∪ B/ ≡ 56F8 0 ∪ B/ : ∃	OP	/î5	KV	OPY	ïñÅóOåò		ô:,ℎ	õOYKVVï 56#8 0 ∪ B/ , 56F8 0∪ B/ 	  
Note that all subgames following outcome 9 = 0 ∪ B/  (prior to the realization of the 
identity of the proposer) are identical and so possess the same set of SPE values i.e. 5ë78 0 ∪ B/ ≡ 5ë7 0 ∪ B/  for ∀	, ≥ 1	OPQ	∀	: ∈ e, f . 
Suppose that the set of SPE values is non-empty, such that there exists a (non-trivial) 
supremum and infimum for each set. Therefore the debtor can do no better than 56F 0 ∪ B/ ≡ ïñõ 5ëF 0 ∪ B/  and no worse than 56F 0 ∪ B/ ≡ :PV 5ëF 0 ∪B/ . Similarly, the creditor can do no better than 56# 0 ∪ B/ ≡ ïñõ 5ë# 0 ∪ B/  and 
no worse than 56# 0 ∪ B/ ≡ :PV 5ë# 0 ∪ B/ . 
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Consider a subgame that begins after nature has determined that creditor makes the offer. 
Since the debtor will reject all offers less than T56F 0 ∪ B/  (the worst payoff it could get 
after rejection), the creditor’s payoff can be no greater than H − T56F 0 ∪ B/ . Since the 
debtor will accept any offer greater than T56F 0 ∪ B/  (the best payoff it could get after 
rejection), the creditor’s payoff can be no less than H − T56F 0 ∪ B/ . Now consider a 
subgame that begins after nature has determined that debtor makes the offer. Since the 
creditor will reject all offers less than T56# 0 ∪ B/ , the debtor’s payoff can be no greater 
than H − T56# 0 ∪ B/ . Since the creditor will accept any offer greater than T56# 0 ∪B/ , the debtor’s payoff can be no less than H − T56# 0 ∪ B/ .  
Moving back to the beginning of subgame, before nature has selected the proposer, we must 
have	 
56# 0 ∪ B/ = GT56# 0 ∪ B/ + 1 − G H − T56F 0 ∪ B/  
That is the best the creditor can do is a probability-weighted sum of the best it can do if the 
debtor is recognised and the best it can do if he (the creditor) is recognised. Analogously, we 
have 	56# 0 ∪ B/ = GT56# 0 ∪ B/ + 1 − G H − T56F 0 ∪ B/ , 	56F 0 ∪ B/ = G H − T56# 0 ∪ B/ + 1 − G T56F 0 ∪ B/ , 
56F 0 ∪ B/ = G H − T56# 0 ∪ B/ + 1 − G T56F 0 ∪ B/  
Solving these equations, we find 56# 0 ∪ B/ = 56# 0 ∪ B/ = 1 − G H , 56F 0 ∪B/ = 56F 0 ∪ B/ = GH . This establishes uniqueness of SPE continuation payoffs 
following9 = 0 ∪ B/. 
To complete the proof, we now exhibit SPE strategies following	9 = 0 ∪ B/. The strategies 
take the following form:  
• The creditor always proposes a split in which it receives H − TGH = H 1 − TG  and 
accepts any offer greater than or equal to T 1 − G H.  
• The debtor always proposes a split in which the creditor receives T 1 − G H and 
accepts any offer greater than or equal to TGH. 
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To check that these strategies are subgame perfect, we consider the following: Suppose 
nature chooses the debtor to make the offer. The creditor will only accept T 1 − G H since 
rejection yields same payoff. Therefore this acceptance rule constitutes a best response by 
the creditor. The debtor proposes T 1 − G H  since H 1 − T 1 − G > TGH  and the 
creditor accepts. Analogous reasoning applies if nature chooses the creditor to make offer. 
Therefore, players must settle at , = 1 following	9 = 0 ∪ B/. 
Q.E.D. 
4.9.2 Proof of Corollary 3 
 
Table 4.5 - Proof of Corollary 3 
 êú(. ) Ñçùû[	~ùü†ù	ü†ùç°¢[ç°† +/− §)§S7 1TGJ > 0 §)§H 1 − TTGJ  > 0 §)§J −H 1 − T + S# + SFTGJZ  < 0 §)§T −H + S# + SFTZGJ  < 0 §)§G −H 1 − T + S# + SFTGZJ  < 0 
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4.9.3 Computing for !, the total outstanding debt claims by " 
Table 4.6 - Computing for the total outstanding debt claims 
 
Details (i.e. bond names, ISIN codes, coupon rates, maturity dates and principal amounts) of the seven listed bonds were sourced from (Cruces and Samples, 2016). The total outstanding 
principal of $4.36billion across all the remaining 119 bonds was also sourced from (Cruces and Samples, 2016). The following computations were made: 1) The ‘remaining maturity’ 
column takes the difference between the bond’s maturity date and 2001, 2) The ‘coupon payment’ column multiplies the bond’s coupon rate to the principal amount, 3) The ‘weights’ 
column divides the bond’s principal amount by the principal subtotal – to be used to compute the weighted-average coupon rate and remaining maturity for the remaining 119 bonds, 4) The 
‘present value’ column discounts the bond’s coupon payments and principal amounts to 2001 terms using 7.5% discount rate and then aggregates, 5) The ‘future value’ column’ converts 
the bond’s present values into 2016 terms. 
* Variable (FRAN) rate is tied to the country risk, with a normal range of 9% to 14.4% but jumped to 101% after default. A rate of 14.4% was used to the reflect the country's economic and 
financial crisis prior to its default. See (Wernau, 2016). 
** This is close to the average coupon rate of 10.04% across sample reported in (Schumacher, 2015, p. 156). 
 
Order in 
Argentina 
Annex C 
Name ISIN codes Coupon rate Maturity date 
Remaining 
Maturity 
(from 
2001) 
Principal 
(in USD 
millions) 
Coupon 
payment 
(annual, USD 
millions) 
Weights 
(Principal/ 
Aggregated 
Principal) 
Present 
Value at 
2001, USD 
millions 
Future 
value at 
2016, USD 
millions 
41 Global bond XS0130278467 10%, 2001-2004 12%, 2004-2008 2008 7 595 
59.5, 2001-2004 
71.4, 2004-2008 0.36 774.95 2292.98 
9 Global bond US040114AR16 11.375% 2017 16 419 47.66125 0.25 615.09 1819.96 
17 Bond US040114AX83 Variable (FRAN) rate* 2005 4 298 42.912 0.18 409.78 1212.49 
14 Global bond US040114GB00 10.25% 2030 29 122 12.505 0.07 173.75 514.09 
7 Global bond US040114GD65 12.375% 2012 11 113 13.98375 0.07 164.80 487.61 
11 Global bond US040114FB19 12% 2020 19 66 7.92 0.04 103.50 306.24 
48 Brady Par bond  DE0004103007 5.87% 2023 22 58 3.4046 0.03 51.56 152.56 
Subtotal      1671   2293.42 6785.93 
Remaining 119 bonds  11.6%**  12 4360 505.7615655  6173.48 18266.56 
Total      6031    25052.50 
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4.10 Heterogeneous Beliefs of Inside Options in 
Bargaining 
4.10.1 Introduction 
An inside option is the payoff a player receives from temporary disagreement in bargaining. 
The model of inside options is very important in sovereign debt renegotiations as the 
sovereign receives some breathing space from not servicing its defaulted debt. This was 
particularly the case for countries like Argentina that benefitted from not servicing its 
defaulted debt during its export boom of 2001-2005. An example of a theoretical literature 
that has indirectly, but not explicitly, modelled debtor inside options in sovereign debt 
literature is Bi (2008).136  However, we model inside options slightly differently in this 
section – we assume players form expectations of their respective inside options during 
bargaining and their inside options become realised after litigation phases that occur during 
temporary disagreements in bargaining. For each litigation phase, there is a purported 
attachable asset that may be seized by the creditor if litigation is successful. The creditor 
(resp. debtor) keeps the sovereign asset and thus obtains the value of the asset following a 
successful (resp. unsuccessful) litigation at a cost of legal fees. In the event of an 
unsuccessful (resp. successful) litigation, the creditor (resp. debtor) receives nothing and 
pays the legal fees.  
The main difference between the models in section 4.4 and section 4.10 is that while the 
model 4.4 is heterogeneous beliefs about outside options arising from a one-shot litigation 
game, this model 4.10 is about heterogeneous beliefs about inside options arising from 
multiple litigation games. It is also more complex as it contains the updating of beliefs along 
the equilibrium path of play and thus the main equilibrium result in 4.10.3.5 (Proposition 4) 
is indexed by the history of play. 
4.10.2 Model 
Consider two risk neutral players, a sovereign debtor ! and a creditor ", with same discount 
factor 	$ ∈ (0,1) . We consider a + -period alternating-offers bargaining game of debt 
restructuring, represented in a discrete time setting of , = 0,1,2,3… , + − 1 . The game 
begins in , = 0 after a debt default. The debtor (creditor) makes an offer at , even (odd) 
                                                
136 Bi (2008) showed that delays in sovereign debt restructuring may be beneficial to allow the debtor sometime 
to recover from crisis. Here the bargaining pie grows overtime. 
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periods and responds to an offer at , odd (even) periods.  Players bargain over the partition 
of the cake of size	2, which is not accessible until settlement. This can be interpreted as the 
amount of funds raised from re-accessing the international capital markets that will mark the 
end of the debt crisis.137 
The model extends the Rubinstein-Stahl framework where players may hold heterogeneous 
prior beliefs about outcomes from a temporary disagreement in bargaining. Such beliefs are 
reflected through optimism about court decisions on enforcement actions against the debtor’s 
commercial assets or payment-streams (including those to exchange bondholders).138 
Player’s beliefs are assumed to be common knowledge and thus there is no asymmetric 
information between players in this model. Their expected payoffs from temporary 
disagreements in litigation are modelled as expected inside options.139 These are formed as a 
consequence of each player’s subjective anticipation of court judgement, where the creditor 
hopes for a successful attachment i.e. to retrieve the face value of debt, while, the debtor 
hopes for an unsuccessful attachment i.e. to keep the face value of debt. Thus the extension 
from Rubinstein is a framework modelling endogenously determined inside options without 
a common prior.   
At date 	, = 0 , !  proposes an offer 345 ∈ 0, 2 	 for " . If accepted, !  keeps 	2 − 345 , 
corresponding to an agreed split of	 345, 2 − 345  and the game ends immediately. If rejected, 
the disagreement game 6	follows for a unit for time, where "  decides between a set of 
actions {8, 98}. 8 denotes creditor seeks to Attach i.e. creditor attempts to enforce his debt 
claim against a sovereign asset through the courts.140 98 denotes creditor decides to Not 
Attach, i.e. creditor does not seek any enforcement action against a sovereign asset in court.  
If action 8 is made, the debtor has a singleton action set {<} where it defends itself in court. 
Thus players inside option between times	,	and	, + 1 depends only on the creditors choice 
                                                
137 In April 2016, Argentina issued $16.5billion of dollar-denominated debt to reportedly pay off a total 
£9.3billion to holdout creditors in cash. The rest of funds planned to be invested in infrastructure projects. 
(See (MercoPress, 2016)) 
138 The author acknowledges the plaintiff initial attempt to seek post-judgement world-wide discovery for 
which, when granted, the litigant pursues limited discovery in foreign courts to locate, and then attempt the 
seizure of, assets in accordance with the law of the locale (See NML Capital Ltd et al. V Republic Of 
Argentina, 12 F.3d 842 (U.S. 2014) at 3. However, for the purpose of simplicity, the litigation process 
modelled in this paper skips this discovery process and considers the creditor’s decision to enforce, or not, 
their claim against a seemingly attachable asset/payment-stream. 
139 An inside option is the utility payoff players get in the disagreement game after a rejected offer at , and 
before the next round of play at , + 1 . In the disagreement game, players form expectations of the 
creditor’s litigation efforts on seeking enforcement actions against the sovereign’s assets/payments.  
140 Since summary judgements are granted automatically when creditor litigates after a debt default, Action 8 
must mean creditor seeks to secure court-enforcement actions on possible attachable sovereign’s assets. 
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of action, where heterogeneous beliefs apply from choice 8 (See Table 4.7 showing the 
breakdown of parties payoffs from different creditor’s actions and realizations). Following 
action 8, the court runs its verdict on the outcome of the litigation and then the game 
continues at a cost of surplus destruction by a factor	$. For simplicity, Let 2 be normalised 
to 1. The author hereafter refers ‘assets/payments’ as property for terminology convenience.  
Figure 4.6 below illustrates the timeline of events.  > and ? denote the eventual winner of 
the court case and loser respectively. @  and A  denote face value of debt and legal cost 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4.6 shows that the creditor can persist in its hunt for attachable property following 
previous unsuccessful attachments and rejected offers (unlike the model in 4.4). Thus, 
implicitly, the length of the game is determined by the total number of possible attachable 
properties.141 Furthermore, it is assumed that these properties of interest are located within 
the jurisdiction governing the defaulted debt and thus the creditor can only file for 
attachment under the court of this jurisdiction.142 More importantly, it is assumed that the 
court would always decide in favour of the creditor in subsequent litigation games following 
a successful attachment.143 An additional crucial assumption is that a court’s decision on a 
                                                
141 However, the game could be extended to an infinite horizon framework where the sovereign possesses an 
infinite number of possible attachable assets located in foreign jurisdictions. For simplicity, we consider 
here a framework with finite set of attachable assets. This can be supported by the prevalence of few 
government assets available for attachment in foreign jurisdictions (Tomz and Wright, 2013).  
142 This assumption is made in order to prevent the creditor from seeking attachments in multiple jurisdictions 
which will complicate the dynamic structure of the model. Allowing for multiple jurisdictions would clash 
with later simplifying assumptions as noted in the supra note 141. 
143 For example, a successful attachment on property 0 would mean that all future attempted attachments on 
property 1	to property		+ − 1  would be successful as well. This would clash with an assumption of multiple 
jurisdictions.  
t=2 …t=T-1 " offers, ! t=1 8: Reject 
Accept: 
Game ends 
98	
! offers, " t=0 
Sovereign defaults 
and Creditor files suit 
Attachable 
Property 0: 
Court decides. >CD,E	@ − A ?	CD,E − A Reject. " 
Accept: 
Game ends 
8:  
98	
Attachable 
Property 1: 
Court decides. >CD,E	@ − A ?	CD,E − A 
Figure 4.6 – Timeline of events – Inside options bargaining game 
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particular lawsuit against an attachable property is final i.e. the decision cannot be 
reversed.144  
The players inside options are described below (payoffs summarised in Table 4.7):  
• Creditor’s (resp. debtor’s) utility for every unit of time when the creditor chooses 98 
is zero (resp. positive) for the following reasons: (i) The creditor receives no debt 
service. (ii) The debtor receives a relief from temporarily not making interest 
payments on defaulted debt and receives little disruption from trade flows.145 As a 
result, the payoff to the debtor is the utility gain from retaining the claims on the 
defaulted debt, which is the face value @.146  
 
• Player F′E expected utility for every unit of time when the creditor choses 8 depends 
on the following: (i) Own belief of a successful attachment (ii) Legal cost	A147, (iii) 
Face value	@. The creditor’s (resp. debtor’s) expected inside option from choice 8 is 
positive with a sufficiently high expectation of a successful (resp. unsuccessful) 
attachment valued at @ at the expense of A. 148 
Before we set the definitions below, let J = {K, L, M} be the set of possible outcomes in 6, 
where K means choice 8 was unsuccessful, L	means choice 8 was successful and M means 
choice 98 was made. Let JN be the set of all possible sequences of histories prior to date	,. 
Denote ℎN ∈ JN for a generic history of outcomes prior to date , (i.e. on 0,1,2, … , − 1 ), 
such that for each E < ,, KQ indicates an unsuccessful attachment of property E at time E, LQ 
indicates a successful attachment of property E  at time E  and MQ  indicates no attempted 
attachment was made at time E. 
                                                
144 This assumption ensures the bargaining environment is stationary. Allowing for an appeal process may 
result in the debtor taking subsequent actions to launch a petition in higher courts against a lower-court 
ruling in favour of the creditor and thus the game would transit into a non-stationary environment.  
145 Not making payments on defaulted debt provides the sovereign breathing space for economic recovery (See 
(Miller and García-Fronti, 2004); (Ghosal and Miller, 2005); (Dhillon et al., 2006); (Ghosal et al., 2010)). 
Little disruption on trade flows is supported by (Dhillon et al., 2006). Note that the debtor suffers from high 
sovereign spreads following credit rating downgrades regardless of the creditor’s attempt to attach or not 
post default. 
146 For the purpose of simplicity, claims on defaulted debt are normalized to the face value	@ i.e. there are no 
interest payment claims when creditor accelerates the debt.  
147 It is assumed that both players incur the same legal cost A irrespective of the outcome of the litigation. 
148 A highly optimistic creditor is less likely to compromise to a proposed haircut by the debtor. If eventually 
successful in a triggered litigation, then he will have a higher bargaining position when negotiating 
settlement in the next round as debtor’s asset/payments become at threat for use (i.e. exposed to liquidation 
or restriction). In other words, creditor uses the successful attachment to retrieve the face value of debt in 
subsequent negotiations. Similarly, a highly optimistic debtor is less likely to satisfy creditor’s full claims. 
If eventually creditor is unsuccessful in litigation, then the debtor‘s bargaining position remains unchanged 
since none of his asset/payments are under threat.  
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Definition 1 (Inside options): For a given history ℎN, the utility payoff for player F ∈ {!, "} 
obtained during temporary disagreement at period	,, as a function of creditor’s action in the 
litigation game at ,, is denoted as	CRN(∙, ℎN). Player F′E expected utility payoff from temporary 
disagreement when the creditor chooses 8 at period	, given ℎN is denoted as TCRN(8, ℎN).  
Definition 2 (Bargaining surplus): Where beliefs are compatible (i.e. in the absence of 
heterogeneous beliefs), there always exists a bargaining surplus in settlement defined by 	U − V − W ∈ [Y, U) when the creditor will choose 	98 in	6, or otherwise defined by	U −V + Z[ − W ∈ [Y, U)  when the creditor will choose 8 in	6.  
The bargaining surplus is the extra surplus parties realize from settlement, over the surplus 
realized from delay. With no heterogeneous beliefs, parties immediately settle at , = 0 since 
the bargaining surplus condition always holds.149  
Definition 3 (Beliefs): Let \4N (ℎN)   ∈ 0,1  denote the creditor’s belief of a successful 
attachment at ,  given history ℎN  and \]N (ℎN) ∈ 0,1  denote the debtor’s belief of an 
unsuccessful attachment given history	ℎN. The combination of player’s beliefs is captured by 
parameter		^_(`_) 	= ab_ (`_) 		+ ac_ (`_). This measures the degree of belief incompatibility. 
We say players are optimistic when dN ℎN > 1 and pessimistic when	dN(ℎN) 	< 1. Beliefs 
are consistent when dN(ℎN) 	= 1. 
Definition 4 (Degree of optimism): The degree of optimism that generates delay in 
agreement at , is measured by	fN 	≡ dN − 1	h	(0,1]. Higher fN	means player’s beliefs are 
more optimistic while lower fN  means beliefs are less optimistic. When	fN = 1, player’s 
beliefs are extremely optimistic. When	fN = 0, player’s beliefs are consistent. Define fN as 
player’s degree of optimism that makes them indifferent between settling and delaying at ,. 
The paper studies the case of optimism in driving delays in settlement. Players update their 
beliefs according to the following remark below. The paper does not study the case of 
pessimism since it is not considered a threat to settlement.  
Remark 1 (Beliefs Update): Players’ prior beliefs are fixed over the course of the game 
until one of the following events occurs after which they update their beliefs: (1) the court 
                                                
149 (See Section 4.10.5.1 of the Appendix 4.10.5, which initially shows the step-by-step process for solving for 
a + = 2	to a + = 4	period game before establishing the equilibrium results for the general case +). Here 
equilibrium offers are a function of common (true) knowledge of success/failure of creditor litigation efforts. 
The conditions suggest that the gains from settlement at , = 0 when the creditor will attach are higher than 
the gains from settlement , = 0 when the creditor will not attach. This means attaching is costly for both 
players.  
  Chapter 4 
92 
 
declares successful action 8 in 6; (2) the game reaches the settlement deadline following a 
sequence of unsuccessful action 8  and/or 98  in 6 . Players’ beliefs are otherwise 
independent of history until one of these two events occurs. Event (1) is identified with any 
history	ℎN of a type set of histories with LNjk. We denote this type set of histories associated 
with Event (1) as JlN ∈ JN. Event (2) is identified with any history	ℎmjk of a type set of 
histories with KmjnMo	Mmjn. We denote this type set of histories associated with Event (2) as Jpmjk ∈ JN . Therefore, players’ posterior beliefs, as a function of any history 	ℎN ∈ JlN , 
are 	\4N ℎN ∈ JlN = 1, \]N ℎN ∈ JlN = 0 , while posterior beliefs, as a function of any 
history	ℎmjk ∈ 	Jpmjk, are	\4N ℎmjk ∈ 	Jpmjk = 0, \]N ℎmjk ∈ 	Jpmjk = 1. 
Table 4.7 - Inside options payoffs at time _ 
 
Creditor’s 
Action	
Debtor’s Payoff Creditor’s Payoff 
98	 C]N 98, ℎN, MN = @ C4N 98, ℎN, MN = 	0 
8 Expec
te
d TC]N 8, ℎN = \]N ℎN ∙ @ − A TC4N (8, ℎN) = \4N (ℎN) ∙ @ − A 
Re
al
is
ed
 
C]N 8, ℎN, KN = @ − A		Mo		C]N 8, ℎN, LN = −A	
C4N 8, ℎN, KN = −A		Mo	C4N 8, ℎN, LN = @ − A	
*Note	0 < A < @ < 1.150 
Table 4.7 shows that players inside options are endogenously determined by the creditor’s 
action. Note that player	F’s expected inside option from 8 is positive when	\RN > A/@.  
Remark 2 (Terminal Payoff): The following assumptions are made about the terminal 
payoffs, which they receive having failed to reach any settlement by deadline: 
• In the event of a successful attachment at any point in the game (indicated by any 
history	ℎN ∈ 	JlN 	rt time	,), the creditor’s terminal payoff is the face value @ which 
he walks away with while the debtor’s terminal payoff is zero as he leaves the 
negotiations with no write-off of debt.  
                                                
150  Note that the face value @  is the size of the judgement decreed by the judge for the winning party. 
Nonetheless, parties always settle outside the court (whether pre/post attachment hunt) and thus the judge’s 
ruling only seeks to inform the bargaining outcome rather than determine the pie distribution.  
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• In the event that there is no successful attachment across the bargaining game 
(indicated by any history	ℎmjk ∈ 	Jpmjk	at time	+ − 1, the creditor’s terminal payoff 
is zero as he receives no compensation from defaulted debt while the debtor’s 
terminal payoff is @ which he retains.  
4.10.3 Characterization of Equilibrium 
The notion of equilibrium is subgame perfection (SPE). We first characterize the solution 
for a simple two-period game. We then derive the solution for a three-period game to show 
the effect of persistent beliefs. We later construct the general case for any +-period game. 
4.10.3.1 Example 1 (s = Z) 
Consider a two-period game with	, = 0,1. Let 3tN(ℎN) denote the equilibrium offer proposed 
by player F for player u at time , given history	ℎN.  
Applying backward induction, at , = 1 creditor proposes to the debtor one of the following: 
• 3]k(L5) = 0 if at , = 0 players failed to reach a settlement and action 8 was made 
and successful.  
• 3]k(K5) = @ if at , = 0 players failed to reach a settlement and action 8 was made 
and unsuccessful.  
• 3]k(M5) = @ if at , = 0 players failed to reach a settlement and action 98 was made 
In 6 of	, = 0, creditor chooses 8 if	\45 > vw and chooses 98 otherwise.  
If	\45 ≤ vw, at , = 0 both players know that creditor will chose 98 and the respective inside 
options of the creditor and the debtor would be C45 98, M5 = 0	and	C]5 98, M5 = @.  In 
the bargaining round of , = 0, debtor will propose 345 = $ 1 − @ 		Fyy		1 − $ 1 − @ ≥ @ + $@ 
This gives 1 ≥ @ + $ which corresponds to the bargaining surplus and thus players settle at , = 0.   
If	\45 > vw, at , = 0 both players know that creditor will chose 8 and the respective expected 
inside options of the creditor and the debtor would be TC45(8) = \45 ∙ @ − A and TC]5(8) =\]5 ∙ @ − A. Note ℎ5 is ∅. In the bargaining round of , = 0, debtor will propose 345 = \45@ − A + \45$ 1 + 1 − \45 $ 1 − @ 		Fyy 
  Chapter 4 
94 
 
1 − \45@ − A + \45$(1) + (1 − \45)$(1 − @) ≥ \]5@ − A + \]5$(@) + (1 − \]5)$(0) 
Simplifying, players settle at , = 0		Fyy  
 1 ≥ d5@ 1 + $ − 2A + $ 1 − @  (4.6) 
and delay agreement otherwise. Player’s delay provided beliefs are sufficiently optimistic to 
a degree of   
 |Y > |Y 	≡ U − V + Z[ − WV U + W  (4.7) 
This is intuitive since if the numerator, the gains from immediate settlement, is high then a 
higher degree of optimism is required for delay. Below summaries the main result. 
Unique SPE with delay: With	\45 > vw rK}		d5 > 1	, player’s delay settlement at , = 0 for 
any parameter combination ($, @, A) for which	f5 > f5 where f5 is defined as the degree of 
optimism. The creditor chooses to ‘attach’ in 6 following	, = 0. Parties eventually settle at , = 1. 
Example 1 characterises the result for a two-period game. Before we derive the solution 
under a three-period game, we introduce some equilibrium notations helpful for expressing 
equilibrium results in longer games. 
4.10.3.2 Equilibrium Notation 
Define ℎ~N ∈ JN as a specific history before date , where for each E < ,, creditor made an 
unsuccessful attachment i.e. ℎ~N ≡ 	 (K5, Kk … , KNjn, KNjk).  
For the remainder of the paper, we focus on the case \45 > vw  where players may delay 
agreement as seen in Example 1.151 Thus, creditor’s optimal strategy in 6 is to choose 8 for ∀ , ∈ 0, 1, … , + − 2 . Note that \RN ℎ~N = \R5 for ∀ F. 
Given a strategy profile, aspects of the equilibrium path of play are summarised by the 
following variables: WN ℎ~N ; 3tN ℎN,WN(ℎ~N ) ; TÅtN ℎN,WN(ℎ~N ) ; \R5(W5 ∅ )  
• Define WN(ℎ~N ) as the equilibrium sequence of expectations of settlement and/or 
delay, as a function of history ℎ~N , from date , for all future times	Ç ∈ [, + 1, , +2,…+ − 2]. For each	Ç, WN(ℎ~N ) indicates a binary variable EÉ or	}É, where EÉ stands 
                                                
151 There is no threat to immediate agreement in any T-period game when \45 ≤ vw  
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for anticipated settlement at Ç while }É stands for anticipated delay at Ç. WN(ℎ~N ) has 13 + − 2 − ,  dimensions.  
• Define 3tN ℎN,WN ℎ~N  as the equilibrium offer proposed by player F for player u at 
time , given history ℎN and WN ℎ~N  conditional on ℎN = ℎ~N .152 
• Define TÅtN ℎ~N ,WN(ℎ~N )  as the equilibrium expected continuation payoff of player u 
at time , given history ℎ~N  and WN ℎ~N .  
• Define \R5(W5 ∅ )  as player 	F ’s prior belief for a given set of parameters ($, @, A, \t5) and W5 ∅  that makes the players indifferent settling and delaying at , = 0. 
4.10.3.3 Example 2 (s = Ñ) 
Consider a three-period game with	, = 0,1,2.  
Walking backwards, at , = 2 debtor either proposes 34n ℎ~n = 0 if ℎn = ℎ~n ≡ (K5, Kk) or 34n ℎn ∈ Jln = @ if ℎn = (K5, Lk) ∈ Jln. Note that Wn(ℎ~n) is ∅.  
If ℎk = ℎ~k ≡ K5 ,	at , = 1 creditor will propose  3]k K5 = TÅ]k K5 	≡ \]k K5 @ − A + $ 1 − 34n ℎ~n+ 1 − \]k K5 −A + $ 1 − 34n Jln  	Fyy		1 − 3]k K5 ≥ TÅ4k K5 	≡ \4k K5 @ − A + $ 34n Jln + 1 − \4k K5 −A + $ 34n ℎ~n 	 
Note that Wk(K5) is also	∅153. As \4k K5 = \45	and	\]k K5 = \]5 , simplifying, players settle 
at , = 1 iff  
 1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + $ + d5 − 1 $ 34n Jln − 34n ℎ~n  (4.8) 
                                                
152  For instance in a five-period game, where ℎk = ℎ~k = K5  and Wk ℎ~k = (dn, sá) ,  3]k K5,Wk K5  
represents the equilibrium offer proposed by the creditor to the debtor at , = 1  when action 8  was 
unsuccessful at , = 0 and when it is anticipated that players would delay at , = 2 but settle at , = 3 with 
beliefs \4k ℎ~k = \45	and	\]k ℎ~k = \]5 . Alternatively, for ℎk = L5, 3]k L5  represents the equilibrium offer 
proposed by the creditor to the debtor at , = 1 when action 8 was successful at , = 0. Wk ℎ~k  becomes 
irrelevant as beliefs update to \4k L5 = 1	and	\]k L5 = 0. 
153 Players do not form expectations of settlement or delay at deadline + − 1 since they would always settle by 
deadline. Hence	Wk ℎ~k 	is ∅. 
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Players delay when Condition (4.8) fails to hold. Note that substituting for 34n ℎ~n  
and	34n Jln  gives Condition (4.6).  
If however ℎk = L5 ∈ Jlk,	at , = 1 \4k L5 = 1	and 	\]k L5 = 0 and therefore creditor 
will propose  3]k L5 = −A + $ 1 − 34n Jln 	Fyy	1 − 3]k L5 ≥ @ − A + $ 34n Jln  
Simplifying gives the bargaining surplus condition. Therefore, players settle at , = 1 
following history	ℎk = L5 . 
Now let’s consider the case when Condition (4.8) holds. Here,	W5 ∅ = Ek. At	, = 0 the 
debtor proposes  
345(Ek) = \45 @ − A + $ 1 − 3]k L5 + 1 − \45 −A + $ 1 − 3]k K5 	Fyy 
1 − 345(Ek) ≥ \]5 @ − A + $ 3]k K5 + 1 − \]5 −A + $ 3]k L5  
Simplifying, players settle at , = 0 iff  
 
 1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + $ + d − 1 $ 3]k K5 − 3]k L5  (4.9) 
Substituting for 3]k K5 and	3]k L5  simplifies to 
 1 ≥ d5@ 1 + $\]5(1 + $) − 2A + $ 1 − @\]5(1 + $)  (4.10) 
Players delay when Condition (4.10) fails to hold. Therefore, from the creditor’s perspective, 
players delay agreement at , = 0 for ∀ \45 > \45(Ek) ∈ vw , 1  where  
 abY àU ≡ U − acYV + Z[ − W + WacYV(U + W)(U − acY )V(U + WacY (U + W)  (4.11) 
Similarly from the debtor’s perspective, players delay agreement at , = 0  for ∀  \]5 >\]5 Ek ∈ [0,1] that solves  Y = abYV − Z[ + W − U + acY V U − W U + W U − abY + acY Z WV(U + W)  (4.12) 
Now let’s consider the case when Condition (4.8) does not hold. Here,	W5 ∅ = }k. At	, =0 the debtor proposes  
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345(}k) = \45 @ − A + $ 1 − 3]k L5 + 1 − \45 −A + $ TÅ4k K5 	Fyy 
1 − 345(}k) ≥ \]5 @ − A + $ TÅ]k K5 + 1 − \]5 −A + $ 3]k L5  
Simplifying, players settle at , = 0 iff  
 
1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + \45$ − d5 − 1 $3]k L5 + (1 − \45)$TÅ4k K5+ \]5$TÅ]k K5  (4.13) 
 Substituting for 3]k L5 ,	TÅ4k K5  and	TÅ]k K5  simplifies to 
 
1 ≥ d5 @ − $ −A + $ − $@ − 2A + \45$ + (\]5)n$n+ $ 1 + \]5$ 1 − \]5 −A + $ − $@+ $ \45 − (\45)n + (\]5)n @ − A + $n\45 1 − \45 @− $(1 − \45)nA 
(4.14) 
Players delay when Condition (4.14) fails to hold. Therefore, from the creditor’s perspective, 
players delay agreement at , = 0 for ∀ \45 > \45(}k) ∈ vw , 1  that solves  
Y = acY V − W −[ + W − WV U − W U − acY + acY ZW W + V − [+ W −[ + W − WV − Zâ − W[ − U+ abY V U + W + ZWZ + W U − W + Z[ − abY Z WV U + W  
(4.15) 
Similarly from the debtor’s perspective, players delay agreement at , = 0  for ∀  \]5 >\]5(}k) ∈ [0,1] that solves  Y = abY V U + W + ZWZ + W U − W + Z[ + abY Z WV U + W+ W −[ + W − WV − Zâ − W[ − U+ acY V − W −[ + W − WV U − W− acY Z W V U + WZ + U − W W − [  
(4.16) 
Below summaries the main results (i.e. conditions ((4.11), (4.12)) and ((4.15), (4.16))).  
Unique SPE with delay: With	d5 > 1, player’s delay settlement at , = 0 for any parameter 
combination ($, @, A) for which \45 > \45(W5 ∅ ) ∈ vw , 1  and 	\]5 > \]5(W5 ∅ ) ∈ [0,1]. 
  Chapter 4 
98 
 
The creditor chooses 8 in , = 0,1 disagreement games. Parties will settle on or before	, =2. 
The following proposition characterises the equilibrium result for any +-period game. 
4.10.3.4 Proposition 3 
For any T-period game with	\45 > vw rK}		d5 > 1	, player’s delay settlement at , = 0 when  
 
U < ^YV − Z[ + abYW − ^Y − U WäcU ãY + acYWåçcU éY,WU éY+ U − abY WåçbU éY,WU éY  (4.17) 
Where 	3]k L5 = y $, @, A, + 	 and 	TÅRk K5,Wk K5 = y $, @, A, +, \R5, \t5 		yMo	∀F ≠u .The creditor optimal strategy in 6	 is 8  for all 	, ≤ + − 2 . Parties will settle on or 
before	, = + − 1. (See Proof of Proposition 3 in section 4.10.5.2). 
For any T-period game, there exist a total of 2mjn	possible delay-conditions at	, = 0. The 
unique delay-condition that will apply at	, = 0 depends on W5 ∅  which has 13(+ − 2) 
dimensions.  
Proposition 4 below is simply a restatement of Proposition 3 with reference to players beliefs. 
4.10.3.5 Proposition 4 
For any T-period game with	d5 > 1	, player’s delay settlement at , = 0 for any 	\45 ∈ vw , 1  
and	\]5 ∈ 0,1  such that, for a given set of parameters (@, A, $), 
 
0 ≤ ym5 W5 ∅ ≡ d5@ − 2A + \45$ − d5 − 1 $3]k L5+ \]5$TÅ]k K5,Wk K5 + 1 − \45 $TÅ4k K5,Wk K5 − 1 (4.18) 
Where	3]k L5 	and	TÅRk K5,Wk K5  are expressed in Proposition 3. 
ym5 W5 ∅  can be interpreted as the combined continuation payoff of players less the 
bargaining pie at , = 0	for a given + game. If this is significantly high, players will delay 
agreement.     
4.10.3.6 Corollary 4 
 For a two-period game,	f5 is increasing with A and decreasing with @	and	$. For a three-
period game, denote yá5 W5 ∅ ∈ 	 yá5 Ek ,yá5 }k  where yá5 Ek 	denotes the RHS of 
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Condition (4.10) and yá5 }k denotes RHS of Condition (4.14). yWê5  is decreasing with A 
and increasing with @	and	$. 
Proof. 
For a + = 2 game,  ëf5ëA = 21 + $ @ > 0, ëf5ë@ = −2A − $ + 11 + $ @n < 0, ëf5ë$ = −2A − @ + 2@ 1 + $ n < 0.	 
For a + = 3 game,  ëyá5 EkëA = 	−2	 < 0,			 ëyá5 Ekë@ = 	d5 + d5 − 1 $\45 1 + $ 	> 0	, 
	ëyá5 Ekë$ = 	1 + d5 − 1 \45@ 1 + 2$ > 0 ëyá5 }këA = 	−2 − 2$ 1 − \45 − $á + $\]5 1 − $(1 − \]5) 	< 0,							 ëyá5 }kë@ = 		 d5 + $\45 1 − \45 + $n d5 − 1 + $ + \45 1 − \45 − \]5$(1 − \]5) > 0	,					 ëyá5 }kë$ = 3$n \]5 1 − @ 1 − \]5 + @ − A+ 2$ 1 + \]5@ − \]5 1 + A 1 − \]5 − @ 1 − \]5 n − \45 + \]5A− 1 − \45 \45@ − 2A + \45 	> 0 
Q.E.D 
4.10.4 Conclusion 
This section considered a model of heterogeneous beliefs regarding inside options from 
bargaining in the context of a sovereign debt dispute. It showed that players delay settlement 
for any length of game when they have sufficient optimistic beliefs about their inside options, 
i.e. payoffs from temporary breakdowns in negotiations, which are determined by court 
outcomes from creditor litigation efforts against attachable sovereign assets. The model 
results were first shown in reduced time settings of two- or three period-games to illustrate 
how the condition for delay varies across time horizons. In an alternative Rubinstein 
bargaining framework, where beliefs are updated according to a specific framework, the 
section illustrates the interplay between optimism, inside options and bargaining delays.    
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4.10.5 Appendix for Section 4.10 Inside options model 
4.10.5.1 Construction of Bargaining Surplus Conditions 
4.10.5.1.1 Equilibrium Solution I (s = Z game) 
Consider a two-period bargaining game which ends at 	, = 1 . Suppose it is common 
knowledge that strategy 8 in 6 at , = 0 would be unsuccessful in court. 
Let ítN ℎN  denote the equilibrium offer proposed by player F for player u at time , given 
history ℎN and dN ℎN = 1. 
Using backward induction, at , = 1 creditor proposes í]k K5 = @ 
The creditor will optimally 98 in 6 since C45 8, K5 = −A < C45 98, M5 = 0 and thus 
 
At , = 0 debtor proposes  í45 ∅ = $(1 − @) Fyy	1 − í45 ∅ ≥ $í]k K5 + @ 
 U − V − W ≥ Y (4.19) 
The LHS of Condition (4.19) defines the bargaining surplus in a game where creditor 
chooses 98 in 6. Condition (4.19) provides the case for the first-best benchmark and it is 
assumed to always hold. The intuition is this: For players to settle immediately, the 
bargaining pie needs to be sufficiently high compensating both the debtor’s payoff from an 
unsuccessful	8 and the discounted gains from future settlement. 
Now suppose it is common knowledge that strategy 8 in 6 at , = 0 would be successful in 
court. Again using backward induction, at , = 1 creditor proposes í]k L5 = 0 
The creditor will optimally 8 in 6 since C45 8, L5 = @ − A > C45 98, M5 = 0 and thus 
At , = 0 debtor proposes  í45 ∅ = @ − A + $ 
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Fyy	1 − í45 ∅ ≥ $í]k L5 − A	 
 	U − V + Z[ − W ≥ Y (4.20) 
The LHS of Condition (4.19) defines the bargaining surplus in a game of compatible beliefs 
about the creditor’s strategy	8. Note that Condition (4.20) is satisfied by Condition (4.19). 
Below establishes that the bargaining surplus condition remains consistent irrespective of 
the length of game.  
4.10.5.1.2 Equilibrium Solution II (s = Ñ game) 
Consider a three-period bargaining game which ends at	, = 2. Here, we consider three 
possible scenarios.  
Firstly, suppose it is common knowledge that strategy 8 at , = 0,1 would be unsuccessful 
in court. The creditor will optimally 98 in 6	of	, = 0,1. Therefore, ℎn = M5, Mk  
Applying backward induction, at , = 2 debtor proposes í4n M5, Mk = 0 
At , = 1 creditor proposes í]k M5 = $ + @ 
At , = 0 debtor proposes  í45 ∅ = $ 1 − $ − @ 	 Fyy	1 − í45 ∅ ≥ $í]k M5 + @ 
 This simplifies to Condition (4.19). 
Secondly, suppose it is common knowledge that strategy 8 would be unsuccessful at , = 0 
but successful at , = 0. The creditor will optimally 98 in 6	of	, = 0 but 8 in 6 of	, = 1. 
Therefore, ℎn = M5, Lk . Again applying backward induction, at , = 2 debtor proposes í4n M5, Lk = @ 
At , = 1 creditor proposes 
 í]k M5 = $ 1 − @ − A Fyy	1 − í]k M5 ≥ @ − A + $@ 
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 This simplifies to Condition (4.20). 
At , = 0 debtor proposes 
 í45 ∅ = $ 1 − í]k M5 	 Fyy	1 − í45 ∅ ≥ $í]k M5 + @ 
 This simplifies to Condition (4.19). 
Thirdly, suppose it is common knowledge that strategy 8 in 6	would be successful in , =0,1 . 154  The creditor will optimally 8  in 6	of 	, = 0,1 . Therefore, ℎn = L5, Lk . Again 
applying backward induction, at , = 2 debtor proposes í4n L5, Lk = @ 
At , = 1 creditor proposes 
 í]k L5 = $ 1 − @ − A Fyy	1 − í]k L5 ≥ @ − A + $@ 
 This simplifies to Condition (4.20). 
At , = 0 debtor proposes 
 í45 ∅ = @ − A + $ 1 − í]k L5  Fyy		1 − í45 ∅ ≥ $í]k L5 − A 
 This also simplifies to Condition (4.20). 
4.10.5.1.3 Equilibrium Solution III (s = ì game) 
Consider a four-period bargaining game which ends at 	, = 3 . Here, we consider four 
possible scenarios. 
Firstly, suppose it is common knowledge that strategy 8 at , = 0,1,2 would be unsuccessful 
in court. The creditor will optimally 98 in 6	of	, = 0,1,2. Therefore, ℎá = M5, Mk, Mn . 
Thus, at , = 3  creditor proposes 	í]á M5, Mk, Mn = @ . At , = 2  debtor 
proposes 		í4n M5, Mk = $(1 − @) . At , = 1  creditor proposes 	í]k M5 = $ 1 −
                                                
154 Recall that according to model assumptions, successful attachment at any , means successful attachment at 
all future period	, + 1, , + 2	 … , + − 2.  
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í4n M5, Mk + @ . At , = 0  debtor proposes í45 ∅ = $ 1 − í]k M5 	which is accepted 
immediately by Condition (4.19). 
Secondly, suppose it is common knowledge that strategy 8 would be unsuccessful at , =0,1 but successful at , = 2. The creditor will optimally 98 in 6	of	, = 0,1 but 8 in 6 of	, =2. Therefore, ℎá = M5, Mk, Ln . Thus, at , = 3 creditor proposes	í]á M5, Mk, Ln = 0. At , =2  debtor proposes 	í4n M5, Mk = @ − A + $ . At , = 1  creditor proposes 	í]k M5 = $ 1 −í4n M5, Mk + @ . At , = 0  debtor proposes í45 ∅ = 	$ 1 − í]k M5  which is accepted 
immediately by Condition (4.19). 
Thirdly, suppose it is common knowledge that strategy 8 would be unsuccessful at , = 0 
but successful at , = 1,2. The creditor will optimally 98 in 6	of	, = 0 but 8 in 6 of	, = 1,2. 
Therefore, ℎá = M5, Lk, Ln . Thus, at , = 3 creditor proposes í]á M5, Lk, Ln = 0. At , = 2 
debtor proposes í4n M5, Lk = @ − A + $ . At , = 1  creditor proposes í]k M5 = $ 1 −í4n M5, Lk − A . At , = 0  debtor proposes í45 ∅ = 	$ 1 − í]k M5  which is accepted 
immediately by Condition (4.19). 
Fourthly, suppose it is common knowledge that strategy 8 in 6	would be successful in , =0,1,2. The creditor will optimally 8 in 6	of	, = 0,1,2. Therefore, ℎá = L5, Lk, Ln . At , =3 creditor proposes í]á L5, Lk, Ln = 0. At , = 2 debtor proposes í4n L5, Lk = @ − A + $. 
At , = 1  creditor proposes í4n L5 = $ 1 − í4n L5, Lk − A . At , = 0  debtor 
proposes	í45 ∅ = 	@ − A + $ 1 − í]k L5  which is accepted immediately by Condition 
(4.20). 
4.10.5.1.4 Equilibrium Solution IV (for any general T) 
The equilibrium solutions I, II, III show that there is always immediate settlement in a game 
without optimistic beliefs. Below establishes same result for any T-period game.  
Suppose it is common knowledge that strategy 8 in 6	would be successful in , = 0. The 
creditor will optimally 8 in 6	for all	, = 0,1, . . , + − 2. Thus,	ℎmjk = L5, Lk, … , Lmjn . At , = 0  debtor proposes 	í45 ∅ = @ − A + $ 1 − í]k L5 Fyy		1 − í45 ∅ ≥ $í]k L5 − A . 
This simplifies to Condition (4.20). 
Now suppose that respective court decisions across the game are known at , = 0. Thus, the 
creditor’s optimal strategy in each 6 is also known at start of game. Suppose it is common 
knowledge that strategy 8 in 6	would be unsuccessful in , = 0. Then creditor will optimally 98 in 6	of	, = 0. Therefore corresponding history of play would be ℎmjk = M5, …  known 
  Chapter 4 
104 
 
at start of game. At , = 0  debtor proposes 	í45 ∅ = $ 1 − í]k M5 Fyy		1 − í45 ∅ ≥$í]k M5 + @. This simplifies to Condition (4.19). 
 
4.10.5.2 Proof of Proposition 3 
We initially derive the equilibrium solutions under a + = 4  period game, and then 
summarise the results for any + period game. We focus on the case \4 > vw  where creditor 
chooses 8 in every 6. 
4.10.5.2.1 s = ì game 
Solving backwards, at , = 3 creditor proposes 3]á ℎ~á = @ or 3]á ℎá ∈ Jlá = 0  
At , = 2, if ℎn = ℎ~n , debtor proposes 34n ℎ~n = TÅ4n ℎ~n≡ \4k ℎ~n @ − A + $ 1 − 3]á Jlá+ 1 − \4k ℎ~n −A + $ 1 − 3]á ℎ~á  Fyy	1 − 34n ℎ~n ≥ TÅ]n ℎ~n≡ \]k ℎ~n @ − A + $3]á ℎ~á + 1 − \]k ℎ~n −A + $3]á Jlá  
This simplifies to 
 1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + $ + d5 − 1 $ 3]á ℎ~á − 3]á Jlá  (4.21) 
Players delay when Condition (4.21) is not satisfied. Substituting for 3]á ℎ~á 	and	3]á Jlá 	gives Condition (4.6).  
If however ℎn ∈ Jln,	at , = 2, debtor proposes 34n Jln = @ − A + $ 1 − 3]á Jlá 	Fyy	1 − 34nî ≥ −A + $ 3]á Jlá  
This simplifies to the Bargaining surplus condition and thus players settle at , = 2 following 
history	ℎn ∈ Jln. 
At , = 1, if	ℎk = ℎ~k  and Wk(ℎ~k) = En , creditor proposes 
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3]k(ℎ~k , En) = TÅ]k(ℎ~k , En)≡ \]k ℎ~k @ − A + $ 1 − 34n ℎ~n+ 1 − \]k ℎ~k −A + $ 1 − 34n Jln 		Fyy 
1 − 3]k(ℎ~k , En) ≥ TÅ4kï,ñó≡ \4k ℎ~k @ − A + $34n Jln + 1 − \4k ℎ~k −A + $34n ℎ~n  
This simplifies to 
 1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + $ + d5 − 1 $ 34n Jln − 34n ℎ~n  (4.22) 
Players delay when Condition (4.22) is not satisfied. However if at , = 1,  ℎk = ℎ~k  and 
Wk(ℎ~k) = }n, creditor proposes 3]k(ℎ~k , }n) = TÅ]k(ℎ~k , }n)≡ \]k ℎ~k @ − A + $TÅ]n ℎ~n+ 1 − \]k ℎ~k −A + $ 1 − 34n Jln 		Fyy 1 − 3]k(ℎ~k , }n) ≥ TÅ4k(ℎ~k , }n)≡ \4k ℎ~k @ − A + $34n Jln + 1 − \4k ℎ~k −A + $TÅ4n ℎ~n  
This simplifies to 
 
1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + 1 − \]5 $ + d5 − 1 $34n Jln + \]$TÅ]n ℎ~n+ 1 − \45 $TÅ4n ℎ~n  (4.23) 
Players delay when Condition (4.23) is not satisfied. However if at , = 1, ℎk ∈ Jlk, creditor 
proposes 3]k(Jlk) = −A + $ 1 − 34n Jln 		Fyy	1 − 3]k(Jlk) ≥ @ − A + $34n Jln  
This simplifies to the Bargaining surplus condition and thus players settle at , = 1. 
At , = 0, if W5 ∅ = Ek, En, debtor proposes 345(Ek, En) = \45 @ − A + $ 1 − 3]k(Jlk) + 1 − \45 −A + $ 1 − 3]k(ℎ~k , En) 	Fyy 1 − 345(Ek, En) ≥ \]5 @ − A + $3]k(ℎ~k , En) + 1 − \]5 −A + $3]k(Jlk)  
This simplifies to 
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 1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + $ + d5 − 1 $ 3]k(ℎ~k , En) − 3]k(Jlk)  (4.24) 
However, if at , = 0, W5 ∅ = }k, En, debtor proposes 345(}k, En) = \45 @ − A + $ 1 − 3]k(Jlk) + 1 − \45 −A + $TÅ4k(ℎ~k , En) 	Fyy 1 − 345(}k, En) ≥ \]5 @ − A + $TÅ]k(ℎ~k , En) + 1 − \]5 −A + $3]k(Jlk)  
This simplifies to 
 
1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + \45$ − d5 − 1 $3]k(Jlk) + \]5$TÅ]k(ℎ~k , En)+ 1 − \45 $TÅ4k(ℎ~k , En) (4.25) 
However, if at , = 0, W5 ∅ = Ek, }n, debtor proposes 345(Ek, }n) = \45 @ − A + $ 1 − 3]k(Jlk) + 1 − \45 −A + $TÅ4k(ℎ~k , }n) 	Fyy 1 − 345(Ek, }n) ≥ \]5 @ − A + $TÅ]k(ℎ~k , }n) + 1 − \]5 −A + $3]k(Jlk)  
This simplifies to 
 1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + $ + d5 − 1 $ 3]k(ℎ~k , }n) − 3]k(Jlk)  (4.26) 
However, if at , = 0, W5 ∅ = }k, }n, debtor proposes 345(}k, }n) = \45 @ − A + $ 1 − 3]k(Jlk) + 1 − \45 −A + $TÅ4k(ℎ~k , }n) 	Fyy 1 − 345(}k, }n) ≥ \]5 @ − A + $TÅ]k(ℎ~k , }n) + 1 − \]5 −A + $3]k(Jlk)  
This simplifies to4 
 
1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + \45$ − d5 − 1 $3]k(Jlk) + \]5$TÅ4k(ℎ~k , }n)+ 1 − \45 $TÅ]k(ℎ~k , }n) (4.27) 
Players delay agreement at , = 0 if any of the 4 conditions (4.24) – (4.27) do not hold. 
 
4.10.5.2.2 s game 
At , = 0, for a given	W5 ∅ = Ek,Wk ℎ~k  where ℎ~k ≡ K5 and Jlk ≡ L5, debtor proposes 345(Ek,Wk ℎ~k )= \45 @ − A + $ 1 − 3]k(Jlk)+ 1 − \45 −A + $ 1 − 3]k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k ) 	Fyy 
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1 − 345(Ek,Wk ℎ~k ) ≥ \]5 @ − A + $3]k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k ) + 1 − \]5 −A + $3]k(Jlk)  
This simplifies to 
 1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + $ + d5 − 1 $ 3]k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k ) − 3]k(Jlk)  (4.28) 
If however at , = 0, W5 ∅ = (}k,Wk ℎ~k ),  debtor proposes 345(}k,Wk ℎ~k )= \45 @ − A + $ 1 − 3]k(Jlk) + 1 − \45 −A + $TÅ4k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k ) 	Fyy 1 − 345(}k,Wk ℎ~k ) ≥ \]5 @ − A + $TÅ]k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k ) + 1 − \]5 −A + $3]k(Jlk)  
This simplifies to 
 
1 ≥ d5@ − 2A + \45$ − d5 − 1 $3]k(Jlk) + \]5$TÅ]k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k )+ 1 − \45 $TÅ4k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k ) (4.29) 
When generalising to any + period game, conditions (4.28) and (4.29) apply, each implicit 
with 2mjá	 conditions .  This provides a total of 2mjn	 settlement-conditions.  Wk	would 
contain + − 3  elements and thus 3]k Jlk , 3]k ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k , TÅ4k ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k 	rK}	TÅ]k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k )  would become 
functions of + . Players delay at , = 0 when the relevant settlement-condition for given 
parameter values	 $, @, A, \]5 , \45 > vw  is not satisfied. Note that condition (4.29) simplifies 
to condition (4.28) when 3]k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k ) = TÅ]k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k ) and 1 − 3]k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k ) ≥TÅ4k(ℎ~k ,Wk ℎ~k ) i.e. when players expect to settle at , = 1.  
Q.E.D  
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4.11 Yildiz (2003) exposition with delay: Heterogeneous 
Beliefs of the Recognition Process 
4.11.1 Introduction  
In this section, we explore Yildiz (2003) model of heterogeneous beliefs in bargaining and 
consider the case for delay under different extensions (illustrated here as examples), such as 
varying degrees of excessive optimism and time preference, along with evolving beliefs. We 
introduce the model below and solve for the equilibrium outcomes.  
This section varies from the model presented in section 4.4 in that it considers the case for 
where players are optimistic about their ability to make proposals in the future – a source of 
bargaining power. In the model in 4.4, we considered the case where nature randomly selects 
the proposer for each period of the remainder of the game. In the model players do not form 
beliefs of the ability to propose offers. We relax that assumption for this model, introducing 
the ability for players to form beliefs of the recognition process and provides conditions for 
delay under excessive optimism. In this model, there are no outside options, inside options 
or legal costs. We simply consider the standard Rubinstein bargaining extensions without 
common priors of the recognition process. This model is important when applied to the 
context of sovereign debt restructuring because a debtor’s initial ability to propose offers 
signals his bargaining strength in a model with complete information. When parties hold 
optimistic expectations about their future bargaining power, it is not no surprise that 
bargaining will end in impasse. Yildiz (2003) paper is theoretical framework that shows that 
players settle immediately in a finite game despite having optimistic beliefs about the 
recognition process. However, section 4.11 shows that delay may still arise with highly 
patient players (an attribute that characterises vulture funds and enduring debtors). We also 
allow for the updating of beliefs through receiving imperfect signals of future bargaining 
power. We show from this that highly patient players may prefer to delay negotiations when 
signals are weak. This result is intuitive because from weak signals155 mean that signals are 
less informative of future bargaining power and this reinforces the role that optimism plays 
in generating delays with sufficiently patient players.  
                                                
155 Players receive signals of their future recognition probability after a player has been recognised in any given 
round of bargaining. Strong signals would mean that a player is more (resp. less) likely to be recognised in 
the next round having been recognised (resp. not recognised) in the current round. Weak signals would mean 
that the contrary, i.e. that a player is not more (resp. not less) likely to be recognised in the next round having 
been recognised (resp. not recognised) in the current round. 
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4.11.2 Model  
Consider two risk neutral players, a sovereign and a creditor, having complete information 
with potentially different discount rates denoted by	oR, where F can be any player	F = 1,2. A 
finite T-period bargaining game of debt restructuring is represented in a discrete time setting 
of , = 0,1,2…+ − 1 and begins in , = 0 after a debt default. The sovereign remains in 
default until it settles its creditor, after which it is able to re-access world capital markets and 
gain 2 (the surplus gross of settlement payments). 2 can be interpreted as the output gains 
from economic recovery after settlement.156For simplicity, Let 2 be normalised to 1. If no 
agreement is reached by the deadline 	, = + − 1 , the economy experiences a chronic 
recession that reduces the bargained surplus (i.e. the anticipated output gains from 
settlement) to nought.  
Similar to Yildiz (2003), the model extends the Rubinstein-Stahl framework where players 
may hold optimistic beliefs about the recognition process determining which player will 
make an offer in every period. Player’s beliefs are assumed to be common knowledge and 
thus similar to Yildiz (2003), the model drops the common prior assumption in the 
Rubinstein-Stahl framework meaning the actual recognition process, determined by nature, 
remains unknown throughout the course of the game. When a player is recognised for any 
given 	, , he proposes an offer 3 ∈ [0,1]  to the unrecognised player and keeps the 
remaining	1 − 3, corresponding to an agreed spilt	 3, 1 − 3 	of the surplus. When an offer 
is accepted the game ends immediately but when rejected otherwise, the game continues to 
the next period at a cost of a surplus destruction by a factor $R = kkòôö ∈ (0,1). Let Player 1 
be sovereign and Player 2 be creditor for convenience. Denote õRN as the probability that 
player F assigns to being recognised in period ,.  
 
4.11.3 Example 1 (excessive optimism and common discount 
rates) 
Consider a + = 4 period game where	∀	F, ,: õRN = 1, $R = $.  
The Yildiz (2003) immediate agreement solution  
                                                
156 These may include higher tax receipts and national output from increased domestic & foreign investment 
and employment generation enjoyed through improved consumer and business confidence. The issuance of 
GDP-linked exchange bonds suggests that the negotiated settlement can be made contingent on national 
output. See supra note 45 for 2 interpretation in some theoretical literatures. 
  Chapter 4 
110 
 
Walking backwards, at , = 3 each player is willing to accept any division of the surplus 
since it is worth zero afterwards and therefore the recognised player offers zero which is 
accepted and takes the whole pie 1. At , = 2, the recognised player proposes $ (making the 
opponent indifferent between accepting and rejecting) if 1 − $ > $ so that his payoff 1 − $ 
would be greater than his continuation payoff $. Therefore, provided	$ < 1/2, at , = 1 the 
recognised player will propose $ 1 − $ 	iff 
 1 − $ 1 − $ > $(1 − $) (4.30) 
Condition (4.30) holds for all	$ ∈ (0,1).  At , = 0 the recognised player will propose $(1 −$ 1 − $ ) iff  
 1 − $ 1 − $ 1 − $ > $(1 − $ 1 − $ ) (4.31) 
Condition (4.31) holds for all 	$ ≾ 0.648 . Therefore, in equilibrium there is immediate 
agreement of share ($ − $n + $á, 1 − $ + $n − $á) if $ < 0.5 with agreement at all stages, 
which is common knowledge at the start of the game.157 
Consider now that $ > 1/2,	 players know that there will be no agreement at , = 2 . 
Therefore, at , = 1  the recognised player will propose 	$n  if 1 − $n > $n . Therefore 
provided	$ < 1/ 2, at , = 0 the recognised player will propose $(1 − $n) if 1 − $ 1 −$n > $(1 − $n)  which holds for all 	$ ∈ (0,1) . Therefore, likewise there is immediate 
agreement of share ($ − $á, 1 − $ + $á) if $ < kn ≈ 0.707 with agreement at all stages but , = 2, known to all at start of game. 
Consider now that $ > 1/ 2,	players know that there will be no agreement at , = 1, 2. 
Therefore at , = 0,  the recognised player will propose 	$á  if 1 − $á > $á . Therefore, 
provided	$ < 1/ 2° ≈ 0.794, there will be immediate agreement of share ($á, 1 − $á). 
                                                
157  For a T (even-period) game, when $ < kn,	the equilibrium share will be $ − $n + $á − $£ …− $mjn +$mjk, 1 − $ + $n − $á + $£ …+ $mjn − $mjk , where as for a T (odd-period) game, equilibrium share will 
be $ − $n + $á − $£ …+ $mjn − $mjk, 1 − $ + $n − $á + $£ …− $mjn + $mjk . This result coincides 
with the solution under the alternating offers Rubinstein game where as +à	∞, the proposer makes an offer •kò•, which the responder accepts, and keeps for himself kkò•. In contrast with the Rubinstein infinite solution 
where the equilibrium share remains the same irrespective of the size of $, a bargaining game with excessive 
optimism needs certain conditions on $ to be satisfied for settlement.  
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Therefore, in a T=4 game, for any $ ∈ 0, kn°  there is immediate agreement. The intuition 
is this: through backward induction the players knowing that they may not be able to reach 
a settlement at later rounds induces them to agree sooner.  
An alternative scenario with delay 
Yildiz (2003) paper does not identify the possibility of delay with sufficiently patient players. 
For any $ > 1/ 2° , there is delay up until , = 3 as the recognised player is unable to make 
an indifferent offer to the opponent without making himself worse off.  
T-period game solution 
For a T-period game, provided $ ∈ 0, k n¶ß® , there is immediate agreement. However, for 
any	$ > k n¶ß® , we observe delay in all periods , < + − 1 and eventual settlement at	+ − 1. 
For any $ ∈ k n¶ß©ßó , k n¶ß©ß®  for which 1 − $mj ™òk > $mj ™òk   and where 1 − $mj´ <$mj´	for all	∀	¨ ∈ ≠ + 2, + − 1 , agreement occurs in all , ≤ ≠ with no agreement in all 
rounds 	, ∈ ≠, + − 2 . For ≠  odd, equilibrium share is ( $ − $n + $á − $£ …+ $™ −$mjk, 1 − $ + $n − $á + $£ …− $™ + $mjk). For ≠ even, equilibrium share is ($ − $n +$á − $£ …− $™ + $mjk, 1 − $ + $n − $á + $£ …+ $™ − $mjk).	 Fixing $  and 
letting	+à	∞, we obtain agreement in more rounds of the game. As +à	∞, lower bound on $ for delay which is k n¶ß® 	 tends to	1 and thus its more difficult to obtain delay. Fixing + and 
letting	$à	1, we obtain agreement in less rounds. 
In summary, for any finite game where $ > k n¶ß®  delay is likely to happen with excessive 
optimism. 
4.11.4 Example 2 (excessive optimism and different discount 
rates) 
For convenience, consider a T=3 period game where	∀	F, ,: õRN = 1. At , = 2, any recognised 
player F ∈ {1,2} offers opponent, player u, $t if 1 − $t > $R. If this condition holds, then at , = 1  any recognised player F  offers $t(1 − $R)  if  1 − $t 1 − $R > 	$R(1 − $t)	  which 
holds for any $R ∈ (0,1). Thus in , = 0, any recognised player F offers $t 1 − $R 1 − $t  
if 1 − $t 1 − $R 1 − $t > $R 1 − $t 1 − $R  which holds if 	1 > $R + $t . Therefore, 
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equilibrium share is ($t 1 − $R 1 − $t , 1 − $t 1 − $R 1 − $t )  provided 	1 > $R +$t.158 
If 1 < $t + $R, players know that there will be no agreement at , = 2. Therefore, at , = 1 
any recognised player F offers $tn if 1 − $tn > $Rn. If this condition holds, then at , = 0, the 
recognised player F offers  $t 1 − $Rn  if 1 − $t 1 − $Rn > $R 1 − $tn  which holds for any $R ∈ (0,1) . Therefore, equilibrium share is ($t 1 − $Rn , 1 − $t 1 − $Rn )  provided 	1 >$Rn + $tn. 
If 1 − $tn < $Rn, players know that there will be no agreement at , = 1. Therefore, at , = 0 
any recognised player F offers $tá if 1 − $tá > $Rá. Therefore, equilibrium share is ($tá, 1 −$tá) provided	1 > $Rá + $tá. 
Therefore, for any given ($R, $t) combination for which 1 < $Rá + $tá, delay occurs until , =3.  
For any given T-period game, if 1 < $Rmjk + $tmjk we obtain delay of T-2 periods. As +à	∞, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to obtain delay. However, fixing + and letting any	$Rà	1, 
we obtain delay of T-2 periods. 
 
4.11.5 Example 3 (different optimistic beliefs and different 
discount rates) 
Similarly consider a T=3 period game where	∀	F, ,: õRN = õR. At	, = 2, any recognised player F offers õt$t if 1 − õt$t > õR$R. If this condition holds, then at , = 1 any recognised player F  offers $t õt 1 − õR$R + 1 − õt õt$t  if 1 − $t õt 1 − õR$R + 1 − õt õt$t >
                                                
158 Again when 1 > $R + $t , the equilibrium offer for a T (even period) game will be $t − $R$t + $R$tn −$Rn$tn + $Rn$tá − $Rá$tá …+ $R¶ó$t¶ójk − $R¶óòk$t¶ójk + $R¶óòk$t¶ó , where as for a T (odd period) game the 
equilibrium offer will be $t − $R$t + $R$tn − $Rn$tn + $Rn$tá − $Rá$tá …− $R¶ß®ó $t¶ß®ó + $R¶ß®ó $t¶Æ®ó −$R¶Æ®ó $t¶Æ®ó . This result also coincides with the solution under the alternating offers Rubinstein game where 
as +à	∞, the proposer makes an offer •Ø(kj•ö)kò•ö•Ø , which the responder accepts, and keeps for himself kj•Økò•ö•Ø. 
Under the Rubinstein case, with any combination of $R, $t , the responder always accepts this equilibrium 
offer, unlike under optimism.  
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$R(õR 1 − õt$t + 1 − õR õR$R )	which holds for all õR ∈ 0.5,1  and $R ∈ 0,1 . Thus 
in	, = 0, any recognised player F offers:  
$t õt 1 − $R õR 1 − õt$t + 1 − õR õR$R +1 − õt $t õt 1 − õR$R + 1 − õt õt$t 	Fyy 
 
1 − $t õt 1 − $R õR 1 − õt$t + 1 − õR õR$R
+ 1 − õt $t õt 1 − õR$R + 1 − õt õt$t
> $R õR 1 − $t õt 1 − õR$R + 1 − õt õt$t
+ 1 − õR $R õR 1 − õt$t + 1 − õR õR$R  
(4.32) 
Condition (4.32) holds provided 1 − õt$t > õR$R. Thus, players reach immediate settlement.  
If 1 < õR$R + õt$t, players know that there will be no agreement at , = 2. Therefore, at , =1 any recognised player F offers õt$tn if 1 − õt$tn > õR$Rn. If this condition holds, then at , = 0 , the recognised player F  offers  $t õt 1 − õR$Rn + 1 − õt õt$tn  if 1 −$t õt 1 − õR$Rn + 1 − õt õt$tn > $R(õR 1 − õt$tn + 1 − õR õR$Rn )	 which holds 
for all õR ∈ 0.5,1 and $R ∈ 0,1 . Thus, the players also reach immediate settlement. 
If 1 > õR$Rn + õt$tn, players know that there will be no agreement at , = 1. Therefore, at , = 0 any recognised player F  offers õt$tá  if 1 − õt$tá > 	õR$Rá . Again, the players reach 
immediate settlement. 
However, if 1 < õR$Rá + õt$tá, we obtain delay of 2 periods. For any given T-period game, 
if  
 1 < õR$Rmjk + õt$tmjk (4.33) 
we obtain delay of T-2 periods. This condition (4.33) is the delay condition. Therefore where õR = õt = õ and	$R = 	$t = $, we obtain delay if $ > kn∞¶ß® . Note that if õ = 0.5, where 
players have compatible beliefs, regardless of the length of game and level of $, we obtain 
immediate agreement.  
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4.11.6 Example 4 (different degrees of patience) 
Case of opponent being relatively impatience: With	õRN = õtN = õ, what happens if $t falls?  
Assume 	$R = $, $t = ±$, ± ∈ 0,1 . We compare our results to condition (4.33). Thus õ$mjk + õ(±$)mjk < 1  à $ < k∞(kò≤¶ß®)¶ß® . Notice that ∀	±:   k∞(kò≤¶ß®)¶ß® > kn∞¶ß®  
which means for any given ±  settlement is more likely. As parameters fall i.e. ±à	0	Mo	õà	0.5, ceteris paribus, delay becomes less likely.  
 
Case of opponent being relatively patience: With	õRN = õtN = õ, what happens if $t rises?  
Assume 	$R = $, $t = (1 + ±)$, ± ∈ 0,1 , also assume $ ≤ 0.5  (as $t	≥¥E,	µD	¨DEE	,ℎrK	1) . We compare our results to condition (4.33). Thus õ$mjk +õ((1 + ±)$)mjk < 1 à 0.5 ≥ $ > k∞(kò(kò≤)¶ß®)¶ß® . As parameters rise ±à	1	Mo	õà	1, 
ceteris paribus, delay becomes more likely.  
 
4.11.7 Example 5 (evolving beliefs) 
Let	∀	F, õR5 = 0.9159, $R = $. Assume that in every round player’s revise their beliefs of being 
recognised in future having observed who was recognised at the current round of play. There 
are two types of revision: (1) upward revision i.e. upgrading belief of being recognised the 
next round õRk > õR5. (2) downward revision i.e. downgrading belief of being recognised the 
next round õRk < õR5.   
Assume there is a commonly known signal generating process that reveals in each period, 
after a player is recognised, the conditional probability distribution over players’ propensity 
to be recognised in every future period. The unrecognised player and the recognised player 
use the signal to update their belief of being recognized the next period. Assume the signal 
                                                
159 According to Bayes Rule, there would be no updating of the beliefs if we consider õR = 1 as 1 − õR = 0. 
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generating process is independent of any previous signals and that signals are imperfectly 
correlated with the true underlying distribution, which is unknown.160 
Firstly, consider the case s = Z	and that Player F is recognised in , = 0. Also consider that 
Player	u downgrades her belief after observing Player F is recognised in , = 0 and Player F 
upgrades her belief after observing she’s recognised in , = 0. The prior beliefs are õR5 =õt5 = 0.9 and the posterior beliefs are õtk < õt5, õRk > õR5.  
Definition of notations:  õtk = <(∂t/9	) = Player u’E	updated belief of being recognised at , = 1 having not been 
recognised at , = 0. õRk = <(∂R/∂) =  Player F’E	 updated belief of being recognised at , = 1	 having been 
recognised at , = 0. 
Signals: 
• <p∏ = <(9/∂) =  Probability of not being recognised at , = 1	 having been 
recognised at , = 0. Let <p∏ ≤ 0.5 161 
• <pp = <(9/9) =  Probability of not being recognised at , = 1  having not been 
recognised at , = 0. <pp ≥ 0.5. Note <p∏ ≤ <pp 
• <∏p = 1 − <pp = <(∂/9) = Probability of being recognised at , = 1 having not 
been recognised at , = 0. 
• <∏∏ = 1 − <p∏ = < ∂/∂ = Probability of being recognised at , = 1 having been 
recognised at , = 0. <∏p ≤ <∏∏ 
Therefore, according to Bayes Rule 
õtk = <(∂t/9) = õt5 ∗ <p∏õt5 ∗ <p∏ + (1 −	õt5) ∗ <pp (4.34) 
 õRk = <(∂R/∂) = õR5 ∗ <∏∏õR5 ∗ <∏∏ + (1 −	õR5) ∗ <∏p (4.35) 
                                                
160 If the true underlying distribution were known, i.e. the probability of being chosen or not in the next period 
conditional on being chosen or not this period, then there would be no need to form beliefs. The reason why 
we have beliefs in the first place is because the true prior probability distribution is unknown.   
161 <p∏ ≤ 0.5	assumption has been made so that the signals work according to standard intuition i.e. that if one 
is chosen to propose this period, the chances of not been chosen the next period is likely to be relatively low. 
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	Table 4.8 outlines the results at , = 0 for the cases below: 
Table 4.8 – Immediate settlement conditions for s = Z game 
 
Case <"(∗) Solution for immediate settlement Condition for delay <p∏ = 0.2, <pp = 0.8 1 − 913 $ > 3637 $ $∗ ∈ (0,0.601) $ > 0.601 <p∏ = 0.3, <pp = 0.8 1 − 2735 $ > 6365 $ $∗ ∈ (0,0.575) $ > 0.575 <p∏ = 0.3, <pp = 0.7 1 − 2734 $ > 2122 $ $∗ ∈ (0,0.572) $ > 0.572 <p∏ = 0.3, <pp = 0.6 1 − 911 $ > 6367 $ $∗ ∈ (0,0.569) $ > 0.569 
*Participation condition (PC) for recognised player F: 1 − õtk$t > õRk$R 
Results of the benchmark case with no updating for $R = 	$t = $ and ∀	F, ,: õRN = 0.9 is PC: 1 − õt$t > õR$R à 1 − 0.9$ > 	0.9$ à  $ < ∫ª 
Therefore for any	$∗ ∈ (0,0.556), we should obtain immediate agreement at , = 0	and thus 
any $ > ∫ª  generates delay. 
It is clear from the results in Table 4.8 that introducing the revision of beliefs yield easier 
settlement, albeit weak signals (as we move down the table) are more likely to yield delay 
outcomes. Settlement outcomes are more pronounced when the signal reveals a lower 
prospect of not being recognised at , = 1 having been recognised at , = 0	and a higher 
prospect of not being recognised at , = 1 having not been recognised at , = 0. This means 
that an unrecognised player downgrades his belief following a signal suggesting lower 
prospect of being recognised in the next period. Meanwhile, the recognised player upgrades 
his belief following a signal suggesting higher prospect of being recognised in the next 
period.  
Thus, the $ condition for settlement is subject to a higher upper bound because the rate of 
change of the unrecognised player’s belief is higher than the rate of change of the recognised 
player’s belief i.e. the unrecognised player’s belief drops at a higher rate than the rate of 
increase in the recognised player’s belief. Therefore, the recognised player can make 
higher	$ offers for immediate agreement (though subject to an upper bound) provided that 
unrecognised player reacts more strongly in revising his belief than the recognised player.  
This means that for any given value of $, the rate of increase in the recognised player’s 
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payoff is more than the rate of increase in the expected discounted payoff from waiting. 
Simply put it, for each value of $, the unrecognised player’s offer has reduced, the effect of 
which could be offset by higher values of $ satisfying the participation condition that enables 
immediate agreement. To conclude therefore, with the rate of decrease in õt being higher 
than the rate of increase in õR, the $ condition for settlement accommodates for higher $′E 
s.t. an upper bound inducing a higher propensity for immediate agreement.  
Studying the case of uninformative signals yields the same results as the case of no signals. 
When	<p∏ = <pp	rK}	<∏p = <∏∏,	then		õtk = õt5	rK}	õRk = õR5 leading to no change in the $	condition for settlement. Therefore, the previous model where there is no updating is a 
special case of the Bayesian framework of beliefs, coinciding with the case where signals 
are not informative. The point here is that if signals are uninformative, regardless of the 
priors, players would not update their beliefs and over-confidence will be an issue persisting 
for a prolonged period of time.  
Secondly, consider the case s = Ñ	and	∀	F:	$R = $. In the benchmark case of no updating 
where	∀	F, ,	õRN = 0.9, similar to the analysis performed above, one out of the three situations 
below will occur.  
(1)  If at , = 1, 1 − õt$t > õR$R , this means	1 − 0.9$ > 0.9$ à $ < ∫ª . Therefore, at , = 0 , recognised player F  will offer 	$t õt 1 − õR$R + 1 − õt õt$t 	 if 1 −$t õt 1 − õR$R + 1 − õt õt$t > $R õR 1 − õt$t + 1 − õR õR$R  à 1 −2$ 0.9 1 − 0.9$ + 1 − 0.9 0.9$ à1.44$n − 1.8$ + 1 > 0  which holds for 
any $ ∈ 0,1 . 
(2) If however $ > ∫ª, at , = 0, recognised player F will offer õt$tn if 1 − õt$tn > õR$Rn 
meaning 1 − 0.9$n > 0.9$n à $ < ∫á  
(3) If however $ > ∫á ≈ 0.745, delay of , = 0,1 periods results with settlement at , =2 
Now consider the case of updating where ∀	F: õR5 = 0.9 . In , = 1 , the condition for 
settlement is 1 − õtn$t > õRn$R . At , = 0 , õRn  is unknown, thus õRn = õRkuntil , = 1  after 
which õRnupdates. 162 Therefore, 1 − õtk$t > õRk$R , at , = 0 , the recognised player F  will 
                                                
162 Players update their beliefs along the play of game. They can only condition their beliefs on current signals 
received and not on future signals which have not been received.  
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offer $t õtk 1 − õRk$R + 1 − õtk õtk$t 	if 1 − $t õtk 1 − õRk$R + 1 − õtk õtk$t >$R õRk 1 − õtk$t + 1 − õRk õRk$R  which holds. If however	1 − õtk$t < õRk$R, at , = 0, 
the recognised player F  will offer õtk$tn  if 1 − õtk$tn > õRk$Rn . Denote <p∏Nòk , <ppNòk  as 
respective signals revealed at period ,. 
Table 4.9 outlines the results at , = 0 for the cases below: 
Table 4.9 – Immediate settlement conditions for s = Ñ game 
 
Case <"(∗) Solution for immediate 
settlement 
Condition 
for delay 
<p∏k =0.2, <ppk =0.8, 
ºy	1 − ªká $ > áΩáæ $,   1 − $ 913 1 − 3637 $ + 1 − 913 913 $> $ 3637 1 − 913 $+ 1 − 3637 3637 $  
$ ∈ (0,0.601) $ > 0.775 
ºy	1 − ªká $ < áΩáæ $,  1 − 913 $n > 3637 $n $∈ (0.601, 0.775) 
<p∏k =0.3, <ppk =0.8, 
ºy	1 − næá∫ $ > ΩáΩ∫,  1 − $ 2735 1 − 6365 $ + 1 − 2735 2735 $> $ 6365 1 − 2735 $+ 1 − 6365 6365 $  
$ ∈ (0,0.575) $ > 0.758 
ºy	1 − næá∫ $ < ΩáΩ∫ $, 1 − 2735 $n > 6365 $n $∈ (0.575,0.758) 
<p∏k =0.3, <ppk =0.7 
If 1 − næá£ $ > nknn $, 	1 − $ 2734 1 − 2122 $ + 1 − 2734 2734 $> $ 2122 1 − 2734 $+ 1 − 2122 2122 $  
$ ∈ (0,0.572) $ > 0.756 
ºy	1 − næá£ $ < nknn $,  1 − 2734 $n > 2122 $n $∈ (0.572, 0.756) 
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<p∏k =0.3, <ppk =0.6 
ºy	1 − ªkk $ > ΩáΩæ $,  	1 − $ 911 1 − 6367 $ + 1 − 911 911 $> $ 6367 1 − 911 $+ 1 − 6367 6367 $  
$ ∈ (0,0.569) $ > 0.754 
ºy	1 − ªkk $ < ΩáΩæ $,  1 − 2734 $n > 2122 $n $∈ (0.569, 0.754) 
*Participation condition (PC) for recognised player F 
The above results for + = 3  also show that it is relatively easier to obtain immediate 
agreement when beliefs evolve compared to the no updating scenario. Nevertheless, it is still 
possible to derive delay in equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient.  
What will be more interesting would be to obtain delay in , = 0 and then obtain settlement 
at , = 1 through further revision in beliefs. This is possible. Consider $ = 0.8 and <p∏k =0.2, <ppk = 0.8. There will be no agreement at , = 0 as 1 − õtk$n < õRk$n as shown above 
in Table 4.9. Consider two cases: 
• Suppose same Player F	was recognised again at , = 1 we derive the updated beliefs 
of both players as follows:  õtn = ∞Ø®∗ø¿¡ó∞Ø®∗ø¿¡ó ò(kj	∞Ø®)∗ø¿¿ó 	  ,  õRn = ∞ö®∗ø¡¡ó∞ö®∗ø¡¡ó ò(kj	∞ö®)∗ø¡¿ó . 
Assume	<p∏n = 0.1, <ppn = 0.9, we find that 1 − õtn$ > õRn$	 inducing agreement at , = 1. There are other various combinations of $, <p∏k , <ppk , <p∏n , <ppn  for which 
this occurs.163 This shows that it is possible to derive settlement at , = 1 despite 
having observed delay at , = 0  under the case were beliefs evolve. This result 
contrasts sharply with the no-updating scenario where delay at , = 0 leads to delay 
up until last period	, = + − 1. For significantly strong signals (for example, <p∏n =0.1, <ppn = 0.9 used above) we would get immediate agreement, otherwise delay 
occurs again.  
• On the other hand, suppose Player u is recognised at	, = 1, for any combination of <p∏n , <ppn , we get delay at , = 1. Note that the respective signals <p∏Nòk, <ppNòk<∏pNòk, 
                                                
163  A simulation exercise was undertaken using Python to establish this result under various parameter 
combinations.  
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<∏∏Nòkare applicable to õRNòk	rK}	õtNòk	according to who was recognised for the given ,. 
Now consider the case for a given + period game and for any given <p∏Nòk, <ppNòk received at 
any t:  
• When $ > k∞ö®ò∞Ø®¶ß®  delay occurs at , = 0. With	$ < k∞öóò∞Øó¶ßó , settlement occurs 
at , = 1, otherwise delay also occurs at , = 1.  
• Similarly, with	$ < k∞ö°ò∞Ø°¶ß° , settlement occurs at , = 2, otherwise delay occurs at , = 2 
Therefore for any given period	, = ≠ − 1, if $ < k∞ö©ò∞Ø©¶ß© , settlement occurs at , = ≠ − 1, 
otherwise delay occurs at , = ≠ − 1 where ≠ ∈ [1, + − 1] 
Summary of Example 5: 
There are a number of additional factors that determine whether agreement occurs sooner or 
later under evolving beliefs: (1) Frequency of a given player being recognised consecutively 
and (2) Strength of signal. The following considers the impact on settlement from different 
signals:  
• Strong signal: When <pp	is high and/or	<p∏	is low, this is a strong signal as it puts 
the recognised player in a stronger bargaining position and unrecognised player in a 
weaker bargaining position. Therefore, it is easier for settlement to occur. 
• Weak signal: When <pp	is low and/or	<p∏	is high, subject to <p∏ ≤ <pp,	this is a 
weak signal as it puts the recognised player in a weaker bargaining position and 
unrecognised player in a stronger bargaining position, relative to the strong signal 
scenario. Therefore, it is harder for settlement to occur. 
4.11.8 Conclusion 
This section has shown that the Yildiz (2003) exposition of heterogeneous beliefs with 
immediate settlement can be extended to various settings, consisting of different degrees of 
excessive optimism, discount rates  and  evolving beliefs. Under these settings, delay may 
occur in equilibrium. The model presented, when applied to sovereign debt restructuring 
negotiations, produces some interesting results: for example, highly patient players may 
prefer to delay negotiations when signals of future bargaining power are weak
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Chapter 5  
5. Good faith in sovereign debt restructuring 
 
5.1. Negotiating a write-down with heterogeneous 
creditors under good faith 
 
5.1.1. Introduction 
There is a general consensus that the implied obligation of good faith prohibits subordinating 
conduct. This is recognised by several common-law cases and analysis.164  Furthermore, 
economic literature on good faith posits that the norm could potentially smoothen debt 
workouts, address incompleteness of contracts, opportunism and other incentivisation 
problems, thereby enhance efficiency and equitable outcomes. 165  Nevertheless, neither 
courts nor commentators have articulated a clear formal operational standard of good faith, 
consequently leaving courts with wide discretion in determining conduct that violates the 
implied duty.  
Despite the lack of a clear set of principles underpinning good faith, the recognition of the 
norm expands across several policy domains concerned with reforming current frameworks 
for sovereign debt restructuring. To name a few: The IMF Policy on Lending into Arrears 
(LIA) to Private Creditors166, the IIF Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt 
Restructuring167; the UNCTAD Principles of Responsible Sovereign Lending & Borrowing 
and its proposal on Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes168 ; the 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism169.  For instance, the IMF LIA policy permits 
lending provided, inter alia, that the debtor is negotiating in good faith on a debt restructuring 
with its creditors, regardless of the degree of creditor heterogeneity. However, IMF 
                                                
164 For more discussion, see section 5.2.2 
165 For more details, see economic literature discussed in section 5.2.3. 
166 (International Monetary Fund, 1999), (International Monetary Fund, 2002). 
167 (Institute of International Finance, 2013) 
168 (UNCTAD, 2012a), (UNCTAD, 2012b), (UNCTAD, 2014), (UNCTAD, 2015a); (UNCTAD, 2015b). 
169 (Krueger, 2001) 
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acknowledges the vagueness in its own definition of the duty. 170 Likewise, the IIF reports 
that ‘it is very difficult to come to a precise definition of “good faith” and is ‘neither wise 
nor practical to seek an exhaustive set of criteria to evaluate this principle’.171  
Professor Summers also recognises this difficulty and has rather suggested an open-ended 
approach.172 He claims that good faith is best understood by what it excludes, which are a set 
of contextually recognised forms of bad faith conduct.173 Mackaay (2012) argues likewise, 
that the good faith doctrine should be defined according to an ‘open-ended arsenal of 
responses’ to opportunism/bad faith as this may take an infinite number of forms and may 
be difficult to assess.  
Nevertheless, the White Hawthorne v Argentina174 dispute provides a starting point to study 
good faith in sovereign debt restructuring. The court opinion seems to suggest that the 
violation of the pari passu clause is inconsistent with the debtor’s duty to negotiate in good 
faith. This leaves us with some research questions:  What is good faith in sovereign debt 
restructuring? Can the summer’s excluder analysis be applied to explain good faith? If so, 
what is bad faith? How do we rationalise the violation of the pari passu clause as indicated 
in the court decisions ensuing disputes of NML and White Hawthrone against Argentina? 
To conceptualise good faith, how is the bargaining context modelled with/without the 
violation of pari passu clause? What are the efficiency and distributional implications of 
such good faith obligation in sovereign debt restructuring? This are questions we hope to 
answer in this paper.  
5.1.1.1. Good faith definition 
We define good faith according to Summer’s excluder analysis which means not acting in 
bad faith. The good faith conduct is a commitment not to violate the court interpretation of 
the pari passu clause proceeding from the NML vs Argentina 2013 decision.175 In the White 
                                                
170 (International Monetary Fund, 2013) 
171 See supra note 167 
172 (Summers, 1982); (Summers, 1968) 
173 Summers argues that "good faith" is a phrase without but serves solely to exclude "a wide range of 
heterogeneous forms of bad faith. His use of the phrase appears intended only to rule out precise forms of 
bad faith conduct in given circumstances. See (Summers, 1968) at 201. 
174 White Hawthorne, LLC, et al v The Republic of Argentina (16-cv-1042 (TPG), Opinion dated 22 December 
2016) (The ‘2016 Opinion’) 
175 NML Capital, Ltd v Argentina, 727 F3d 237 (2d Cir 2013) (The ‘2013 Decision’). The Second Circuit’s 
2013 decision states that “As we have held, by defaulting on the [plaintiffs’] Bonds, enacting legislation 
specifically forbidding future payment on them, and continuing to pay interest on subsequently issued debt, 
Argentina breached its promise of equal treatment”. 
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Hawthorne vs Argentina dispute, Judge Griesa’s Opinion clearly stated the combination of 
conduct that violates the pari passu clause, which were the following: (1) failure to make 
scheduled payments on holdout debt, (2) legislative enactments (lock law) and (3) executive 
declarations of indefinite default on non-tendered bonds.176 The 2016 Opinion also inferred 
the combination of conduct that constituted non-violation of the pari passu clause, which 
were the following: (1) declarations to resolve disputes, (2) repealing legislative enactments 
(lock law) and perhaps (3) acknowledgments by the wider community, ministerial bodies 
and appointed officers recognising “good faith efforts” in resolving the debt disputes.177  
Thus we conclude that the combination of Argentina’s conduct in dealing with the NML 
holdouts violates the pari passu clause, consistent with bad faith behaviour, and thus – 
according to Summers excluder theory – is in violation of good faith. As the court did not 
state what conduct holds more significance in violating the clause – neither did it specify the 
exact combination of conduct – we therefore allow in our model each conduct to have an 
equal weighing in triggering the breach.  
5.1.1.2. Ghosal and Miller (2016) Model: Lock law vs Good faith 
We revisit the Ghosal and Miller (2016) model of heterogeneous creditors. In a framework 
that allows the passage of a lock law, they examine a bargaining game with two creditor 
types (impatient and patient) and incomplete information where creditors know their types 
but debtor does not know respective creditors’ types. They derive a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium (PBE) with delay where an enacted lock law sufficiently tempts the impatient 
creditor to an immediate settlement with the debtor while the patient creditor delays 
settlement till after the lock law expires in order to receive a more generous settlement. In 
our current paper on good faith, we relax Ghosal and Miller’s model by imposing the court 
interpretation of the pari passu clause on the debtor’s bargaining behaviour.  We design a 
PBE consistent with the debtor’s commitment to the court mandate and associate such 
commitment with fulfilment of the good faith debtor duty in sovereign debt restructuring.  
5.1.2. Model 
Consider a sovereign debtor negotiating with two private creditors, one patient and the other 
impatient. The debtor, denoted by D, has a discount rate $! > 0  with discount factor D−$!∆,. 
The game is represented in a discrete time setting of 0, ∆,2∆,3∆,… , ,∆, …. where ∆> 0. ∆, 
is the time difference between two successive periods and is assumed to be negligible. Offers 
                                                
176 Supra note 174 at 5. Judge Griesa held that violation of one conduct, such as non-payment of defaulted debt, 
was insufficient to show the breach of pari passu clause.   
177 Supra note 174 at 6 
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are also made at discrete points in time. The creditors, denoted by √  for the 
impatient/exchange-bondholder type creditor and by J for the patient/holdout type creditor, 
are differentiated by discount rates 0 < $J < $√ and thus discount factors D−$J∆, > 	D−$√∆, 
respectively. It is assumed that each creditor knows its own discount rate. The debtor is 
informed of the different discount rates but does not know who is which. At each ,, the 
creditors must decide whether to settle or not (i.e. whether to enter bargaining or not). If both 
agree to settle, one of the two will be chosen with equal probability to bargain with the debtor. 
Following a decision to settle, the debtor and the creditor bargain according to the alternating 
offers Rubinstein bargaining game. The creditor exist the process once an agreement has 
been reached receiving a settlement according to that agreed. For convenience, the 
bargaining pie (the potential gains from restoring the debtor’s access to capital markets) is 
taken to be constant and normalised to one. 
Through the debtor’s commitment to act in good faith, the debtor is prohibited from taking 
actions that constitute bad faith. An action, consisting of a combination of conduct as 
highlighted, violates the pari passu clause and thus is bad faith. We examine whether 
commitment to good faith conduct can eliminate inefficient delays in debt restructuring. Let 
us conceptualize the debtor’s negotiating behaviour in violation of the pari passu clause. We 
look at the offending debtor conducts stated in the 2013 decision and conceptualise them in 
turn. Firstly, remaining in default on plaintiffs bonds whilst servicing subsequently issued 
debt would entail making a restructuring offer to impatient type creditors with them 
accepting the offer, while the patient type creditors rejects such offer and remains in default 
until the next round of bargaining where the debtor and patient-type creditor may engage in 
negotiations. Secondly, enacting legislation (lock law) and making executive declarations 
specifically forbidding future payment on plaintiffs bonds would entail banning any 
enhanced settlement terms to the patient-type creditor for a certain number of periods, as 
stated in Ghosal and Miller (2016). Thus, good faith conduct in this model would consist of 
the following:  
• the proposal of identical offers178 (as part of the rules of the game) that both creditor 
types accept179 (derived in equilibrium) and  
                                                
178 Here, debtor would have to make identical offers since, in this model, both creditor types hold identical debt 
claims. The only differentiating characteristic between the two creditor types are their discount rates. 
179 Though the debtor can only bargain with one creditor at a time, an offer made with the bargained creditor 
who accepts becomes binding on the other creditor (which in the proposed pooling equilibrium also would 
have accepted that offer if he was chosen to bargain with debtor). 
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• the prohibition of a law that permits different offers to one creditor type vis-à-vis the 
other after a certain length of time.180  
Consequently, the combination of conduct (1) and (2) is consistent with the promise of equal 
treatment (i.e. pari passu clause).  
Now that we have defined what good faith is in terms of debtor bargaining behaviour, let us 
now turn to the equilibrium solutions. All our results are stated for the case when ∆, is 
negligibly small at the continuous time limit as ∆, → 0. 
5.1.3. Equilibrium solutions 
We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria where strategies and beliefs are configured so that: 
(i) The debtor, impatient type creditor and patient type choose to settle immediately 
and the debtor makes a pooled offer E≈  for which both creditor types accept 
immediately. 
(ii) Denote the probabilities of being an impatient type by ∆3 	∈ 0,1  and the 
probability of being a patient type by 	∆« = 1 − ∆» . Let the posterior 
belief	≈o √ 8  (resp.	≈o J 8 ) be the debtors belief that the settling creditor at , is the impatient (resp. patient) type. Similarly, let the posterior belief	≈o √ ∂  
(resp.	≈o J ∂ ) be the debtors belief that the non-settling creditor at , is the 
impatient (resp. patient) type. 8  and ∂  denote accepting and rejecting 
respectively. Thus the debtors posteriors are as follows: 
a. Conditional on both creditor types settling at , = 0 , with probability ≈o √ 8 = ∆» , the creditor is an impatient type creditor and with 
probability	≈o J 8 = 1 − ∆», the creditor is a patient type creditor. 
b. Conditional on one creditor type settling and the other type not settling at , =0, with probability	≈o J ∂ = 1, the non-settling creditor is a patient type.181 
Thus and	≈o √ ∂ = 0. Due to the obligation to the good faith requirement, 
                                                
180 Prohibition of a lock law means the debtor is free to make separating offers to the different creditor types 
irrespective of the time elapsed between accepted proposals. For example, with the prohibition of a lock law, 
the debtor is allowed to be in default with Holdout-type for one/two periods (and not +	periods as stated in 
the lock law) while paying the exchange bondholder.  Notwithstanding, the Prohibition of a lock law permits 
making identical offers to both types at the same time. The other conduct disallowing default with one type 
whilst servicing another rules out the possibility altogether of making separating offers at different times. 
Commitment to the pari passu clause means making identical offers at same time to both types (of which 
they must accept) or making separating offers at the same time (if debtor could separate out the types). As 
the model assumes that the debtor can only bargain with one type at a time and does not know which type 
he is bargaining with, the only possible conduct that satisfies the clause is making identical offers which 
both type must accept. We show that the resulting equilibrium strategy is this (i.e. identical offers which 
both type must accept) with immediate agreement when the debtor attempts to fulfil the pari passu clause.   
181 Here the consistence condition does not restrict the debtor’s (out-of-equilibrium) belief as a creditors choice 
to reject an equilibrium offer is a zero-probability event. We set the out-of-equilibrium belief as stated to 
support the PBE. 
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the debtor is restricted to proposing the same offer and thus he proposes E≈ 
for 	∀, ≥ 1.182 
c. Conditional on both creditors not settling at , = 0, posterior beliefs remains 
the same as priors i.e. probability ≈o √ ∂ = ∆»  and ≈o J ∂ = 1 − ∆» . 
Debtor offers E≈ for ∀	,	 ≥ 1  in such conditions. 
Proof: 
Consider the complete information bargaining game between the debtor and a creditor (type 
unknown to the debtor). The debtor must anticipate a reduction of the bargaining surplus 
when bargaining with one creditor by virtue of the pari passu condition requiring the debtor 
to make identical offers. At the continuous time limit, there will be immediate agreement 
with any creditor where the pooled share183 is 
 E… = $]$] + ∆»$» + 1 − ∆» $« 1 − E…  (5.1) 
Simplifying (5.1) we get 
 E≈ = $!2$! + ∆3$3 + 1 − ∆3 $J (5.2) 
Thus the debtor share is  
 E] = 1 − 2E… (5.3) 
We now need to consider the relevant participation conditions. 
Scenario 1: Suppose both types choose to not to settle , = 0. They will both be made the 
same offer E≈. Due to the time cost of delay, each player is worse off from not-settling.   
Scenario 2: Suppose only one type settles at	, = 0. In , = 1, the non-settling creditor is made 
the same offer	E≈. Due to the time cost of delay, the non-settling creditor is worse off from 
not-settling.   
                                                
182 Since the debtor is forced to treat both creditors alike according to the pari passu clause, he will propose the 
same offer made to an earlier settling creditor to any one creditor who decides to go off-the-equilibrium path 
of play. Thus by the results of the game, we have ruled out the possibility of a separating equilibrium where 
the debtor makes different offers. Pari passu condition clearly restricts the bargaining range of offers. 
183 We use the subgame perfect equilibrium from the alternating bargaining game result shown in Corollary 
3.1 in (Muthoo, 1999, p. 46) for ∆> 0 but small and use a weighted average of the different types discount 
rates.  
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Under the two scenarios, both types are clearly worse off from not-settling at , = 0 as the 
following inequalities hold:  
For the impatient type:  
 E≈ D−$√∆ ≤ E≈ (5.4) 
For the patient type:  
 E≈ D−$J∆ ≤ E≈ (5.5) 
For any $F > 0  where F ∈ √, J  and ∆> 0  but negligibly small, the two creditor types 
strictly prefer to settle immediately.  In addition, the debtor obtains a higher share of the 
bargaining surplus from immediate settlement as his participation constraint holds, that is 
 1 − 2E… ≥ Dj• ∆ 1 − 2E…  (5.6) 
Thus there exists a unique pure strategy pooling equilibrium where settlement between 
creditor types and the debtor happens immediately.184  
Q.E.D. 
5.1.4. Comparative statics  E≈ is decreasing in both creditor types discount rates but increasing in the debtor’s discount 
rate. It is also decreasing in the debtor’s prior belief of an impatient type creditor.  
Proof: 
 
ëE…ë$«	 = − $] 1 − ≈À2$] + ∆»$» + 1 − ∆» $« n < 0 (5.7) 
 
ëE…ë$À		 = − $]≈À2$] + ∆»$» + 1 − ∆» $« n < 0	 (5.8) 
 
ëE…ë$]	 = ∆»$» + 1 − ∆» $«2$] + ∆»$» + 1 − ∆» $« n > 0	 (5.9) 
 
ëE…ë∆»	 = − $] $À − $«2$] + $« + ∆» $À − $« n < 0	 (5.10) 
                                                
184 Any observed delay in this model would be trivial delay where, by construction of the model assumption 
that the debtor can only bargain with one creditor at a time, remaining creditor is settled at the next period. 
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As both creditor types are becoming more patient, the equilibrium pooling offer made by the 
debtor must increase in order to make creditors indifferent between accepting and rejecting 
offers in the alternative bargaining game. As expected, as the debtor becomes more patient, 
ceteris paribus, the pooled offer made decreases. Finally, as the debtor’s prior belief of an 
impatient type creditor increases, the pooled offer made decreases. This is expected as $√ >$J. Now we look at the distribution implications of the good faith duty requirement. 
5.1.5. Efficiency and distributional implications 
We have shown that the good faith duty, that is fulfilment of the pari passu clause, eliminates 
inefficient delay in bargaining.  However, distributional implications remain. Let us take the 
separating equilibrium offers derived under the Ghosal and Miller (2016) paper consistent 
with the lock law and thus bad faith conduct.  
The patient creditor offer EJ received after , = + periods under the lock law is 
EJ = $!$3$! $3 + $J + $3$J 
The impatient creditor offer E√ received from immediate settlement at , = 0 
E√ = $!$J$! $3 + $J + $3$J 
Note that EJ > E< > E√ 
Comparing the discounted payoffs, we have that: 
Impatient creditor type is better off under the pooling equilibrium E< > E√		rE $!2$! + ∆3$3 + 1 − ∆3 $J > $!$J$! $3 + $J + $3$J 
which	solves	to	 $] + $«2 $À − $« > 0 
To assess whether the patient creditor and the debtor are better or worse off under the pooling 
equilibrium, we conduct the calibration exercise below. The patient creditor is better off 
when E< > D−$J+∆EJ, while the debtor is worse off when 1 − 2Eø < Dj• m∆ 1 − EÀ − E«  
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5.1.6. Calibration 
Let us conduct a simple calibration of our results above. Similar to Ghosal and Miller, we 
set $! = $√ = 5% , We start with $J = 5%  and then decrease the discount rate of the 
holdout creditor, thereby increasing the degree of creditor heterogeneity. Let ≈√ = 0.5 and ∆= 1. Let + be the second-best delay time represented in Ghosal and Miller as +.Thus for 
simplicity, we assume players coordinate to the second-best benchmark. 
Illustrated below, Table 5.1 shows that the impatient creditor (exchange bondholder) is 
always better off with a pooled offer than with a separating offer and moreover, his relative 
gain from the pooling equilibrium increases exponentially as the holdout creditor becomes 
increasingly patient. This can also be shown through the dotted line in Figure 5.1. The 
intuition is this: as the holdout creditor becomes more patient, the debtor has to propose a 
higher offer to make the holdout indifferent between accepting and rejecting, and since the 
both creditor types receive same offer in equilibrium, the impatient creditor is made better 
off.  
An interesting case is the holdout creditor’s relative payoff function: Table 5.1 shows that 
with sufficiently low creditor heterogeneity (more specifically where the discount rate of the 
holdout higher than 2.3%), he makes a payoff gain from the pooled offer, but under high 
degrees of creditor heterogeneity (lower than 2.3%), he makes a payoff loss from the pooled 
offer. Moreover, his relative payoff function is non-monotonic in his discount rate: Figure 
5.1 shows that for discount rates above 3.5%, there is a logarithmic increase in his relative 
payoff as his discount rate decreases, but for discount rates below 3.5% there is an 
exponential decrease in his relative payoff as his discount rate decreases. The intuition is 
this: the holdout type would rather prefer the pooled offer over the separating offer to avoid 
the costs of delay when he is not substantially different from the exchange bondholder type. 
In fact under a sufficiently low degree of creditor heterogeneity, he receives an increasing 
payoff from being more patience since the pooled offer compensates, more relative to the 
separating offer, with low levels of heterogeneity. However under high degrees of creditor 
heterogeneity, he would prefer the separating offer over the pooled offer even at the expense 
of delay as the separating offer is more compensating for his much higher level of patience. 
Here, he is increasingly worse off from not being able to later exploit the gains from a 
separating offer.   
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Table 5.1 - Calibration of the creditors’ and debtor’s discounted payoff 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Ghosal and Miller (2016) – Lock law model	 Good faith model	 Relative	Payoff	from	good	faith	
!"	 #	 $% $"	 &'!"#∆$"	 $)	 &'!)#∆ * − $% − $" 	 $, $) Exchange	 Holdout	 Debtor	
5.0%	 0.0	 0.33	 0.33	 0.33	 0.33	 0.33	 0.33	 0.33	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	
4.5%	 2.1	 0.32	 0.36	 0.32	 0.32	 0.29	 0.34	 0.32	 0.02	 0.01	 0.03	
4.0%	 4.5	 0.31	 0.38	 0.32	 0.31	 0.25	 0.34	 0.31	 0.04	 0.02	 0.06	
3.5%	 7.1	 0.29	 0.42	 0.32	 0.29	 0.20	 0.35	 0.30	 0.06	 0.03	 0.09	
3.0%	 10.2	 0.27	 0.45	 0.33	 0.27	 0.16	 0.36	 0.29	 0.08	 0.02	 0.12	
2.5%	 13.9	 0.25	 0.50	 0.35	 0.25	 0.13	 0.36	 0.27	 0.11	 0.01	 0.15	
2.0%	 18.3	 0.22	 0.56	 0.39	 0.22	 0.09	 0.37	 0.26	 0.15	 -0.01	 0.17	
1.5%	 24.1	 0.19	 0.63	 0.44	 0.19	 0.06	 0.38	 0.25	 0.19	 -0.06	 0.19	
1.0%	 32.2	 0.14	 0.71	 0.52	 0.14	 0.03	 0.38	 0.23	 0.24	 -0.13	 0.20	
0.5%	 46.1	 0.08	 0.83	 0.66	 0.08	 0.01	 0.39	 0.22	 0.31	 -0.27	 0.21	
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Figure 5.1 – Relative payoff functions under good faith vis-à-vis lock law with varying degrees of patience on the Holdout type 
 
 
Figure 5.1 is a simple graphical representation of Table 5.1 showing the parties’ payoff gain/loss from the good faith obligation.  
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The debtor exhibits a concave relative payoff function where his payoff logarithmically 
increases as the holdout becomes more patient. The intuition is this: Offering a pooled offer 
to both types means he saves on the cost of making separating offers (including the cost of 
delay and the cost of compensating high levels of patience). Also, graphically we can see 
that his relative payoff tails off with very high creditor heterogeneity. The intuition is: though 
the debtor would always strictly prefer the good faith equilibrium to that of the lock law, it 
comes a time where – with very high level of patience by the holdout – the debtor is not any 
more better off under good faith as his required to compensate the very high rate of patience 
with the pooled offer (as he does with the separating offer).  
An additional insight we draw from the analysis is that good faith produces Pareto improving 
settlement outcomes, provided the holdout is not too patient. The intuition for this follows: 
Since delay is costly and the debtor’s commitment to good faith means that he must make 
the same offer to both types of creditors at any given round, a low patient holdout (with 
discount rate close to that of exchange bondholder) will prefer a prompt settlement and in so 
doing avoid the costs of delay. Thus, as the good faith solution is always profitable for the 
exchange bondholder and the debtor, we have a pareto improvement outcome where all 
parties gain by avoiding the time cost of delay. However, a high patient holdout (with 
discount rate far from that of exchange bondholder) will be worse off under the good faith 
commitment as he would have otherwise gained from waiting and receiving a higher offer 
permitted by the Lock Law. Thus, with a highly patient holdout we fail to obtain a Pareto 
improvement outcome as not everyone gains from the good faith commitment.185 
5.1.7. Other considerations 
Here we offer a brief narrative that considers the effects of excusable default and creditor 
good faith on our analysis. 
5.1.7.1. Excusable sovereign default 
There has been much study and evidence to suggest that sovereigns sometimes excusably 
default. For some references, see Grossman and Van Huyck (1988), Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997), Guimaraes (2011), Kuttner (2013), Buchheit et al. (2013). Guimaraes (2011) shows 
                                                
185 In summary, delaying – in the hope for a higher offer which the Lock Law provides – is not worth it to the 
low patient holdout when he is quite similar to the exchange bondholder, but it is certainly worth it when he 
is substantially different from the exchange bondholder. From Table 5.1, we can see that with holdout 
discount rate as low as 0.5%, his payoff under the Lock Law is 0.66, which is much higher than the 0.39 
payoff he receives under good faith. 
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that the increase in the US interest rate in the 1980’s, being the main driver of the Latin 
American debt crisis, led to the eventual debt relief of 30% for most of the region’s major 
economies.186 This is an example of an excusable sovereign default precipitated by external 
shocks. It is also consistent with our good faith analysis in this chapter which shows that, 
with sufficiently high levels of creditor heterogeneity, the debtor obtains 20% more debt 
relief under good faith conduct than under bad faith. Thus, we could perceive an excusable 
default as the debtor having defaulted in good faith. 
Chapter 5.2 highlights that an assessment of good faith debtor conduct under the IMF LIA 
policy requires the sharing of information about the causes of default (see section 5.2.4.6) 
and as such provides the opportunity for assessing whether default could be excused or not. 
In our alternative proposal made in section 5.2.5.3, we propose that the courts defer to the 
good faith and fair dealing market norms, also informed by the IMF LIA and IIF policy 
assessments, when the debtor seems to be negotiating in good faith with its creditors. Thus, 
we propose that the courts recognise policy assessments made of the debtor’s conduct in 
relation to the causes of the default when deciding to abstain from ongoing negotiations or 
intervene through court injunctions. If the debtor defaulted excusably as well as negotiating 
with its creditors in good faith, then the courts should abstain. Such good faith efforts will 
result to immediate agreement with debt relief, as per our analysis in this chapter. However, 
if the debtor inexcusably defaulted and is not negotiation with its creditors in good faith 
(according to market expectations), then the courts should grant injunctions pursuant to 
litigants demands. Such bad faith conduct will result in expensive delays, as per our analysis 
in this chapter. 
5.1.7.2. Good faith creditor conduct 
Across the policy domain, good faith creditor conduct is expected in debt restructuring 
negotiations. For example, within the IMF LIA policy, creditors are required to agree to a 
standstill of payments and a stay on litigation during negotiations. UNCTAD (2015a), 
recognising the duty as mutual between both parties, states that the norm requires “only 
legitimate expectations be afforded legal protection”. In particular, it mentions that abusive 
creditor holdouts, who purchased such claims or sued with the intention to extract a 
preferential treatment, should be incompatible with the good faith principle. This is more 
pronounced for those who purchased the distressed debt containing unanimity clauses. Due 
to the collapse of the Champerty defence, the court could fail to grant creditor remedies of 
                                                
186 Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay received debt relief of around 30%. However, Venezuela received 20%. 
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money judgement when litigants have undertaken such abusive strategies. This will mean 
that the court will abstain when it observes bad faith conduct by the creditor but good faith 
conduct by the debtor. Where this is the rule of the game, we could observe immediate 
settlement as creditor cannot receive a higher offer in later rounds of bargaining. However, 
the courts will intervene when it observes bad faith debtor conduct and good faith creditor 
conduct. Here, we could observe delays in restructuring as the debtor will have to make 
higher offers in later bargaining rounds following court orders.  
Another criterion for assessing creditor bad faith could be a situation where the creditor 
purchases a blocking minority of a bond issue at near sovereign default and holds out for a 
better deal. Here, the creditor could hold out for a deal that would have otherwise been 
excluded by aggregated CACs’. Like above, the court could interpret such action as bad faith 
creditor conduct and act accordingly. Then creditors, knowing that such is the court’s 
template, will settle immediately as explained above.   
5.1.8. Conclusion 
The good faith debtor duty is fulfilled by the non-violation of the pari passu clause. 
According to the pari passu clause, the debtor cannot be in default with one private creditor 
while serving another where both creditors hold identical claims. Using the Ghosal and 
Miller (2016) framework and extending it to allow for the obligatory commitment to the pari 
passu clause, we show that in equilibrium the debtor will make an offer at the beginning of 
the game that both types accept immediately. Though efficiency conditions are enhanced in 
that there is no delay with good faith, distributional implications remain. Compared to 
Ghosal and Miller’s results, the impatient creditor and the debtor are always better off with 
the pooled offer, while the patient creditor is only better off with low levels of heterogeneity 
and worse off otherwise.  
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5.2. The Enforcement of a Duty to Negotiate in Sovereign 
Debt Litigation187 
 
5.2.1. Introduction – The NML Legacy 
 
 
“If, in a galaxy not too far away, sovereign debt workouts are to have any chance of an 
orderly completion, a method must be found to neutralize this new weapon [of enforcement].” 
       (Buchheit and Gulati, 2017, p. 224) 
 
In sovereign debt litigation, it is difficult to overstate the significance of the NML litigation 
against the Republic of Argentina. 188 To overcome the problem of weak enforcement- a 
structural flaw in sovereign debt markets - a US court interpreted a boilerplate provision in 
the way that now makes it possible to give one set of creditor’s access to payment streams 
flowing to another. It was widely argued that the judicial interpretation disrupted historically 
established market practice. 189  This was backed by evidence of subsequent attempts to 
disavow what was viewed as ‘an aberrant judicial interpretation’.190 The ‘market did not in 
fact understand the clause to mean what the judiciary said the market understood the clause 
to mean’.191 From the perspective of the common law, the courts recourse to equity powers 
to injunct third party payment streams rather than issue money judgements to compensate 
claimants for breach of contract was incoherent. Further, the current direct impact of 
enforcement in US law on third party claims is clearly unjust. However the courts hands 
were tied. The standard contractual remedies which would otherwise include a right to 
compensation for breach would also hit the structural constraint when it came to attachment. 
The clear legacy of the NML decision was that it went against reasonable expectations of 
                                                
187 Some of the materials of this chapter appears published in Thomas D., Obi C. (2018), “Managing the NML 
legacy: Is it time to imply a common law good faith duty to negotiate in sovereign debt litigation?", Adam 
Smith Business School, University of Glasgow.  
188 See (Buchheit and Gulati, 2017); (Gelpern, 2016); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 
259, 260 (2d Cir. 2012) and NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-cv-6978 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 
2011) 
189 Id 
190 See (International Capital Market Association, 2014, Annex) listing sovereign debtors that adopted the 
revised pari passu clauses during the period from 1 October 2014 to 30 October 2016); See also (Choi et al., 
2016) reporting data on the revisions to pari passu clauses between 1 June 2011 and 30 May 2016. 
191 Id 
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commercial parties and detracted from rather than enhanced commercial certainty. More 
specifically, non-ratable payments – an established market practice – are now subject to 
judicial oversight. This paper examines the possibility of a doctrinal threshold that restricts 
judicial intervention to situations in which there is clear evidence of a failure of good faith 
duty to negotiate.  
5.2.1.1. Historical recognition of Good faith in Sovereign debt 
There is significant historical evidence to suggest that voluntary debt restructurings rely on 
an implicit market norm of good faith that facilitates cooperation.192 Historical evidence also 
indicates that sovereigns rarely strategically default. 193  By refusing to negotiate or 
acknowledge holdout claims Argentina can be seen as an outlier to this general historical 
trend. However, the official mechanisms in place to contain the consequences of 
opportunistic behaviour are fracturing.194 In an important sense, the NML legacy is also a 
function of the fundamental disruptions and transitions in official sector involvement 
facilitating sovereign debt workouts. Moreover, the IMF had no role to play in the eventual 
resolution of the Argentina’s repayment crisis.195 Though the factors that have facilitated 
consensual debt workouts such as creditor committees, long term relationships between 
commercial banks and debtor governments, the ‘take it or leave it’ offers made by sovereigns 
have changed overtime, there are identifiable trends that persist in the modern period of 
sovereign lending suggesting that mutual efforts are required by both parties to reach 
settlements, thus implying the good faith norm in sovereign debt contracts (Sturzenegger and 
Zettlemeyer, 2007). 
Figure 5.5 in the appendix provides a timeline of selected commercial court cases linked 
with the good faith duty. The figure shows that the implied duty has been historically 
recognised both under the common law and as a market norm. The next two sub-sections 
                                                
192 The historical evidence indicates that ‘the great majority of defaults in the nineteenth and twentieth century 
eventually led to some form of settlement between creditors and the debtor country’ implying the exercise 
of an implicit good faith norm in sovereign debt contracts. Following debt defaults, sovereigns usually 
engage creditors in debt negotiations and settlements were reached with the acceptance by supermajorities 
of creditors (80-90 percent) as specified in the offers. In most cases during this period, debt renegotiations 
are completed within a matter of months and creditor holdouts were not a significant problem. See 
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2007). 
193 In Buckley’s view, there is good evidence to suggest that default is not in the interest of domestic elites. See 
(Buckley, 2005). 
194 See (Gelpern, 2016). 
195 In many ways the markets are responding to these shifts, one change is the recent establishment of the 
sovereign credit default swap market where market actors can buy insurance to protect themselves from 
opportunistic behaviour. See (Gulati and Choi, 2006). 
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briefly looks at the interplay between key court decisions from lawsuits against Argentina 
within the sphere of the unique contracting environment of sovereign debt. 
5.2.1.2. Unique contracting environment of Sovereign debt 
Sovereign debt workouts settle in the unique contracting environment defined by a balance 
between weak enforcement 196  and the absence of statutory, sovereign bankruptcy 
protections197. The adoption by creditor states, first the US (and later the UK) of restricted 
sovereign immunity regimes, released commercial sovereign assets for attachment. 198 This 
arguably led to a rise in creditor litigation 199 . Sovereigns responded to this regime by 
immunising their assets from attachment. This led to a decline in creditor power,200 which 
was counterbalanced by creditor’s resistance to any form of sovereign bankruptcy 
protections. 201  This restored balance encouraged creditors and debtors to come to the 
negotiating table as options for recovery from the crisis for the debtor and from non-payment 
for creditors were limited.202  During this time, by and large the courts remained at the 
margins of debt workouts. That is until NML.203  
Because sovereign debt litigation occurs in a non-standard contracting context between 
sophisticated parties that do not hold unequal bargaining positions, the possibility of judicial 
intervention and the exercise of discretion outside the framework of organising principles, 
which state in general terms the requirements of justice, becomes real. This motivates our 
current examination. Our paper examines whether good faith is one such general organising 
principle that can be drawn upon to articulate a doctrinal threshold to limit enforcement 
through the NML route to specific situations discussed below. This is explored as one way 
to manage the NML legacy.   
                                                
196 Even though plaintiff-creditors obtain summary judgements, it remains difficult to enforce those judgments 
in light of the scarcity of attachable assets outside of the debtor’s jurisdiction. 
197 Many proposals have been made for sovereign bankruptcy regimes but have received insufficient market 
interest from leading creditor countries – For details on bankruptcy proposals, see (Buchheit et al., 2013).  
198 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in the US, and the State Immunity Act of 1978 (SIA) in the UK. 
After adoption of a restrictive immunity regime, a foreign sovereign could be sued for its commercial 
activities albeit the boundaries of “commercial” activity were contested. See (Weidemaier and Gulati, 2016) 
199See (Fisch and Gentile, 2004), (Schumacher et al., 2015)  
200 See (Lastra and Buchheit, 2015) 
201 See Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, Second Circuit (1985) 
(act of state doctrine defence was no longer applicable). Also see Buchheit et al. (2013) for details on 
attempts and obstacles to introduce bankruptcy proceedings. 
202 See (Gelpern, 2016) on the fracturing overarching political economy that sustained debt workouts. 
203 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 2012) and NML Capital Ltd. v. 
Republic of Argentina, No. 08-cv-6978 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011) 
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5.2.1.3. Key court decisions under Argentina’s sovereign debt dispute 
The NML ruling204 shifted this balance by giving creditors a legal right to attach payments 
to third party creditors without any countervailing enhancement in debtor protection. This 
skewed balance opens up the possibility of opportunistic behaviour otherwise confined to a 
set of aggressively litigant sub-set of creditors. 205  The ‘NML route’ entails the court’s 
exercise judicial intervention requiring ratable payments that attaches the payment streams 
to third-party creditors. This route dis-incentivises creditor participation, potentially 
delaying settlements and eventually increasing costs of negotiations. Interested parties would 
now need to take steps to protect themselves from this behaviour and the courts are now 
positioned to play a critical role in debt settlements. 
The White Hawthorne litigation206 that followed NML limited judicial intervention in the face 
of Argentina’s good faith behaviour towards NML claimants.  We argue that the post-NML 
cases which limit judicial intervention opens up a discussion into the kind of conduct that 
will trigger the NML route in two specific ways. First, what kinds of behaviour would count 
as good faith conduct? Second, in what way can the recognition of good faith behaviour 
draw on, expand or restrict the good faith norm implied in sovereign debt contracts? 
This paper examines whether a specific good faith duty to negotiate can function as a 
doctrinal threshold that limits the NML route in attachment proceedings. The paper is 
organised as follows: Section 2 investigates the salience of good faith in sovereign debt 
litigation i.e. good faith as an overarching organising principle in the US common law. 
Section 3 considers its importance as a market norm that reins in opportunistic behaviour. 
Section 4 reviews institutional arrangements recognising the good faith duty to negotiate as 
key for orderly sovereign debt workouts and restoration of capital market access. Section 5 
conceptualises how the common law doctrinal threshold will operate in attachment 
proceedings and how this will require judicial deference until such time as debt workouts 
settle. The last section concludes. 
                                                
204 Here, US district court granted injunctive relief to the holdouts, ordering that ‘whenever the Republic pays 
any amount due under the terms of the exchange bonds, it must concurrently or in advance pay the holdouts 
the same fraction of the amount due to them’ (“Ratable payment”). 
205 Such sub-set of creditors are often known as vulture funds, who buy distressed debt at steep discounts in 
secondary markets with the aim to litigate later for full face value plus interest amounts. 
206 See White Hawthorne, LLC v. Republic Argentina, No 16-cv-1042 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016) 
Chapter 5 
139 
 
5.2.2. Good faith and limits on the exercise of judicial discretion 
in commercial contracts 
In contract law generally, the meaning of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing implied 
into contracts has been notoriously unclear. 207 Black Law’s Dictionary defines “good faith” 
as “an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning”. Attempts to identify the 
scope of such a ‘nebulous standard’ are fraught and have caused common law courts 
“intractable difficulty”. This is matched by exasperation amongst contract scholars, ‘who 
have had very little success in agreeing on standards that might give court guidance.’208  This 
section examines whether the common law jurisprudence on good faith in commercial 
disputes delineates a template for judicial deference and explores the relevance (and 
feasibility) of this template in managing the NML legacy. 
Contract scholars highlight the difficulties of mismatches between ‘...what legislatures and 
judges say, and …what judges do.’209 For instance, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 
general definition of good faith includes both “honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing”210 In response to the question about when 
the duty is breached, the courts have unrestricted powers to determine what would constitute 
appropriate ‘post-formation’ conduct regardless of what is specified in the contract itself and 
what is viewed as commercially acceptable behaviour. This opens up, rather than limits, the 
policing of contract performance by the courts. The focus therefore is on the development of 
doctrinal tests to limit judicial intervention and contain the scope of a good faith inquiry. 
At a theoretical level, good faith contractual performance operates as a general organising 
principle in the common law of contract. This principle underpins and informs good faith 
obligations as these exist in different types of contractual relationships and contracting 
situations. Commercial litigation reveals a further manifestation of this organising principle. 
Here the courts engage in good faith discussions recognising the importance of private 
ordering and commercial certainty. As the discussion that follows indicates, good faith as an 
organising principle in this context typifies the view that contracting parties should have 
‘appropriate regard’ to the legitimate contractual interests of each other. In contract law, the 
                                                
207 It is assumed here that the U.C.C. does not apply in the context of sovereign debt contracts. However, the 
working assumption in this paper is that the standard specified in the Code will influence the common law 
doctrine as this develops in sovereign debt litigation. 
208 See (White and Summers, 2010, p. 14). 
209 MM 2051 
210 Id 
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minimum regard required is that a party not seek to undermine these legitimate, mutually 
contemplated interests, otherwise the party would be acting in bad faith.211 
This section clarifies the nature of a good faith determination in contract law disputes 
involving sophisticated commercial parties. To assess an allegation of a breach of a good 
faith and fair dealing norm, the courts engage in a threshold determination of whether there 
is ‘bad faith’- if there is, then there is a breach of the good faith norm. 
5.2.2.1. Katz v. Oak: No Coercive behaviour, No Good faith breach 
Katz212, for instance involved a discussion of what constitutes ‘coercive behaviour’ in a 
dispute between the plaintiff owners of long term debt securities issued by Oak.213 The issue 
of coercion was raised to enjoin the conclusion of an exchange offer and consent solicitation 
made by Oak to holders of its long-term debt. Katz and other similarly situated claimants 
alleged ‘that the linking of the offer and the consent solicitation constitutes a breach of a 
contractual obligation that Oak owes to its bondholders to act in good faith.’214 The main 
concern of the court was of course to identify the meaning of ‘coercion’ for the purpose of 
determining whether there was a breach as claimed. In doing so the court was avoiding the 
controversial business of identifying conduct that would constitute good faith. Instead the 
court was attempting to identify the relevant legal norm on the basis of which the coercive 
conduct would be deemed wrongful in contract law. In the absence of a clear finding of 
wrongfulness in contract law, the conduct claimed would not be coercive and there would 
be no breach of a good faith duty. The court is attempting to delineate a clear test or legal 
rule for wrongfulness. This test limits the exercise of judicial discretion in policing contract 
performance to evidence of wrongfulness.  
                                                
211 This distinguishes good faith from duties of a fiduciary. See Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, (Here the 
court recognized that good faith is a “general organizing principle” that underlies contract law, speaking to 
the obligation of honest performance in contracts)   
212 See Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986) – one of the initial cases to deal with a consent 
offer as a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings. 
213 Oak Industries offered to sell off certain assets to a company called Allied-Signal. In addition to purchasing 
these assets, Allied agreed to buy a portion of Oak’s debt provided that 85% of debtholders agreed to an 
exchange – employing a form of exit consent for bondholders who held out. Katz brought action against 
Oak claiming (1) the exchange offer was coercive because any ‘reasonable’ debtholder would take the offer, 
and (2) the exchange benefitted shareholders at the expense of debtholders. The court ruled that the offer 
was not coercive and thus not a breach of the implied good faith covenant, as the offer provided for a price 
higher than the current value of the bond should the debtholder wish to trade on the market. The court ran 
that the board of directors owed fiduciary duties to shareholders, and taking value from debtholders did not 
violate such duties. For more details see (Anderson-Parson et al., 2015) 
214 See supra note 212 at 878 
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The question then examined by the court was the ‘contractual theory’ behind the implied 
obligation ‘that each party to contract will act with good faith towards the other with respect 
to the subject matter of the contract’215  Referring to Corbin on Contracts216, the purpose of 
contract law according to the Katz court is ‘to enforce the reasonable expectations of the 
parties induced by promises’. This clearly delineates the judicial role in that the courts must 
‘look at the substance rather than the form of the agreement and to hold that the substance 
controls over form,’217 To achieve this purpose, the courts must recognise ‘that the parties 
occasionally have understandings or expectations that were so fundamental that they did not 
need to negotiate about those expectations.’ The duty of the court in this circumstance is to 
recognise that ‘the spirit of the bargain is higher than its duty to the technicalities of the 
language’218 In other words, the courts must defer to the spirit of the bargain and refrain from 
exercising its discretion ‘to scrutinize the motives of contracting parties’.219  
In a situation where good faith is implied as a contractual obligation to seek relief, the Katz 
court specified a doctrinal threshold that limits the exercise of judicial discretion to police 
the performance of covenants that link wrongfulness and good faith. This link between 
wrongfulness and good faith must be either expressed as a contract term or be in the mutual 
contemplation of the parties. In accordance with the appropriate legal test, in this case, the 
spirit of the bargain was that the parties did ‘not proscribe the act later complained of as a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith.’ 
 Katz opens up the possibility that in certain contract situations, wrongfulness can be the 
failure of a party to perform a specific duty.220 Following Katz, this section answers the 
hypothetical: if they could, would parties have inserted this specific duty into the contract? 
If yes, what would this duty be? More specifically (and controversially) what conduct would 
evidence the fulfilment of this duty? 
The common law courts exercise wide discretion in determining what constitutes conduct 
that evidences the breach of an implied good faith and fair dealing duty. However, as the 
                                                
215 See supra note 212 at 880 
216 See (Corbin and Perillo, 1993) 
217 Id 
218 Id 
219 See Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 
220 A recent attempt at doing this is the Bhasin case, supra note 219 
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analysis of Katz above shows, the judicial exercise of this discretion is limited by common 
law doctrinal tests. In the common law, this restriction is a matter of law rather than facts. 
5.2.2.2. Metropolitan Life v. Nabisco: No Denial of legitimate, mutually 
contemplated benefit, No Good faith breach 
The issue of the breach of an implied good faith duty was raised three years later in 
Nabisco.221 This case involved the announcement by Nabisco of a leveraged buy-out (LBO) 
of its shareholders. The announcement of the LBO led to a bidding war. The company 
eventually accepted an outside offer which the plaintiffs to the present action claimed 
‘drastically impaired the value of their bonds’ resulting in a multimillion dollar loss to them. 
They moved for summary judgment alleging the “breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing’. The implied covenant alleged was a duty ‘not to incur the debt 
necessary to facilitate the LBO and thereby betray what they claimed was the fundamental 
basis of their bargain with the company.’222 In a similar vein to Katz, the Nabisco court found 
that the ‘‘fruits’ of the plaintiffs indentures did not include an implied restrictive covenant 
that would prevent the incurrence of new debt to facilitate the recent LBO.’ In this case, the 
court held “that the plaintiffs do not invoke an implied covenant of good faith to protect a 
legitimate, mutually contemplated benefit of the indentures; rather they seek to have this 
court create an additional benefit for which they did not bargain.”223 The Nabisco court 
reinforces a doctrinal threshold that limits the exercise of judicial discretion in policing 
contract performance on the grounds of a breach of an implied good faith and fair dealing 
obligation. Like Katz, this is a legal threshold that requires judicial deference to the mutually 
contemplated ‘fruits’ of the indentures. This is not a factual inquiry that relies on the 
specification of conduct that would be viewed as either good faith conduct or using 
Summer’s excluder analysis conduct that evidences bad faith224. Thus the judicial role is 
confined to situations in which there is a denial of ‘a legitimate, mutually contemplated 
benefit. In the absence of such a denial there is no breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and by implication judicial deference to expressed terms. 
                                                
221 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6253 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 31, 1989) 
222 Id 1507 
223 Id 1519 
224 See (Summers, 1982, pp. 810, 816) proposing excluder-analysis approach to good faith. See also (Summers, 
1968, pp. 195,196). 
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5.2.2.3. CIBC v. Brasil: No Refusal to recognise contractual rights, No 
Good faith breach 
The issue of good faith was discussed in the case of CIBC v Banco Central do Brasil 225 by 
the US District Court. This dispute arose in the period before the securitization of debt and 
involved a loan agreement.226 The plaintiff creditors argued that the defendant bank (an entity 
exercising sovereign functions) was liable for breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing as the Bank had acted to prevent CIBC from declaring an acceleration.227 In 
rejecting the creditors claim, the court cited the law in New York which made it clear that  
 “Although the obligation of good faith is implied in every contract, it is the terms of 
the contract which govern the rights and obligations of the parties. The parties contractual 
rights and liabilities may not be varied, nor their terms eviscerated, by a claim that one party 
has exercised a contractual right but has failed to do so in good faith.” 
 Though the CIBC court recognised that good faith obligations are implied into every 
contract, contract performance would not be a ground to raise a claim of breach of this 
obligation.  In other words, in a line of reasoning that follows CIBC, would the implied 
common law duty be breached in the event there is objective evidence of ‘bad faith’? Yes. 
The doctrinal test here is that in the absence of ‘evisceration’ (‘wrongfulness’ in Katz), there 
is no breach of the implied term and therefore no reason for the court to police contract 
performance. One way to read this decision is that there is no scope for judicial intervention 
to enforce a good faith and fair dealing norm in the absence of evidence that reveals 
‘evisceration’, ‘bad faith’ or wrongfulness. 
5.2.2.4. NML v. Argentina: Refusal to recognise contractual rights, Good 
faith breach 
 
As mentioned above, what was unclear in the NML case was what would count as evidence 
of ‘bad faith’ conduct. Were the actions of a ‘recalcitrant’ debtor – refusal to accept and fulfil 
the orders of the court- evidence of bad faith? Or was the refusal of Argentina to recognise 
the contractual rights of NML and others evidence of bad faith? Or as the court found, were 
non-ratable payments – paying other creditors while refusing to pay the holdouts- evidence 
                                                
225 See CIBC Bank & Trust Co. v. Banco Cent. Do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
226 The MYDFA was ‘an agreement originally between the nation of Brazil, its Central Bank, and the numerous 
creditors holding Brazilian sovereign debt. Its purpose was to restructure that debt and to facilitate an orderly 
repayment of it, in the wake of Brazil’s inability to make timely repayments during the mid-1980’s.  
227 An acceleration clause is a contract term that on default triggers the payment of the full face value plus 
accrued interests. 
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of bad faith? Out of the three types of conduct clubbed together as ‘bad faith’, only one 
would qualify as ‘bad faith’ as per the legal analysis developed above – the refusal of 
Argentina to recognise the contractual rights of NML and others. This refusal denies the 
holdouts a mutually contemplated benefit – repayment. Following the common law test 
identified above, ‘recalcitrance’ 228  is not evidence of bad faith. Further, ‘non-ratable’ 
payments do not evidence bad faith. As far as a majority of the creditors were concerned, 
this was a ‘legitimate, mutually contemplated benefit and by all accounts consistent with 
party expectations. Non-ratable payments did not deny the plaintiffs mutually contemplated 
benefit – repayment. The benefits were denied by the refusal of the debtor to negotiate their 
outstanding claims. The only conduct that satisfies the bad faith test (and thus breaches the 
implied good faith norm) was the failure of the debtor to negotiate with or even recognise 
the contractual rights of NML and other similarly placed holdout creditors. It is consistent 
with the doctrinal analysis of the test for good faith, that judicial intervention is confined to 
clear evidence of ‘bad faith’ - a refusal to negotiate with all or a subclass of creditors. This 
opens up procedural issues: At which point of the proceeding would this test be applied? 
After default, is an explicit recognition of a duty to negotiate necessary to fulfil the implied 
good faith and fair dealing norm? This question leads us to the following section which 
draws on the salience of the discussion of the good faith norm as a common law template for 
judicial deference in sovereign debt disputes and explores its importance as a market norm 
in reining in opportunistic behaviour. 
5.2.3. Good faith in sovereign debt disputes 
In US law, as discussed, it is uncontroversial that a good faith norm is an overarching 
principle implied into commercial contracts.229 However, the sovereign debt context raises 
significant and distinct challenges. Sovereign debt contracts are unique. They are not discrete 
contracts but boilerplates with small variations in contract terms – the meanings of which 
are unclear.230 This raises challenges for contract interpretation,231 but in particular opens up 
the scope for judicial intervention in the face of the uncertainty about the meaning of contract 
terms. One of the aspects of the NML legacy is the uncertainty about the point at which the 
courts must defer to market practice and limit its discretion in policing contract performance. 
The focus of this section therefore is to examine the salience of the common law template of 
                                                
228 Recalcitrance in this context meant the refusal to obey court orders 
229 See supra note 212 
230 There is now a vast empirical literature examining the significance of these variations in contract terms. See 
(Gulati and Scott, 2013). 
231 See (Gulati and Choi, 2006) for the challenges to contract interpretation. 
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judicial deference identified above to sovereign debt disputes. This is with a view to manage 
the NML legacy. 
5.2.3.1. The common law duty is narrower than the duty discussed in the 
economic literature 
It has been argued that the implied obligation of good faith prohibits subordinating conduct. 
232  A leading approach to the common law good faith doctrine 233  is the “foregone 
opportunities” approach, by Professor Burton. In his economic analysis of good faith, 
Burton 234  states that a party breaches good faith when they abuse their discretion by 
attempting to recapture opportunities – in the form of resources committed for fulfilling their 
promised performance – foregone during contract formation.235 Burton argues that where 
contracts involve an unequal balance of discretion between the parties, the good faith 
doctrine serves to protect a “weaker” party against the “stronger” party’s assigned discretion.  
This is a contracting situation that is distinct from the sovereign debt context involving 
sophisticated parties who do not occupy unequal bargaining positions.  Therefore the good 
faith doctrine cannot be justified by the ‘unequal balance of discretion between the parties’. 
Rather, as discussed in the case law analysis above, the good faith doctrine has a role to play 
in policing the exercise of contract discretion given evidence of ‘bad faith’.  
A more promising way to think of the economic significance of the good faith doctrine is 
provided by Duke (2007). 236  Here a regime that ‘only enforces obligations expressly 
assumed under the contract’ is less efficient than that which ‘qualifies expressly assumed 
obligations by notions of good faith’ because the latter is more likely to ‘promote cooperation 
and contractual performance’. Parties consent to be bound by express obligations in contracts 
but are also ‘bound by the norms of the relationship’ between them, so that the implied duty 
of good faith takes effect when realities – of the evolving exchange relationship or a 
weakened cooperative spirit – strike as requiring reasonable conduct from parties in such 
situations. This approach recognises that good faith norms also have a function in sustaining 
contract performance (and cooperative behaviour). Unlike Burton, Duke recognises the 
significance of extra contractual norms that influence contractual performance. Examples 
                                                
232 See (Houh, 2003, pp. 1025, 1088). 
233 The Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 205 (1981) in the United States provides that “every contract 
imposes upon every party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement”. 
[Italics added for emphasis]. Similarly, Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (amended 2003)), 
as mentioned in Section 5.2.2, explicitly provides that “Every contract or duty within [the U.C.C.] imposes 
an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement” § 1-304.  
234 See (Burton, 1980, pp. 369, 372) proposing foregone opportunities approach to good faith. 
235 See (Houh, 2005). 
236 See (Duke, 2007). 
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would include the IMF references to good faith discussed below. However, Duke (2009) also 
argues for an expansive judicial role to provide a ‘performance-inducing high enforcement’ 
environment through imposing an obligation to act in good faith, as absent this, expectations 
about contract performance may fail if parties are only obliged to act solely according to the 
written agreement.  This makes the judicial role pivotal in enforcing an obligation in good 
faith - the NML legacy. One reading of the NML decision was that the courts generated a 
‘performance-inducing high enforcement’ through implicitly enforcing an obligation to act 
in good faith (as evidenced in the later case of White Hawthorne). In the face of weak 
enforcement, post-NML, an expansive judicial role in policing contract performance can 
easily become the only game in town. The argument developed in this paper makes a 
significantly limited case for judicial intervention – that the courts police performance only 
when there is clear evidence of ‘bad faith’, i.e. the denial of ‘mutually contemplated benefits’.   
5.2.3.2. Is opportunistic behaviour the same as bad faith? 
The standard defence of good faith and fair dealing in normative law and economics is based 
on constraining opportunistic behaviour.237 Courts police contract performance where one 
party (Party A) performs contrary to how the other party’s (Party B) understanding of their 
relationship even if the performance is not contrary to expressed terms. More specifically, 
courts enforce a good faith duty to police opportunistic behaviour as this behaviour would 
otherwise transfer wealth from B to A. This transfer incentivises parties to take the steps 
required to protect themselves. The courts can intervene to enforce a good faith norm and 
reduce the costs of protection. 238  In his discussion on good faith Bayley (2009)239 assumes 
that the courts can enforce a good faith norm, thereby address the problem of “contractual 
incompleteness” and remedy party opportunism. In so doing, the enforcement of this 
obligation can deal with incentivisation problems such as moral hazard240 and thereby obtain 
                                                
237 (Muris, 1981, p. 521) defines opportunism as follows: “a major problem occurs when a performing party 
behaves contrary to the other party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the 
agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party to the performer – a 
phenomenon that has come to be known as opportunistic behaviour”. Furthermore, Cohen (Cohen, 1992) 
describes opportunism as “any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the other party's reasonable 
expectations based on the parties' agreement, contractual norms, or conventional morality.” 
238 (Mackaay, 2012) suggests likewise that the market of creditors and debtors will incur a net social loss 
through attempts made by parties to protect themselves against opportunistic behaviours of their 
counterparts. Thus the duty of good faith provides certain safeguards that are less costly than the 
compensations individuals demand against the risk of bad faith conduct. 
239 See (Bayley, 2009). 
240 Moral hazard is the risk that a party to contract has not entered it in good faith, Definition sourced from 
(Gastineau and Kritzman, 1992) (In order words, a party has an incentive to take unusual risks in an attempt 
to reap unmerited benefits before the contract ends. It arises when both the parties have incomplete 
information about each other). 
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efficient and welfare maximising outcomes.241 It has been argued that the courts can reduce 
the costs of these steps by policing contractual performance with a requirement of good faith 
and fair dealing. There is however little clarity in the literature on how opportunistic conduct 
can be identified and whether this conduct can be reined in by the enforcement of a good 
faith duty. An inquiry into either dimension also envisages significant and expansive242 
intervention by non-specialist judges who must identify opportunistic conduct and then 
develop a good faith duty to reduce the cost of protection.243 Nevertheless, the common law 
test of bad faith is much narrower than the opportunistic conduct discussed in the economic 
literature since, as indicted above by the case law analysis, contract performance absent bad 
faith does not meet the threshold for the courts to police contract performance. By courts 
recognising a good faith duty to negotiate, the common law offers a template for judicial 
deference to ongoing debt negotiations. The following draws on institutional settings 
recognising this good faith duty to negotiate which reinforces such duty as an established 
market norm in sovereign debt.  
5.2.4. Good faith as an established duty to negotiate in sovereign 
debt markets  
Successful debt workouts indicate that market practice is informed by good faith and fair 
dealing norms. For instance, consensual debt workouts in the face of expressed clauses that 
mandate unanimous consent to modify terms evidence party expectations of implied good 
faith and fair dealing norms that inform post-default contract performance. Likewise, at the 
institutional level, good faith and fair dealing norms are recognized as part of wider post-
default stakeholder responses to debt negotiations. The IMF244 and the IIF245 for instance 
                                                
241 Bayley (2009) claims that greater transaction costs may be incurred by parties in order to protect against 
opportunism caused by contractual incompleteness. 
242(Mackaay, 2012) argues that the law needs an ‘open-ended arsenal of responses’ to opportunism as it may 
take an infinite number of forms and may be difficult to assess. This provides a strong case for why the good 
faith definition cannot be reduced to a definite set of acceptable behaviours, giving rise to the open-ended 
approach to good faith as suggested by Professor Summers. The open-ended instrument allows courts with 
considerable discretion to punish undesirable acts (Mackaay and Leblanc, 2003). However, as this would 
cause a problem of legal uncertainty and thus to address certain related opportunism concepts, some 
boundaries to the good faith norm may need to be in place to provide measures of legal certainty (Mackaay, 
2012). 
243 According to (Mackaay and Leblanc, 2003), good faith is the ‘exact opposite of opportunism’ i.e. to act in 
good faith is essentially to refrain from opportunistic conduct considered to be bad faith. Moreover, they 
mention that the cost of protecting oneself against opportunism means foregoing some gains from trade. As 
a result, the good faith obligation can be seen as a cost-effective legal doctrine to deter opportunism.  
244 See (International Monetary Fund, 1999), (International Monetary Fund, 2002), (International Monetary 
Fund, 2013), (International Monetary Fund, 2015Annex I).  
245  See (Institute of International Finance, 2013). 
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explicitly rely on good faith and fair dealing to reinforce the actions taken by market actors 
to protect themselves from opportunistic behaviour by debtors and creditors alike until such 
time as heterogeneous claims are settled. However, attempts to scrutinize, verify and enforce 
good faith and fair dealing norms in these formal and informal institutionalised settings have 
been repeatedly criticised as being vague and imprecise.246  
5.2.4.1. The IMF and a duty to negotiate 
The intervention of the IMF offering Lender of Last Resort support is conditional on 
evidence of the debtor fulfilling a good faith duty. In its revised LIA policy in 1999, the Fund 
permits continued support to debtors under LIA  provided, inter alia, that there are ‘firm 
indications suggesting that the debtor is negotiating in good faith’  ‘to reach a collaborative 
agreement with’ its private creditors. The requirement to negotiate in good faith was intended 
to address delays in bond restructuring on account of the lack of creditor coordination.247 A 
key problem with this policy was that the good faith criteria specified was vague and lacked 
definition.248 
In 2002 the IMF revisited the good faith criterion and set out the principles that would guide 
the dialogue between the debtor and its creditors. This revision elaborated the duty to 
negotiate. This policy change centred on the requirement that the debtor actively seek out 
ways in which to negotiate a settlement with its creditors as part of its overarching good faith 
obligation. 249  In particular, the policy paper set out practices for guiding negotiations 
between the debtor and a representative committee250 including agreeing to a standstill on 
litigation during negotiations. The policy relies on a determination of good faith compliance 
– an assessment of whether the debtor is negotiating with its creditors as recommended – in 
exchange for creditors agreeing to suspend litigation that would otherwise disrupt ongoing 
                                                
246 See (Lerrick, 2004).  
247 See (International Monetary Fund, 1999) 
248 See (Lerrick, 2004). 
249 These guiding principles include the following: the debtor should (1) seek early dialogue with creditors and 
continue until restructuring is complete; (2) share with all creditors information on the economic and 
financial situation, structural adjustment program, how restructuring plan would restore medium-term 
sustainability and the treatment of all different types of debt claims; (3) provide creditors with early 
opportunity to offer ideas on the design of restructuring strategies and instruments. The modality for 
conducting such a dialogue will be up to the individual debtor and thus case-specific. It will depend upon 
the complexity of the case, the degree of creditor heterogeneity, the readiness of creditors to negotiate within 
a formal collective framework e.g. a steering committee and the willingness of creditors to agree to a debtor’s 
offer that is within the financing parameters under the Fund-supported program. For more details, see 
(International Monetary Fund, 2002). 
250 Such practices are guided by principles underpinning the operations of bank steering committees in the 
1980s, adjusting for recent developments in the capital markets. 
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negotiations.251 This is consistent with formal bankruptcy proposals indicating for the need 
for a stay on litigation – a judicial deference to ongoing negotiations. 252 
The IMF policy also recognises the problems posed by increased litigation – a necessary 
consequence of creditor heterogeneity – where some creditors would choose to negotiate and 
others hold out for the face value of their debt. The policy recognised that aggressive creditor 
litigation had to be limited.  The LIA policy would ensure that distressed debtors are in 
receipt of funding despite creditors unwillingness to accept the financial parameters under 
the fund-supported program. This was possible on the condition that the debtor was making 
good faith efforts to negotiate to eventually achieve a collaborative agreement with its 
creditors.253  
5.2.4.2. IMF Good faith policy – Problems of vagueness 
The reliance by the IMF on structural adjustment as a component of LIA has been severely 
criticised for its lack of effectiveness in restoring financial stability.254 In response to the 
developing situations in Greece and Argentina, the IMF undertook a review of LIA.  This 
review found variations in the application of the ‘underlying guiding principles to assess 
whether the good-faith effort criterion is observed’. For instance ‘in four of the Fund-
supported programs reviewed (Dominican Republic, Grenada, Seychelles, and St. Kitts and 
Nevis), the LIA policy was considered met’.  Here ‘staff generally judged that the authorities 
were engaged in good faith efforts to reach a collaborative agreement with creditors.’ 
However, the problems of vagueness about the criterion itself plagued these efforts.255 The 
policy did not specify or list the types of conduct that would satisfy the good faith criteria. 
256  The criterion was ad hoc and sui generis and modified to each crisis situation as these 
arose. The salience of the duty to negotiate as part of the good faith criterion has however 
not been disputed. It is clear that the duty to negotiate is a context-specific understanding of 
                                                
251 Additional requirements include the following: (1) steering committee needs to be representative of all 
private creditors, where subcommittees may be created in more complex restructurings; (2) debtor shares 
all relevant information, including confidential information, for creditors to make informed decisions. 
Confidentiality of any material non-public information must be respected by the committee; (3) Costs 
incurred by the steering committee would be borne by the debtor.   
252 For details on bankruptcy proposals, see (Buchheit et al., 2013).   
253 See (International Monetary Fund, 2002). 
254 See (Mody, 2015). The IMF policy has also been criticised on the grounds of moral hazards, systemic risk 
to the banking system. Moreover, it has also been criticised for its poor performance in the Argentine debt 
crisis. 
255 It was also noted that ‘it was not always clear how a member’s adherence to the underlying guiding 
principles of the good faith criterion should be assessed.’ 
256 The lack of clarity has also been discussed in (Lerrick, 2004). 
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the good faith norm that informs party expectations about implied obligations in post-default 
contract performance. In addition to the IMF, other institutions recognise good faith as 
underpinning debtor’s obligations in post-default negotiations as discussed in the following 
subsection. 
5.2.4.3. The IIF and a duty to negotiate 
In 2004, the Institute of International Finance (IIF) - a global association of financial 
institutions, (IIF) 257 launched a voluntary code - Principles for ‘Stable Capital Glows and 
Fair Debt Restructuring’. This code of conduct applies to all sovereign debt issuers and their 
private sector creditors and is aimed at preserving the access of sovereign debtors to external 
financing during periods of financing distress (‘the Principles’). The code incorporates 
market-based guidelines for the behavior of both parties with the ‘aim of maintaining and 
promoting stable capital flows, financial stability and sustainable growth’. The Principles 
help to promote crisis prevention and resolution through sound debtor ‘policies, data 
transparency, open communication and dialogue with creditors’, as well as guiding good-
faith negotiations with representative creditors and discouraging discriminatory treatment of 
creditors. 258  The Principles explicitly recognize party expectations of good faith 
negotiations and contain an established process to monitor dialogues between debtors and 
its creditors to evaluate their adherence to good faith obligations. Like the IMF criterion, the 
IIF good faith principle elaborates the conduct required to fulfill a duty to negotiate. The 
negotiations must be a ‘Voluntary good faith process’259 respecting the ‘Sanctity of contracts’ 
where contractual rights are to remain respected and fully enforceable to uphold its integrity 
and voluntary nature. The process specifies ‘Vehicles of restructurings’ which require early 
post-default negotiations with representative creditors.260 The code also specifies ‘Creditor 
                                                
257 It was created by 38 banks of leading industrialized countries in 1983 in response to the international debt 
crisis of the early 1980s. Its mission is to ‘support the financial industry in the prudent management of risks; 
to develop sound industry practices; and to advocate for regulatory, financial and economic policies that are 
in the broad interests of its members and foster global financial stability and sustainable economic growth’. 
IIF members include commercial and investment banks, asset managers, insurance companies, sovereign 
wealth funds, hedge funds, central banks and development banks. It currently has close to 500 members 
from 70 countries. The Principles are monitored by two oversight bodies—the Group of Trustees and the 
Principles Consultative Group (PCG), which includes senior officials from developed and emerging-market 
countries, as well as senior bankers and investors. See https://www.iif.com/about and (UNESCAP, 2000). 
258 IIF principles has been reportedly useful particularly for sovereign debt restructuring episodes in Grenada 
(2015) and Ukraine (2015). Its 2015 report supports the agreement issuing from the negotiations between 
Ukraine and its private creditors, noting good-faith efforts made that suggested both parties were ‘flexible 
and willing to compromise’ See (Institute of International Finance, 2015, p. 8)  
259 IIF encourages the implementation of the good faith criteria under the IMF policy on lending into arrears to 
private creditors.  
260 An Institute of International Finance (2015) statement makes it clear that ‘an early discussion is necessary 
between the representative private creditor committee and the sovereign debtor, in close consultation with 
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committee policies and practices’ so that, for instance, when a creditor committee is formed, 
it should abide by established ethical standards, form a single committee at the earliest 
opportunity taking account the interests of all affected bondholders and so forth.261 Finally, 
the code specifies ‘debtor and creditor actions during restructuring’. So, for instance, debtors 
are expected to service debt partially while negotiations are ongoing as a sign of good faith 
and restrict further exchange controls on capital outflows. Though the Principles are applied 
flexibly on a case-by-case basis as individual country debt crises are unique, the IIF report 
as observed stresses good-faith negotiations as a key element of debt workouts, and a move 
away from this principle is considered ‘inconsistent with international understandings that 
have been historically at the heart of sovereign debt restructurings’.  
5.2.4.4. IIF acknowledges imprecision of “Good faith” duty 
However, the IIF report states that ‘it is very difficult to come to a precise definition of “good 
faith” and is neither wise nor practical to seek an exhaustive set of criteria to evaluate this 
principle.’ It rather proposes that participants in negotiations should ‘indicate when it 
believes that actions of another party have not been conducted in good faith’.  There is the 
recognition that ‘bad faith’ actions can be more easily identified to find that a good faith 
obligation has not been fulfilled. 
5.2.4.5. Good faith breach confined to identifiable bad faith conduct 
This discussion indicates the widespread acceptance amongst market actors and the official 
sector of a good faith and fair dealing expectation that informs debtor and creditor behavior 
in post-default context. However, this discussion also reveals that the identification of good 
faith conduct is a term of art and in most cases depends on a belief ‘that the actions of another 
party have not been conducted in good faith’. In other words, good faith discussions only 
                                                
the official sector, on the overall multi-year macroeconomic framework and objectives, including the broad 
fiscal policy targets and the underlying outlook for output growth and public debt under alternative 
assumptions on the debt restructuring.’ 
261 The creditor committee must also protect confidential information arising from negotiations and commit 
not to use this information for trading purposes; act as a ‘communication link’ between the debtor and its 
creditors through which the debtor can present its economic program and financing proposals; collect and 
analyse economic data, as well as gather, evaluate and disseminate creditor input on financing proposals. 
Further, IIF acknowledges the concerns expressed by debtors regarding the set-up of creditor committees. 
Some of the concerns include underrepresented creditor committee group, sour relationships with certain 
committee members hampering negotiation prospects, committee process ‘slow-moving and causes delay 
in the resolution of a debt problem’ and untrustworthiness of certain types of creditors in ‘maintaining 
required confidentiality and obeying applicable trading standards. The IIF report introduced practices to 
address these problems, ranging from cooperation and trust development to the management of diversity of 
the creditor community.  
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arise in the face of identifiable ‘bad faith’ conduct. This conduct is then policed either within 
the frameworks of the IMF policy or that of the IIF voluntary code.   
This section describes an established market expectation of good faith and fair dealing norms 
that elaborates a duty to negotiate, as well as clarifies what key stakeholders perceive to be 
“legitimate, mutually contemplated benefits”. The mechanisms by which these norms are 
enforced are unclear but effective. The discussion provides the context-specific 
understanding that recognising a duty to negotiate fulfils the legitimate interests of 
contracting parties. The failure to negotiate is thus in breach of a good faith and fair dealing 
norm triggering the exercise of judicial intervention – the NML route. In the following 
section, we provide a clarification of how the recognition of a common law good faith duty 
to negotiate can achieve the purpose of confining judicial intervention to situations in which 
there is objective evidence of ‘bad faith’ – the denial of mutually contemplated benefits – 
and offers a template of judicial deference to debt workout negotiations in the absence of 
such evidence. The options discussed are with a view to managing the NML legacy. 
5.2.4.6. Other considerations: Good faith duty in addressing 
opportunism and other inefficiencies 
Common forms of opportunism identified in the sovereign debt literature are moral hazard, 
holdout and free-riding.   The economic effect of the good faith duty on the moral hazard 
incentive associated with over-borrowing is not very clear. The good faith requirement may 
address over-borrowing concerns beyond its capacity to repay as the debtor knows that, 
during negotiations post default, he must be able to demonstrate to creditor(s) that 
unsustainable debt is caused by domestic/external shocks and not the government decision 
to accumulate debt beyond repayment capacity.  
On the flipside, the good faith duty could make default more frequent: Buchheit et al. (2013) 
identifies certain pathologies of sovereign debt such as the debtor moral hazard associated 
with the presence of international bailouts. If the debtor’s fulfilment of the good faith duty 
means that it will receive bailout or contracts become less enforceable (as courts recognise 
good faith conduct), then the debtor may be incentivised to strategically default and make 
good faith efforts to negotiate. Though the debtor must fulfil the transparency requirement, 
it may not be so obvious to the creditor(s) the debtor’s motive to default. Additionally, 
identified in the Buchheit et al. (2013) were other issues raised in relation to the restructuring 
of unsustainable debt – “restructuring too little” and “restructuring too late”. Good faith 
negotiations post default help to discourage procrastination of debt restructuring. As 
mentioned in the Brookings report, prolonged defaults can reduce a sovereign’s capacity and 
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willingness to pay.  The mutual duty to negotiate in good faith helps mitigate this effect by 
increasing the predictability of debt workouts and thereby reducing the lack of investor 
confidence – that would otherwise have spill-over effects on various parts of the economy – 
and thereby reducing the associated costs of default.  
Moreover, International Monetary Fund (2013) describes some incentivisation problems that 
may lead to prolonged delays in restructuring debt. It reports cases in which countries, such 
as Greece (in 2012), Belize (in 2007), Seychelles (in 2009) and St. Kitts and Nevis (in 2012), 
delayed restructuring because, among other things, there was the loss of market access and 
the ‘ample availability of official financing’. The good faith condition for official financing 
will thus reduce these incentives to delay restructuring by encouraging early dialogue 
between the debtor and its creditor(s).  On the issue of restructuring-too-little, the good faith 
duty may also have a desirable outcome. International Monetary Fund (2013) reports that 
some restructuring episodes of certain countries were based on overoptimistic debt 
sustainability assessments with relatively small face-value haircuts that did not eventually 
restore debt sustainability, resulting to insufficient debt reduction. The duty to engage in 
good faith negotiations, according to the IMF lending to arrears policy, requires that the 
debtor offers the creditor terms consistent with the parameters of the Fund-supported 
program. Therefore, making offers in good faith consistent with debt sustainability, in the 
likes of the IMF LIA policy, may help address the problem of restructuring too little.  
It has been widely advocated that courts should consider various strands of opportunism 
from both the creditor and debtor side when finding a violation of the implicit duty to act in 
good faith. For example, Goldmann (2014) indicates that the good faith principle provides a 
basis for a duty on both the sovereign debtor and its creditor(s) to enter into negotiations in 
the presence of unsustainable debt, as well as a basis for a duty by the creditor to not obstruct 
negotiations and to not engage in abusive behaviour aimed at extracting preferential 
settlement. Goldmann (2014) mentions the precision of the practicalities of such good faith 
duties will determine the effectiveness of debt workouts. Goldmann (2016) argues that the 
“incremental approach”, i.e. good faith as a general principle of law between statutory and 
contractual avenues for sovereign debt workouts, improves the legal framework for 
governing restructurings. He argues here that the good faith principle potentially smoothen 
debt workouts through the ‘duty to negotiate, exercise of voting rights in good faith and the 
refrainment of abusive holdout strategies’.  A further pointed he made has that a duty to 
negotiate is a necessary to achieve greater debt sustainability. Furthermore, UNCTAD 
argues that workouts must be smooth to achieve such (UNCTAD, 2015a).   
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A mutual good faith duty, thus, has the potential to produce more ex-ante benefits, for 
example encouraging sovereign debtor to engage in good policy efforts, incentivising the 
creditors to undertake cautious lending decisions and increase creditor coordination. In 
relation to transparency, IMF good faith duty requires sharing of information, including the 
economic and financial state of the nation, causes of the crisis etc. and creditors may use 
such information during early negotiations with the debtor to assess whether the default was 
an ‘ability to pay’ problem or a ‘willingness to pay’ problem or whether an ‘ability to pay’ 
problem was caused by reckless fiscal policies or bad luck from negative domestic and 
external shocks. Therefore, the good faith duty requiring honesty and transparency in 
negotiations will incentivise the sovereign to undertake sound fiscal policies to ensure 
inability to pay is caused by bad luck to convince creditors to a debt restructuring. Another 
concern is creditor moral hazard, associated with reckless lending behaviour due to the 
presence of official sector bailouts. Good faith requirement may mitigate this problem by 
requiring the creditors to engage in a constructive dialogue with the debtor to the end of 
achieving a debt restructuring. Creditors knowing that they must engage in negotiations for 
debt write-down will alter their incentives towards undertaking cautious lending decisions. 
Furthermore, the December 2016 district court decision of White Hawthorne vs Argentina 
suggests that future holdout creditors will not be able to invoke the ratable-payment 
interpretation of the pari passu clause – that gave rise to the court injunction order on third 
party payments in NML vs Argentina – when the debtor negotiates in good faith with the 
holdouts. Therefore, the good faith duty reduces the availability of powerful enforcement 
tools, reducing the incentives to free-ride on other holdouts litigation strategies and thus 
increases creditor coordination.  
In relation to fairness, the debtor’s duty to negotiate in good faith enforces equal treatment 
of all creditors dissuading arbitrary discrimination against them. Therefore the good faith 
duty enhances equitable outcomes in debt restructuring by the requirement to share relevant 
information to all creditors and provide creditors the opportunity to make counter 
restructuring offers whether bilaterally or through creditor committees. 
5.2.5. Operationalizing a proposed good faith duty to negotiate 
There is a gap in sovereign debt good faith jurisprudence in so far as there is no legal doctrine 
derived from the implied good faith duty that applies to all non-standard debt contracts 
disputes. Following the NML case, it can be argued that this gap leads to unjust outcomes 
that are ad hoc and imprecise and thereby diminish commercial certainty. Therefore this 
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section discusses three scenarios to clarify how this implied good faith duty to negotiate can 
be operationalized to provide a template for judicial deference.  
In the first scenario, the courts are under pressure to ‘level up’ from established market 
practice to find attachable assets in the context of weak enforcement. For example, in the 
face of Argentina’s refusal to negotiate with the holdouts - the NML courts levelled up from 
market practice (non-ratable payments) to overcome weak enforcement (‘the NML route’). 
In the second scenario, we see a shift. The Hawthorne court was levelling down as they 
confined the wide application of the NML route (and its role) to certain conduct. However 
this was partial as they did not specify the kinds of conduct that would trigger the NML 
route.262 The third scenario provides a complete levelling down approach where the court 
defers to good faith market norms of the parties. Here, we provide a template for judicial 
deference in cases where the good faith duty to negotiate is fulfilled. The doctrinal test of 
whether or not a good faith duty to negotiate is fulfilled should be further informed by 
evidence presented by the debtor government, the IIF and the IMF, the latter – as indicated 
above – explicitly work within a good faith framework. 
5.2.5.1. NML: Ratable payment interpretation: the court levels-up 
Argentina declared a moratorium on its outstanding debt in 2001 and made no payments for 
six years on plaintiffs bonds while simultaneously fulfilling its obligations on its exchange 
bonds. Argentina refused to negotiate with one set of its creditors. In doing so, the debtor 
was ‘eviscerating’ the contractual rights to payment of this set of creditors. Argentina then 
renewed the moratorium in its budget laws every year after 2001. It also declared in the 
prospectus documents associated with the two exchange offers in 2005 and 2010 that “it is 
not in a legal … position to pay” the defaulted debt. It also enacted legislation “the Lock law” 
which had been given full effect in its domestic courts. This law prohibited Argentine 
officials from paying defaulted bondholders and the courts were barred from recognising the 
judgements of the US courts. This refusal to negotiate with a subset of its creditors 
eviscerates263 their claims and as such is in breach of the good faith norms embedded both in 
IMF policy and the IIF Principles.  
                                                
262 (Buchheit and Gulati, 2017)  
263 In the NML decision the court found that “the combination of Argentina’s executive declarations and 
legislative enactments have insured that plaintiffs beneficial interests do not remain direct, unconditional, 
unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and that any claims that may arise from the 
Republic restructured debt do have priority in Argentine courts over claims arising out of the Republic’s 
unstructured debt”. In a subsequent decision the court found that in response to the Supreme Court denial of 
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In the NML decision the court found that the debtor had engaged in what was described as 
continuing conduct that effectively “ranked its payment obligations to the plaintiffs below 
those of the exchange bondholders”. Given the context of weak enforcement and the 
dismantling political economy modular framework that would otherwise have constrained 
opportunistic behaviour, there was pressure on the court to enforce the contracts, attach 
payment streams with a ‘ratable’ interpretation and in the process ‘level up’ from market 
understandings of good faith conduct that included non-ratable payments. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates how the court levels up from market understandings of what constitutes 
good faith conduct in two specific ways – contract interpretation and injunction. The contract 
interpretation relied on a literal interpretation of the pari passu clause. The court interpreted 
the clause to mean ratable payments. It followed then that all instances of non-ratable 
payments were contractual breaches as opposed to legitimate exercises of debtor discretion. 
In the absence of a doctrinal test that recognised a general duty to negotiate and required 
objective evidence of evisceration, the court relied instead on an unlimited list of 
objectionable debtor conduct and intention not to obey the orders of the court264 to interpret 
a contract term. 
For the purposes of granting a remedy, the scope of what would count as recalcitrance is 
wide and extends from legislative conduct to statements by governments in the press. As 
mentioned, the identified array of recalcitrant behaviour was not confined to the ‘Republic’s 
failure to make scheduled payment on its debt’. In the court’s view, the conduct extended to 
the ‘Republic’s “entire and continuing course of conduct”, including harmful legislation like 
the Lock Law265 and incendiary statements by the former administration’.266 
The wide scope of what would constitute objectionable debtor behaviour to trigger the ‘pari 
passu’ interpretation was reaffirmed by the 2nd Circuit. This would include the ‘combination 
                                                
the Republic’s for a writ of certiorari, the Republic announced a plan to pay on the exchange bondholders 
without making a payment to the FAA bondholders. The court also found that it had attempted to make two 
additional payments. The court also found that between 2014 and 2015 the Republic made three illegal 
transfers with the intention of paying on the exchange bonds without making a ratable payment to the lead 
plaintiffs. 
264 The court also noted that the Argentine president announced it would “pay on the exchange bonds ‘but not 
one dollar’ to the ‘vulture funds’”. The court also noted the economy ministers statements that “Argentina 
isn’t going to change its position of not paying vulture funds … we will continue to follow that policy despite 
any ruling that could come out of any jurisdiction, in this case New York”. Finally, the court noted a post 
on the presidential website that criticised “the ‘justice system’ overseen by it and the statement that it was 
“evidently … unaware of its own legislation”.  
265 The Lock Law declared that “The national Executive Power may not, with respect to the [defaulted] bonds…, 
reopen the swap process established in the [2005 exchange offer]. The national state shall be prohibited from 
conducting any type of in-court or private settlement with respect to the [defaulted] bonds …” 
266 NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246-265 (2d Cir. 2012) at 20 (on Argentina’s 
executive declarations and legislative statements) 
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of Argentina’s executive declarations and legislative amendments” and its entire “course of 
conduct”. This finding of recalcitrance opens up two further sub-questions - what would 
count as recalcitrant conduct? Would for instance objective evidence of the debtor engaging 
in negotiations with only a minority or a larger subset of creditors willing to participate in a 
debt restructuring, that would inter alia entail a write-down in the face of their debt, be 
viewed as recalcitrance triggering the pari passu clause? 
The injunction that followed the pari passu interpretation led to default. The court 
overlooked the third party claims violated in the process. When viewed from the perspective 
of the implied good faith duty as an organising principle, a standard that underpins all 
contracting situations, the court was responding to what was really an evisceration of the 
terms of the contract as far as the holdouts were concerned. The debtor was acting in bad 
faith and as such was in breach of the implied duty. However, to overcome the reality of 
weak enforcement, the court was levelling up from a market recognised good faith duty to 
negotiate. In the absence of a clear specification of conduct that constitutes recalcitrance, 
levelling-up expands the exercise of judicial discretion to decide what conduct constitutes 
good faith.  
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Figure 5.2 – NML ‘ratable’ payments interpretation – Levels up 
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5.2.5.2. White Hawthorne: Partial levelling down 
The White Hawthorne action267 filed by another group of holdouts (Hawthorne holdouts HH) 
followed. Here HH sought to rely on the NH (NML Holdouts) interpretation of the pari 
passu clause in settlement of their outstanding claims on defaulted debt. They argued that 
the Republic violated the clause every time payments were made to NH and their claims 
remained unsettled. The SDNY denied their claims.  
The court found that debtor’s intention to disobey the orders of the court had changed. The 
debtor had by then repealed its offending “legislative enactments’ and the [new] 
administration aimed to settle with its creditors. This is the finding that the debtor was now 
intending to negotiate with the holdouts and therefore obeying its orders. In other words, in 
the absence of evidence indicating evisceration of creditor claims, the attachment orders 
would not be forthcoming. 
Further, ‘the “combination” and “course” of conduct that formerly constituted breach of 
the…clause no longer exists.’268 Here it can also be argued that the debtor’s good faith 
conduct excludes its bad faith conduct.  In addition, the court found that the ‘[p]laintiffs have 
not also alleged sufficient new conduct on behalf of the Republic to establish a breach of the 
[clause].’269 On these grounds, it was held that ‘the Republic is not now270’ in breach of the 
clause.  
In 2015, President Marci was elected and had stated publically “I want to be clear: we need 
to reach a settlement. We want to find a fair agreement”. The special master “praised the 
Republic’s leaders for their “courage and flexibility in stepping up and dealing with this long 
festering problem which was not of their making”. Here the special master was recognising 
the problem as a mutual problem as opposed to one that only involved objectionable debtor 
conduct. This expectation that “the Republic’s good faith efforts to resolve the disputes could 
be matched by the “strong hope” that all bondholders will accept settlement soon”. This was 
also the view taken by the US government as expressed by the then Treasury Secretary.  
In the order of Feb 19 2016, the court acknowledged that “the Republic has shown a good 
faith willingness to negotiate with the holdouts”. The court contrasted this good faith 
behaviour with the prior conduct of the Republic with the finding that it “never seriously 
                                                
267 Like the NML case, the White Hawthorne case was an action seeking breach of contract damages based on 
non-payment of principal and interest as well as injunctive relief and money damaged for violation of the 
pari passu clause. See White Hawthorne v. Argentina, supra note 206 (slip op. at 2) 
268 Id at 8 
269 Id 
270 Emphasis in italics 
Chapter 5 
160 
 
pursued negotiations towards settlement. Instead the Republic’s leadership engaged in 
rhetoric, calling plaintiffs “vultures” or “financial terrorists” while showing open contempt 
for” its rulings. The court also found that the special master could not coax the Republic to 
negotiate with plaintiffs in good faith in 2014 and 2015.   
Though the court recognised good faith contract performance as an organising principle in 
the common law that eventually informed resolution of the dispute, the court however does 
not specify that there is a common law duty to negotiate that applies to all contracts or that 
this duty is necessary to facilitate just outcomes as it is in line with reasonable expectations 
of parties in this specific non-standard contracting context. The court also does not specify 
that there is a need for the recognition of such a duty that will enhance rather than detract 
from commercial certainty. The Hawthorne decision leaves gaps in the common law position 
in relation to good faith. This means that further incremental steps are required to make the 
law more coherent, just and in line with party expectations. 
Hawthorne also restricts the application of the NML decision. In effect confining judicial 
intervention to very specific situations, though the court does not specify what these 
situations are. The court clarifies that the NML decision “does not control the interpretation 
of all pari passu clauses or the obligations of other sovereign debtors under pari passu 
clauses in other debt instruments.” The NML decision would also not be automatically 
triggered to stop non-ratable payments. Thus the court found that a sovereign debtor does 
not breach its “pari passu clause every time it pays one creditor and not the other, or even 
every time it enacts a law disparately affecting a creditor’s rights”. Therefore, the court 
acknowledges that non-ratable payments are legitimate exercises of debtor discretion in 
contract performance. In addition, the court reaffirmed the observation that “Argentina’s 
extraordinary behaviour was a violation” of the clause and found “that cases like this one are 
unlikely to occur in the future because Argentina has been a uniquely recalcitrant debtor”. 
Argentina is thus recognised as an outlier though the court does not specify what conduct 
would trigger the NML route.  When compared to NML, the Hawthorne court partially levels 
down to market understandings as their findings implicitly acknowledge the good faith 
norms that sustain cooperative behaviour (See Figure 5.3). 
In a further clarification of the NML decision, the Hawthorne court finds that default per se 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to trigger the pari passu interpretation.  There 
must be objective evidence of ‘recalcitrance’ over and above default. Thus the court finds 
that ‘[n]onpayment on defaulted debt alone is insufficient to show breach’ of the clause. 
More evidence of objectively ascertained recalcitrance is required to establish a breach. In 
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the case Exp-Imp. Bank of Republic of China v. Grenada 271 where the issue of non-ratable 
payments was raised as well, the court re-affirmed the legal position that a sovereign debtor 
does not breach the clause ‘every time it pays one creditor and not another, or even every 
time it enacts a law disparately affecting a creditor’s rights.’272 In that case the court found 
that these ‘two facts alone fail to establish Grenada’s liability.’ The court was 
exceptionalizing the NML litigation. In the absence of a clear doctrinal test of what conduct 
could trigger the NML route, Hawthorne was an improvement on NML although many 
questions remain unanswered. 
A reading of the decisions therefore indicates that the courts are relying on clear, objective 
evidence of evisceration of the kind found in CIBC. In Hawthorne the court implicitly 
affirms the view that absent such evidence, the debtor must show objective evidence of a 
willingness to engage in negotiations with a view to eventually settling creditor claims.273 
Absent the evidence of evisceration and the presence of an objective evidence of a good faith 
duty to negotiate, the exercise of contractual discretion through non-ratable payments is 
permissible in US law.274 This was further affirmed by the Court of Appeal where it found 
that ‘one creditor’s interest in getting paid is not cognizably affected” by payment to another 
creditor.’ 275  Does it follow then that in the absence of clear evidence of evisceration 
combined with objective evidence of a good faith duty to negotiate (in acknowledgment of 
extant contractual claims), the courts will defer to the good faith dealings of the debtor? 
 
                                                
271 Exp.-Imp. Bank of Republic of China v. Grenada, No. 13-cv-1450, 2013 WL 4414875, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
19, 2013). In White Hawthorne v. Argentina, the court stated that the “pleadings alleged that Grenada had 
paid exchange bondholders without paying holdouts and had indicated it would not pay holdouts: "Those 
two facts alone fail to establish Grenada's liability")”. See White Hawthorne v. Argentina supra note 206 at 
7. 
272 In White Hawthorne v. Argentina, the court stated also that “The U.S. Government, too, has maintained the 
position that simply paying some creditors and not others does not constitute breach. See White Hawthorne 
v. Argentina supra note 206 at 7. See also Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Reversal 
at 12, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105(L) (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2012) and Br. for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of the Republic of Argentina's Pet. for Panel Reh'g 8s Reh'g En 
Banc, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105(L) (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012). 
273 Provided the claims are made expeditiously and do not breach the statute of limitations as was the case in 
White Hawthorne 
274 This interpretation is consistent with a finding in Hawthorne where the court found the Plaintiff’s theory of 
separate money damages for each breach of the pari passu clause to be legally unsound. Here the court found 
that ‘even if payment to one creditor constituted breach, that act inflicts no separate monetary damage on 
other holders of unpaid debt. This however comes with the proviso that the debtor is engaged in evidencing 
a willingness to pay – fulfil its outstanding obligations.  
275 White Hawthorne case cited “NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d at 240; cf. D.C.A. 
Grantor Trust v. Republic of Argentina, 616 F. App'x 30, 32 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that there are no 
"'superior' rights to property based on subjective equitable assessments of the relative fairness of paying one 
class of creditor or another")”. 
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Figure 5.3 – White Hawthorne – Partial levelling down 
 
However, as the courts did not specify the kinds of conduct considered as evidence of 
evisceration, this raises problems that may prove to be intractable and stymie debt workouts. 
In Hawthorne, the court is focussed on determining conduct relevant to assessing the 
intention of the debtor. Though it accepts the non-ratable payment by the debtor as legitimate 
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exercise of contractual discretion it does this through the lens of debtor intention. We argue 
that the courts do not go far enough, the decision is only partially but not fully levelled down 
in a manner that requires the court to defer to good faith market norms. This leaves open the 
possibility of judicial intervention to disrupt and stymie ongoing debt workouts. In the 
following sub-section, we discuss the completely levelled-down framework premised on 
such deference.  
 
5.2.5.3. Alternate proposal: Complete levelling down 
In the earlier sections, the NML decision was re-read against the backdrop of good faith and 
fair dealing as an organising principle in US law. It was shown that in the absence of a clear 
doctrinal test premised on the recognition of a general good faith duty to negotiate in all 
sovereign debt contracts, the NML decision was inconsistent, unjust and contrary to the 
reasonable expectations of contracting parties. In the absence of a doctrinal test that would 
make the common law more coherent and just, the NML decision will detract from 
commercial certainty.    
The alternative proposed in this section works within the constraints imposed on debtor and 
creditor power. It assumes the availability of the pari passu ratable payments interpretation 
as an enforcement option. This proposal is motivated by concerns raised in the literature 
about the sustainability of debt workouts on account of the availability of this option in US 
law. The proposition developed relies on interventions by the courts in earlier decisions that 
prevented the disruption of debt settlements in the face of good faith actions by the debtor to 
renegotiate its outstanding obligations. It specifically relies on an earlier iteration of the 
NML litigation in 2005.276  In this case the court deferred to the good faith actions of 
Argentina as it successfully renegotiated its debt obligations and refused to attach swapped 
bonds that were being exchanged as part of the settlement.277 Similarly, here we propose that 
the court level down to good faith and fair dealing duty as market norms that facilitate 
cooperative behaviour and as such limit the NML route to instances where there is clear 
evidence of evisceration of contractual rights. Our template for judicial deference is 
supported by recommendations in the SDRM 278 , the UNCTAD Roadmap 279  and the 
Brookings Report 280 . Each of these contains a template for judicial deference to debt 
                                                
276 See NML Capital Ltd v. The Republic of Argentina (13 March 2005) (S.D.N.Y 2005) 
277 See (Miller and Thomas, 2007). 
278 See (Krueger, 2001). 
279 See (UNCTAD, 2015a). 
280 See (Buchheit et al., 2013)   
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workouts negotiations which extends the litigation standstills that form an integral part of 
statutory corporate and municipal bankruptcy proceedings. 
In our proposal on default enforcement, litigation will proceed to protect third party creditor 
claims. The courts will initially issue summary judgements. It is when the holdout creditors 
seek to attach payments that are flowing to third party creditors that the court is required to 
make a threshold determination of whether the parties are fulfilling their implied good faith 
and fair dealing duties. This proposal makes the case for the recognition of an implied good 
faith duty to negotiate that is consistent with historical evidence of successful debt 
restructurings, the reluctance of debtors to default and the reluctance of the courts to disrupt 
debt settlements. The proposal also draws on the articulation of a good faith duty in the IMF 
lending into arrears policy and the IIF. It offers an alternative that requires a court to ensure 
that attempts to trigger the NML route would have to satisfy the doctrinal threshold – thus, 
in the absence of objective evidence of evisceration the assumption is that the debtor is 
engaged in good faith negotiations with all its creditors.  
As indicated in Figure 5.4, there are two options under the doctrinal test that may result. One 
is which the doctrinal test is satisfied and the NML route is triggered – the left side of Figure 
5.4. The second option is which the doctrinal test is not satisfied and the courts defer to 
ongoing debt workout negotiations triggered – the right side of Figure 5.4. When the 
doctrinal test is not satisfied, it opens up two options. One in which all claims (holdouts and 
exchange bondholders) are satisfied and the other in which outstanding claims remain, this 
would then trigger the NML route. If in the event that there is no objective evidence of 
evisceration then a good faith duty to negotiate is fulfilled raising no grounds for intervention. 
This good faith duty once established will require the court to defer to this norm. The two 
options, one being that the workout settles with a majority of bondholders and the holdouts 
are paid as per their pending claims – consistent with historical evidence discussed earlier in 
this paper – and the other option being that some creditors are not settled despite successful 
debt workouts with the majority bondholders. In the latter option, there is evidence of 
evisceration and the court will find a breach of the implied good faith and fair dealing duty 
triggering the NML route. 
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Figure 5.4 – Complete levelling down 
 
In addition to specifying the good faith duty to negotiate that is consistent with market 
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role and follows the practice in common law courts where the exercise of judicial discretion 
is limited to evidence of evisceration.  This proposal restores the balance between weak 
enforcement and the absence of bankruptcy protections necessary to facilitate consensual 
debt workouts. It does this to the extent that in the absence of evisceration, it proposes a 
template for judicial deference to ongoing debt negotiations. 
Our proposition leads to the question about whether the NML case would have been decided 
differently had the court deferred to good faith market norms. The answer to that is both yes 
and no. If the case was levelled down and deferred to the implied duty, then the ‘non-ratable’ 
payments would not be viewed as a contractual harm but as the legitimate exercise of debtor 
discretion. As such the court would not have attached the payments made in good faith to 
third parties, but would have recognised acceleration and ordered monetary compensation to 
the holdouts as contractual remedies for breach.  
5.2.6. Conclusions 
This paper recognises that the political economy that has so far sustained debt workouts is 
fracturing and that courts are positioned to play a more interventionist role.281 This paper 
speaks to concerns raised by scholars about the implications of the NML decision on 
voluntary debt workouts. Concerns include that the court’s expansive role will further upset 
the balance that ensures debtors and creditors come to the negotiating table and thereby 
stymie the successful renegotiation of debtor obligations.282 This motivates the articulation 
of a doctrinal threshold that requires judicial deference – to the market accepted standards 
of exercises of debtor discretion – rather than intervention.  
In examining the applicability of the common-law duty, the paper finds there is a general 
consensus that good faith conduct has the potential to smoothen and facilitate sustainable 
debt workouts. Market understanding of good faith debtor conduct informed by contract 
design and official sector policies further reinforce the salience of the duty. Moreover, in the 
face of express clauses that require unanimous consent to modify payment terms, the 
historical evidence indicates that party expectations of good faith and fair dealing sustain the 
consensual resolution of sovereign debt crises.283 However, the good faith criterion under 
                                                
281 Interventionist role is required particularly because of legacy debt requiring unanimous consent to debt 
restructuring in the likes of NML v. Argentina. 
282 There are the wider and more pressing issue of extending the exclusion of sovereigns from capital markets 
and diminishing the prospects of recovery and growth down the line. These are the central tenets of the IIF 
principles discussed above. 
283 See (Porzecanski, 2005, p. 326figure 4). 
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official frameworks remains undefined and too vague to specify types of conduct that will 
satisfy the good faith requirement.  
This paper concludes that there is in fact a clear definition, informed by market expectations 
and common law, that good faith is the duty to negotiate. Justified by the high-enforcement 
environment created by the court injunction that ensued NML v. Argentina, we propose a 
template for judicial deference conditional on debtor satisfying a good faith duty to negotiate. 
Such opportunity allows the good faith market norms evolved to restrain the consequences 
of opportunistic behaviour and thereby facilitate successful debt workouts.  
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5.2.7. Appendix 
 
  
Allied Bank v. Costa Rica: 
Collapse of Comity 
defence and Act of State 
defence. 
1985 1986 1989 1995 2005 2013 2014 2016 2011 
Katz v. Oak: Katz alleged Oak 
consent solicitation was in breach 
of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealings. Court 
rejected this claim. 
 
Metropolitan Life v. Nabisco: Claimant alleged 
Nabisco violated an implied good faith duty by 
incurring debt to facilitate a leveraged buy-out 
(LBO). Court found that contracts did not include 
an implied covenant that restricts the acquisition of 
debt to advance the LBO.     
 
CIBC Bank v. Brazil: CIBC argued that 
Brazil breached the implied covenant in 
retaining its debt to prevent 
acceleration. The court denied this 
claim, recognising that Brazil was 
merely exercising its contractual right to 
do so. 
NML v Argentina: The court initially 
granted plaintiffs’ attachment orders on 
swapped bonds exchanged in a 2005 debt 
settlement). The court later, in 
recognition of good faith efforts by 
Argentina, vacated the orders after 
finding that it will abort the successful 
conclusion of the swap. 
 
NML v Argentina: NML claimed Argentina 
breached the pari passu clause by servicing 
exchange bonds but not theirs, and enacting the 
Lock law. The court found such to be true, that 
Argentina eviscerated the plaintiff’s contractual 
rights. Finding suggested Argentina breached the 
implied duty of good faith. 
  
Exp.-Imp. Bank v. Grenada: Plaintiff alleged 
breach of pari passu clause through servicing 
exchange bonds but ignoring court 
judgements awarded to plaintiffs, and 
declaring no-payment on pay non-tended debt 
until resources become available. The court 
held that these facts alone were insufficient to 
establish a breach of clause. 
 
Bhasin v Hrynew: The court recognised good faith 
as a general organizing principle of common law. It 
applies to all contracts to act honestly in the 
performance of obligations, according to the 
reasonable expectations of commercial parties. 
 
White Hawthorne, v. Argentina: Plaintiff 
claimed breach of Pari passu clause after 
settlement with NML. The court found 
that Argentina’s previous conduct that 
breached the clause no longer existed: It 
had repealed the Lock law and intended to 
negotiate with holdouts, thus showing 
good faith efforts. 
Figure 5.5 - Timeline of cited cases 
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6. Conclusion 
In the context of the current ad hoc and informal sovereign debt resolution process, there 
remains a strong call for further work on the redesigning of contracts and the adoption of an 
international bankruptcy procedure. Researchers agree that debt renegotiations are plagued 
with inefficiencies and there is disagreement on the expected outcomes on sovereign debt 
lawsuits. Though legal enforcement remains a difficult challenge for creditors, recent court 
decisions suggest that “a new creditor weapon has been uncloaked” (Buchheit and Gulati, 
2017, p. 224): holdouts have been granted a weapon to block the sovereign from servicing 
creditors’ bonds, who voluntarily participated in a debt restructuring, until the debtor ratably 
satisfies their claims. This has the potential to impede the achievement of the objectives of 
sovereign debt restructuring processes, as such strong creditor remedy will remain a 
possibility (Guzman, 2016). Only time will tell, intensifying the need for an international 
framework that can coordinate parties’ ex post default to more orderly resolution process. 
As long as there is no market appetite for an international law governing sovereign debt, 
judgement passed in one jurisdiction will remain non-binding on other jurisdictions, creating 
further legal incoherence and introducing different variations in legal interpretations.284 This 
problem aggravates information asymmetries across parties, steering baseless optimism and 
biased beliefs that could have been reduced had there been a statutory or arbitration process 
that may coordinate parties’ expectations ex-post default.  This thesis has provided an 
account of how such problems may cause inefficiencies in debt restructuring. Without a 
system that provides clear rules on adjudicating claims, history – on the frustrating 
experiences of the economic and social costs of default – will continue to repeat itself.  
This thesis not only sheds new insights into causes of observed delays in sovereign debt 
negotiations, but is also relevant for evaluating the effectiveness and design of policy 
interventions in sovereign debt markets. The joint use of both economic and legal reasoning 
to understand the gaps in debt restructuring architecture, its subsequent findings and 
suggested proposals are relevant for the continuing debate on an internationally agreed 
sovereign debt restructuring procedure. The thesis study of heterogeneous beliefs of court 
enforcement and the good faith principle are two distinct approaches in examining the pre-
existing inefficiencies in the current framework. 
                                                
284 For example, a ruling from a UK judge in February 2015 clarified that English bonds with the pari passu 
clause were governed by English law and not New York law, putting some limits to US judicial rulings. See 
(Guzman and Stiglitz, 2015a). 
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Though it is true that sovereign debt litigation plays a key role in disciplining governments 
to repay (Schumacher, 2015), large magnitudes of distressed sovereign debts in today’s 
financial markets remain attractive for vulture funds who are highly patient in litigation and 
optimistic of their prospects in court should the sovereign default. In addition, as noted in 
Stiglitz and Guzman (2014), aggressive enforcement of sovereign debt makes defaults 
unduly costly. With the little-to-no application of theory in modelling sovereign debt 
litigation dynamics, this thesis provides a stepping stone for future theoretical research in 
sovereign debt legal enforcement and impediments it has on debt restructuring.  
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